From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id EBAE9C433F5 for ; Mon, 16 May 2022 15:21:36 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S238220AbiEPPVe (ORCPT ); Mon, 16 May 2022 11:21:34 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:58382 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S245242AbiEPPVH (ORCPT ); Mon, 16 May 2022 11:21:07 -0400 Received: from frasgout.his.huawei.com (frasgout.his.huawei.com [185.176.79.56]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 957B73BFA5; Mon, 16 May 2022 08:21:00 -0700 (PDT) Received: from fraeml704-chm.china.huawei.com (unknown [172.18.147.207]) by frasgout.his.huawei.com (SkyGuard) with ESMTP id 4L22t60LyDz67n8d; Mon, 16 May 2022 23:17:18 +0800 (CST) Received: from mscphispre00059.huawei.com (10.123.71.64) by fraeml704-chm.china.huawei.com (10.206.15.53) with Microsoft SMTP Server (version=TLS1_2, cipher=TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256_P256) id 15.1.2375.24; Mon, 16 May 2022 17:20:58 +0200 From: Konstantin Meskhidze To: CC: , , , , , Subject: [PATCH v5 08/15] landlock: TCP network hooks implementation Date: Mon, 16 May 2022 23:20:31 +0800 Message-ID: <20220516152038.39594-9-konstantin.meskhidze@huawei.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: <20220516152038.39594-1-konstantin.meskhidze@huawei.com> References: <20220516152038.39594-1-konstantin.meskhidze@huawei.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7BIT Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII X-Originating-IP: [10.123.71.64] X-ClientProxiedBy: mscpeml500001.china.huawei.com (7.188.26.142) To fraeml704-chm.china.huawei.com (10.206.15.53) X-CFilter-Loop: Reflected Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: netdev@vger.kernel.org Support of socket_bind() and socket_connect() hooks. Its possible to restrict binding and connecting of TCP types of sockets to particular ports. Its just basic idea how Landlock could support network confinement. Signed-off-by: Konstantin Meskhidze --- Changes since v3: * Split commit. * Add SECURITY_NETWORK in config. * Add IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET) if a kernel has no INET configuration. * Add hook_socket_bind and hook_socket_connect hooks. Changes since v4: * Factors out CONFIG_INET into make file. * Refactoring check_socket_access(). * Adds helper get_port(). * Adds CONFIG_IPV6 in get_port(), hook_socket_bind/connect functions to support AF_INET6 family. * Adds AF_UNSPEC family support in hook_socket_bind/connect functions. * Refactoring add_rule_net_service() and landlock_add_rule syscall to support network rule inserting. * Refactoring init_layer_masks() to support network rules. --- security/landlock/Kconfig | 1 + security/landlock/Makefile | 2 + security/landlock/net.c | 159 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ security/landlock/net.h | 25 ++++++ security/landlock/ruleset.c | 15 +++- security/landlock/setup.c | 2 + security/landlock/syscalls.c | 63 ++++++++++++-- 7 files changed, 261 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) create mode 100644 security/landlock/net.c create mode 100644 security/landlock/net.h diff --git a/security/landlock/Kconfig b/security/landlock/Kconfig index 8e33c4e8ffb8..10c099097533 100644 --- a/security/landlock/Kconfig +++ b/security/landlock/Kconfig @@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ config SECURITY_LANDLOCK bool "Landlock support" depends on SECURITY && !ARCH_EPHEMERAL_INODES + select SECURITY_NETWORK select SECURITY_PATH help Landlock is a sandboxing mechanism that enables processes to restrict diff --git a/security/landlock/Makefile b/security/landlock/Makefile index 7bbd2f413b3e..53d3c92ae22e 100644 --- a/security/landlock/Makefile +++ b/security/landlock/Makefile @@ -2,3 +2,5 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK) := landlock.o landlock-y := setup.o syscalls.o object.o ruleset.o \ cred.o ptrace.o fs.o + +landlock-$(CONFIG_INET) += net.o \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/security/landlock/net.c b/security/landlock/net.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..9302e5891991 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/landlock/net.c @@ -0,0 +1,159 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only +/* + * Landlock LSM - Network management and hooks + * + * Copyright (C) 2022 Huawei Tech. Co., Ltd. + */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "cred.h" +#include "limits.h" +#include "net.h" + +int landlock_append_net_rule(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset, + u16 port, u32 access_rights) +{ + int err; + + /* Transforms relative access rights to absolute ones. */ + access_rights |= LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_NET & + ~landlock_get_net_access_mask(ruleset, 0); + + BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(port) > sizeof(uintptr_t)); + mutex_lock(&ruleset->lock); + err = landlock_insert_rule(ruleset, NULL, port, + access_rights, LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE); + mutex_unlock(&ruleset->lock); + + return err; +} + +static int check_socket_access(const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain, + u16 port, access_mask_t access_request) +{ + bool allowed = false; + layer_mask_t layer_masks[LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_NET] = {}; + const struct landlock_rule *rule; + access_mask_t handled_access; + + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!domain)) + return 0; + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(domain->num_layers < 1)) + return -EACCES; + + rule = landlock_find_rule(domain, port, + LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE); + + handled_access = init_layer_masks(domain, access_request, + &layer_masks, sizeof(layer_masks), + LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE); + allowed = unmask_layers(rule, handled_access, + &layer_masks, ARRAY_SIZE(layer_masks)); + + return allowed ? 0 : -EACCES; +} + +static u16 get_port(const struct sockaddr *const address) +{ + /* Gets port value in host byte order. */ + switch (address->sa_family) { + case AF_UNSPEC: + case AF_INET: + { + const struct sockaddr_in *const sockaddr = + (struct sockaddr_in *)address; + return ntohs(sockaddr->sin_port); + } +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) + case AF_INET6: + { + const struct sockaddr_in6 *const sockaddr_ip6 = + (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address; + return ntohs(sockaddr_ip6->sin6_port); + } +#endif + } + return 0; +} + +static int hook_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, + int addrlen) +{ + const struct landlock_ruleset *const dom = + landlock_get_current_domain(); + + if (!dom) + return 0; + + /* Check if it's a TCP socket */ + if (sock->type != SOCK_STREAM) + return 0; + + /* Get port value in host byte order */ + switch (address->sa_family) { + case AF_UNSPEC: + case AF_INET: +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) + case AF_INET6: +#endif + return check_socket_access(dom, get_port(address), + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP); + default: + return 0; + } +} + +static int hook_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, + int addrlen) +{ + const struct landlock_ruleset *const dom = + landlock_get_current_domain(); + + if (!dom) + return 0; + + /* Check if it's a TCP socket */ + if (sock->type != SOCK_STREAM) + return 0; + + /* Get port value in host byte order */ + switch (address->sa_family) { + case AF_INET: +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) + case AF_INET6: +#endif + return check_socket_access(dom, get_port(address), + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP); + case AF_UNSPEC: + { + u16 i; + /* + * If just in a layer a mask supports connect access, + * the socket_connect() hook with AF_UNSPEC family flag + * must be banned. This prevents from disconnecting already + * connected sockets. + */ + for (i = 0; i < dom->num_layers; i++) { + if (landlock_get_net_access_mask(dom, i) & + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP) + return -EACCES; + } + } + } + return 0; +} + +static struct security_hook_list landlock_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { + LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_bind, hook_socket_bind), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_connect, hook_socket_connect), +}; + +__init void landlock_add_net_hooks(void) +{ + security_add_hooks(landlock_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(landlock_hooks), + LANDLOCK_NAME); +} diff --git a/security/landlock/net.h b/security/landlock/net.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..da5ce8fa04cc --- /dev/null +++ b/security/landlock/net.h @@ -0,0 +1,25 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only +/* + * Landlock LSM - Network management and hooks + * + * Copyright (C) 2022 Huawei Tech. Co., Ltd. + */ + +#ifndef _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_NET_H +#define _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_NET_H + +#include "common.h" +#include "ruleset.h" +#include "setup.h" + +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET) +__init void landlock_add_net_hooks(void); + +int landlock_append_net_rule(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset, + u16 port, u32 access_hierarchy); +#else /* IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET) */ +static inline void landlock_add_net_hooks(void) +{} +#endif /* IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET) */ + +#endif /* _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_NET_H */ diff --git a/security/landlock/ruleset.c b/security/landlock/ruleset.c index ea9ecb3f471a..317cf98890f6 100644 --- a/security/landlock/ruleset.c +++ b/security/landlock/ruleset.c @@ -671,7 +671,7 @@ access_mask_t get_handled_accesses( } break; default: - break; + return 0; } return access_dom; } @@ -763,6 +763,19 @@ access_mask_t init_layer_masks(const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain, } } break; + case LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE: + for_each_set_bit(access_bit, &access_req, + LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_NET) { + if (landlock_get_net_access_mask(domain, + layer_level) & + BIT_ULL(access_bit)) { + (*layer_masks)[access_bit] |= + BIT_ULL(layer_level); + handled_accesses |= + BIT_ULL(access_bit); + } + } + break; default: return 0; } diff --git a/security/landlock/setup.c b/security/landlock/setup.c index f8e8e980454c..8059dc0b47d3 100644 --- a/security/landlock/setup.c +++ b/security/landlock/setup.c @@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ #include "fs.h" #include "ptrace.h" #include "setup.h" +#include "net.h" bool landlock_initialized __lsm_ro_after_init = false; @@ -28,6 +29,7 @@ static int __init landlock_init(void) landlock_add_cred_hooks(); landlock_add_ptrace_hooks(); landlock_add_fs_hooks(); + landlock_add_net_hooks(); landlock_initialized = true; pr_info("Up and running.\n"); return 0; diff --git a/security/landlock/syscalls.c b/security/landlock/syscalls.c index 812541f4e155..9454c6361011 100644 --- a/security/landlock/syscalls.c +++ b/security/landlock/syscalls.c @@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ #include "cred.h" #include "fs.h" #include "limits.h" +#include "net.h" #include "ruleset.h" #include "setup.h" @@ -74,7 +75,8 @@ static void build_check_abi(void) { struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr; struct landlock_path_beneath_attr path_beneath_attr; - size_t ruleset_size, path_beneath_size; + struct landlock_net_service_attr net_service_attr; + size_t ruleset_size, path_beneath_size, net_service_size; /* * For each user space ABI structures, first checks that there is no @@ -90,6 +92,11 @@ static void build_check_abi(void) path_beneath_size += sizeof(path_beneath_attr.parent_fd); BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(path_beneath_attr) != path_beneath_size); BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(path_beneath_attr) != 12); + + net_service_size = sizeof(net_service_attr.allowed_access); + net_service_size += sizeof(net_service_attr.port); + BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(net_service_attr) != net_service_size); + BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(net_service_attr) != 10); } /* Ruleset handling */ @@ -299,9 +306,9 @@ static int add_rule_path_beneath(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset, * Informs about useless rule: empty allowed_access (i.e. deny rules) * are ignored in path walks. */ - if (!path_beneath_attr.allowed_access) { + if (!path_beneath_attr.allowed_access) return -ENOMSG; - } + /* * Checks that allowed_access matches the @ruleset constraints * (ruleset->access_masks[0] is automatically upgraded to 64-bits). @@ -323,13 +330,54 @@ static int add_rule_path_beneath(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset, return err; } +static int add_rule_net_service(struct landlock_ruleset *ruleset, + const void *const rule_attr) +{ +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET) + struct landlock_net_service_attr net_service_attr; + int res; + u32 mask; + + /* Copies raw user space buffer, only one type for now. */ + res = copy_from_user(&net_service_attr, rule_attr, + sizeof(net_service_attr)); + if (res) + return -EFAULT; + + /* + * Informs about useless rule: empty allowed_access (i.e. deny rules) + * are ignored by network actions + */ + if (!net_service_attr.allowed_access) + return -ENOMSG; + + /* + * Checks that allowed_access matches the @ruleset constraints + * (ruleset->access_masks[0] is automatically upgraded to 64-bits). + */ + mask = landlock_get_net_access_mask(ruleset, 0); + if ((net_service_attr.allowed_access | mask) != mask) + return -EINVAL; + + /* Denies inserting a rule with port 0 */ + if (net_service_attr.port == 0) + return -EINVAL; + + /* Imports the new rule. */ + return landlock_append_net_rule(ruleset, net_service_attr.port, + net_service_attr.allowed_access); +#else /* IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET) */ + return -EAFNOSUPPORT; +#endif /* IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET) */ +} + /** * sys_landlock_add_rule - Add a new rule to a ruleset * * @ruleset_fd: File descriptor tied to the ruleset that should be extended * with the new rule. - * @rule_type: Identify the structure type pointed to by @rule_attr (only - * LANDLOCK_RULE_PATH_BENEATH for now). + * @rule_type: Identify the structure type pointed to by @rule_attr: + * LANDLOCK_RULE_PATH_BENEATH or LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE. * @rule_attr: Pointer to a rule (only of type &struct * landlock_path_beneath_attr for now). * @flags: Must be 0. @@ -340,6 +388,8 @@ static int add_rule_path_beneath(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset, * Possible returned errors are: * * - EOPNOTSUPP: Landlock is supported by the kernel but disabled at boot time; + * - EAFNOSUPPORT: @rule_type is LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE but TCP/IP is not + * supported by the running kernel; * - EINVAL: @flags is not 0, or inconsistent access in the rule (i.e. * &landlock_path_beneath_attr.allowed_access is not a subset of the rule's * accesses); @@ -375,6 +425,9 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE4(landlock_add_rule, case LANDLOCK_RULE_PATH_BENEATH: err = add_rule_path_beneath(ruleset, rule_attr); break; + case LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE: + err = add_rule_net_service(ruleset, rule_attr); + break; default: err = -EINVAL; break; -- 2.25.1