* [PATCH ipsec] xfrm: state: match with both mark and mask on user interfaces
@ 2020-06-30 6:15 Xin Long
2020-06-30 9:08 ` Tobias Brunner
2020-07-07 13:29 ` Dan Carpenter
0 siblings, 2 replies; 6+ messages in thread
From: Xin Long @ 2020-06-30 6:15 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: netdev
Cc: Steffen Klassert, Herbert Xu, David S. Miller, Jamal Hadi Salim,
Sabrina Dubroca, Tobias Brunner
Similar to commit 4f47e8ab6ab79 ("xfrm: policy: match with both mark and
mask on user interfaces"), this patch is to match both mark and mask for
state on these user interfaces:
xfrm_state_lookup_byaddr_user
xfrm_state_lookup_user
xfrm_state_update
xfrm_state_find
xfrm_state_add
__xfrm_state_lookup_byaddr(struct xfrm_mark)
__xfrm_state_lookup(struct xfrm_mark)
xfrm_find_acq_byseq
xfrm_stateonly_find
mark.v == x->mark.v && mark.m == x->mark.m
and leave the mark match for tx/rx path only:
xfrm_state_lookup_byaddr
xfrm_state_lookup
__xfrm_state_lookup_byaddr(u32)
__xfrm_state_lookup(u32)
(mark & x->mark.m) == x->mark.v
Fixes: 3d6acfa7641f ("xfrm: SA lookups with mark")
Tested-by: Tobias Brunner <tobias@strongswan.org>
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
---
include/net/xfrm.h | 21 ++++++++---
net/core/pktgen.c | 4 +--
net/key/af_key.c | 4 +--
net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c | 96 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------
net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c | 34 +++++++++---------
5 files changed, 107 insertions(+), 52 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/net/xfrm.h b/include/net/xfrm.h
index 5c20953..eb22627 100644
--- a/include/net/xfrm.h
+++ b/include/net/xfrm.h
@@ -1480,7 +1480,8 @@ struct xfrm_state *xfrm_state_find(const xfrm_address_t *daddr,
struct xfrm_tmpl *tmpl,
struct xfrm_policy *pol, int *err,
unsigned short family, u32 if_id);
-struct xfrm_state *xfrm_stateonly_find(struct net *net, u32 mark, u32 if_id,
+struct xfrm_state *xfrm_stateonly_find(struct net *net,
+ const struct xfrm_mark *mark, u32 if_id,
xfrm_address_t *daddr,
xfrm_address_t *saddr,
unsigned short family,
@@ -1491,6 +1492,11 @@ int xfrm_state_check_expire(struct xfrm_state *x);
void xfrm_state_insert(struct xfrm_state *x);
int xfrm_state_add(struct xfrm_state *x);
int xfrm_state_update(struct xfrm_state *x);
+struct xfrm_state *xfrm_state_lookup_user(struct net *net,
+ const struct xfrm_mark *mark,
+ const xfrm_address_t *daddr,
+ __be32 spi, u8 proto,
+ unsigned short family);
struct xfrm_state *xfrm_state_lookup(struct net *net, u32 mark,
const xfrm_address_t *daddr, __be32 spi,
u8 proto, unsigned short family);
@@ -1499,6 +1505,12 @@ struct xfrm_state *xfrm_state_lookup_byaddr(struct net *net, u32 mark,
const xfrm_address_t *saddr,
u8 proto,
unsigned short family);
+struct xfrm_state *xfrm_state_lookup_byaddr_user(struct net *net,
+ const struct xfrm_mark *mark,
+ const xfrm_address_t *daddr,
+ const xfrm_address_t *saddr,
+ u8 proto,
+ unsigned short family);
#ifdef CONFIG_XFRM_SUB_POLICY
void xfrm_tmpl_sort(struct xfrm_tmpl **dst, struct xfrm_tmpl **src, int n,
unsigned short family);
@@ -1533,7 +1545,8 @@ struct xfrmk_spdinfo {
u32 spdhmcnt;
};
-struct xfrm_state *xfrm_find_acq_byseq(struct net *net, u32 mark, u32 seq);
+struct xfrm_state *xfrm_find_acq_byseq(struct net *net,
+ const struct xfrm_mark *mark, u32 seq);
int xfrm_state_delete(struct xfrm_state *x);
int xfrm_state_flush(struct net *net, u8 proto, bool task_valid, bool sync);
int xfrm_dev_state_flush(struct net *net, struct net_device *dev, bool task_valid);
@@ -1938,14 +1951,12 @@ static inline bool xfrm_dst_offload_ok(struct dst_entry *dst)
}
#endif
-static inline int xfrm_mark_get(struct nlattr **attrs, struct xfrm_mark *m)
+static inline void xfrm_mark_get(struct nlattr **attrs, struct xfrm_mark *m)
{
if (attrs[XFRMA_MARK])
memcpy(m, nla_data(attrs[XFRMA_MARK]), sizeof(struct xfrm_mark));
else
m->v = m->m = 0;
-
- return m->v & m->m;
}
static inline int xfrm_mark_put(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct xfrm_mark *m)
diff --git a/net/core/pktgen.c b/net/core/pktgen.c
index b53b6d3..4264f84 100644
--- a/net/core/pktgen.c
+++ b/net/core/pktgen.c
@@ -2233,7 +2233,7 @@ static inline int f_pick(struct pktgen_dev *pkt_dev)
/* If there was already an IPSEC SA, we keep it as is, else
* we go look for it ...
*/
-#define DUMMY_MARK 0
+static const struct xfrm_mark dummy_mark = {0, 0};
static void get_ipsec_sa(struct pktgen_dev *pkt_dev, int flow)
{
struct xfrm_state *x = pkt_dev->flows[flow].x;
@@ -2247,7 +2247,7 @@ static void get_ipsec_sa(struct pktgen_dev *pkt_dev, int flow)
x = xfrm_state_lookup_byspi(pn->net, htonl(pkt_dev->spi), AF_INET);
} else {
/* slow path: we dont already have xfrm_state */
- x = xfrm_stateonly_find(pn->net, DUMMY_MARK, 0,
+ x = xfrm_stateonly_find(pn->net, &dummy_mark, 0,
(xfrm_address_t *)&pkt_dev->cur_daddr,
(xfrm_address_t *)&pkt_dev->cur_saddr,
AF_INET,
diff --git a/net/key/af_key.c b/net/key/af_key.c
index 979c579..e48fb94 100644
--- a/net/key/af_key.c
+++ b/net/key/af_key.c
@@ -1359,7 +1359,7 @@ static int pfkey_getspi(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, const struct sadb_
}
if (hdr->sadb_msg_seq) {
- x = xfrm_find_acq_byseq(net, DUMMY_MARK, hdr->sadb_msg_seq);
+ x = xfrm_find_acq_byseq(net, &dummy_mark, hdr->sadb_msg_seq);
if (x && !xfrm_addr_equal(&x->id.daddr, xdaddr, family)) {
xfrm_state_put(x);
x = NULL;
@@ -1422,7 +1422,7 @@ static int pfkey_acquire(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, const struct sadb
if (hdr->sadb_msg_seq == 0 || hdr->sadb_msg_errno == 0)
return 0;
- x = xfrm_find_acq_byseq(net, DUMMY_MARK, hdr->sadb_msg_seq);
+ x = xfrm_find_acq_byseq(net, &dummy_mark, hdr->sadb_msg_seq);
if (x == NULL)
return 0;
diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c
index 8be2d92..dd566d6 100644
--- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c
+++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c
@@ -927,7 +927,17 @@ xfrm_init_tempstate(struct xfrm_state *x, const struct flowi *fl,
x->props.family = tmpl->encap_family;
}
+static inline bool xfrm_state_mark_match(const struct xfrm_mark *m, u32 mark,
+ struct xfrm_state *x)
+{
+ if (m)
+ return m->v == x->mark.v && m->m == x->mark.m;
+
+ return (mark & x->mark.m) == x->mark.v;
+}
+
static struct xfrm_state *__xfrm_state_lookup(struct net *net, u32 mark,
+ const struct xfrm_mark *m,
const xfrm_address_t *daddr,
__be32 spi, u8 proto,
unsigned short family)
@@ -942,7 +952,7 @@ static struct xfrm_state *__xfrm_state_lookup(struct net *net, u32 mark,
!xfrm_addr_equal(&x->id.daddr, daddr, family))
continue;
- if ((mark & x->mark.m) != x->mark.v)
+ if (!xfrm_state_mark_match(m, mark, x))
continue;
if (!xfrm_state_hold_rcu(x))
continue;
@@ -953,6 +963,7 @@ static struct xfrm_state *__xfrm_state_lookup(struct net *net, u32 mark,
}
static struct xfrm_state *__xfrm_state_lookup_byaddr(struct net *net, u32 mark,
+ const struct xfrm_mark *m,
const xfrm_address_t *daddr,
const xfrm_address_t *saddr,
u8 proto, unsigned short family)
@@ -967,7 +978,7 @@ static struct xfrm_state *__xfrm_state_lookup_byaddr(struct net *net, u32 mark,
!xfrm_addr_equal(&x->props.saddr, saddr, family))
continue;
- if ((mark & x->mark.m) != x->mark.v)
+ if (!xfrm_state_mark_match(m, mark, x))
continue;
if (!xfrm_state_hold_rcu(x))
continue;
@@ -981,13 +992,12 @@ static inline struct xfrm_state *
__xfrm_state_locate(struct xfrm_state *x, int use_spi, int family)
{
struct net *net = xs_net(x);
- u32 mark = x->mark.v & x->mark.m;
if (use_spi)
- return __xfrm_state_lookup(net, mark, &x->id.daddr,
+ return __xfrm_state_lookup(net, 0, &x->mark, &x->id.daddr,
x->id.spi, x->id.proto, family);
else
- return __xfrm_state_lookup_byaddr(net, mark,
+ return __xfrm_state_lookup_byaddr(net, 0, &x->mark,
&x->id.daddr,
&x->props.saddr,
x->id.proto, family);
@@ -1051,7 +1061,6 @@ xfrm_state_find(const xfrm_address_t *daddr, const xfrm_address_t *saddr,
int acquire_in_progress = 0;
int error = 0;
struct xfrm_state *best = NULL;
- u32 mark = pol->mark.v & pol->mark.m;
unsigned short encap_family = tmpl->encap_family;
unsigned int sequence;
struct km_event c;
@@ -1065,7 +1074,7 @@ xfrm_state_find(const xfrm_address_t *daddr, const xfrm_address_t *saddr,
hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(x, net->xfrm.state_bydst + h, bydst) {
if (x->props.family == encap_family &&
x->props.reqid == tmpl->reqid &&
- (mark & x->mark.m) == x->mark.v &&
+ (pol->mark.v == x->mark.v && pol->mark.m == x->mark.m) &&
x->if_id == if_id &&
!(x->props.flags & XFRM_STATE_WILDRECV) &&
xfrm_state_addr_check(x, daddr, saddr, encap_family) &&
@@ -1082,7 +1091,7 @@ xfrm_state_find(const xfrm_address_t *daddr, const xfrm_address_t *saddr,
hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(x, net->xfrm.state_bydst + h_wildcard, bydst) {
if (x->props.family == encap_family &&
x->props.reqid == tmpl->reqid &&
- (mark & x->mark.m) == x->mark.v &&
+ (pol->mark.v == x->mark.v && pol->mark.m == x->mark.m) &&
x->if_id == if_id &&
!(x->props.flags & XFRM_STATE_WILDRECV) &&
xfrm_addr_equal(&x->id.daddr, daddr, encap_family) &&
@@ -1097,8 +1106,9 @@ xfrm_state_find(const xfrm_address_t *daddr, const xfrm_address_t *saddr,
x = best;
if (!x && !error && !acquire_in_progress) {
if (tmpl->id.spi &&
- (x0 = __xfrm_state_lookup(net, mark, daddr, tmpl->id.spi,
- tmpl->id.proto, encap_family)) != NULL) {
+ (x0 = __xfrm_state_lookup(net, 0, &pol->mark, daddr,
+ tmpl->id.spi, tmpl->id.proto,
+ encap_family)) != NULL) {
to_put = x0;
error = -EEXIST;
goto out;
@@ -1183,7 +1193,7 @@ xfrm_state_find(const xfrm_address_t *daddr, const xfrm_address_t *saddr,
}
struct xfrm_state *
-xfrm_stateonly_find(struct net *net, u32 mark, u32 if_id,
+xfrm_stateonly_find(struct net *net, const struct xfrm_mark *mark, u32 if_id,
xfrm_address_t *daddr, xfrm_address_t *saddr,
unsigned short family, u8 mode, u8 proto, u32 reqid)
{
@@ -1195,7 +1205,7 @@ xfrm_stateonly_find(struct net *net, u32 mark, u32 if_id,
hlist_for_each_entry(x, net->xfrm.state_bydst+h, bydst) {
if (x->props.family == family &&
x->props.reqid == reqid &&
- (mark & x->mark.m) == x->mark.v &&
+ (mark->v == x->mark.v && mark->m == x->mark.m) &&
x->if_id == if_id &&
!(x->props.flags & XFRM_STATE_WILDRECV) &&
xfrm_state_addr_check(x, daddr, saddr, family) &&
@@ -1276,7 +1286,6 @@ static void __xfrm_state_bump_genids(struct xfrm_state *xnew)
u32 reqid = xnew->props.reqid;
struct xfrm_state *x;
unsigned int h;
- u32 mark = xnew->mark.v & xnew->mark.m;
u32 if_id = xnew->if_id;
h = xfrm_dst_hash(net, &xnew->id.daddr, &xnew->props.saddr, reqid, family);
@@ -1284,7 +1293,7 @@ static void __xfrm_state_bump_genids(struct xfrm_state *xnew)
if (x->props.family == family &&
x->props.reqid == reqid &&
x->if_id == if_id &&
- (mark & x->mark.m) == x->mark.v &&
+ (xnew->mark.v == x->mark.v && xnew->mark.m == x->mark.m) &&
xfrm_addr_equal(&x->id.daddr, &xnew->id.daddr, family) &&
xfrm_addr_equal(&x->props.saddr, &xnew->props.saddr, family))
x->genid++;
@@ -1313,7 +1322,6 @@ static struct xfrm_state *__find_acq_core(struct net *net,
{
unsigned int h = xfrm_dst_hash(net, daddr, saddr, reqid, family);
struct xfrm_state *x;
- u32 mark = m->v & m->m;
hlist_for_each_entry(x, net->xfrm.state_bydst+h, bydst) {
if (x->props.reqid != reqid ||
@@ -1322,7 +1330,7 @@ static struct xfrm_state *__find_acq_core(struct net *net,
x->km.state != XFRM_STATE_ACQ ||
x->id.spi != 0 ||
x->id.proto != proto ||
- (mark & x->mark.m) != x->mark.v ||
+ (m->v != x->mark.v || m->m != x->mark.m) ||
!xfrm_addr_equal(&x->id.daddr, daddr, family) ||
!xfrm_addr_equal(&x->props.saddr, saddr, family))
continue;
@@ -1382,7 +1390,8 @@ static struct xfrm_state *__find_acq_core(struct net *net,
return x;
}
-static struct xfrm_state *__xfrm_find_acq_byseq(struct net *net, u32 mark, u32 seq);
+static struct xfrm_state *
+__xfrm_find_acq_byseq(struct net *net, const struct xfrm_mark *mark, u32 seq);
int xfrm_state_add(struct xfrm_state *x)
{
@@ -1390,7 +1399,6 @@ int xfrm_state_add(struct xfrm_state *x)
struct xfrm_state *x1, *to_put;
int family;
int err;
- u32 mark = x->mark.v & x->mark.m;
int use_spi = xfrm_id_proto_match(x->id.proto, IPSEC_PROTO_ANY);
family = x->props.family;
@@ -1408,7 +1416,7 @@ int xfrm_state_add(struct xfrm_state *x)
}
if (use_spi && x->km.seq) {
- x1 = __xfrm_find_acq_byseq(net, mark, x->km.seq);
+ x1 = __xfrm_find_acq_byseq(net, &x->mark, x->km.seq);
if (x1 && ((x1->id.proto != x->id.proto) ||
!xfrm_addr_equal(&x1->id.daddr, &x->id.daddr, family))) {
to_put = x1;
@@ -1734,13 +1742,27 @@ xfrm_state_lookup(struct net *net, u32 mark, const xfrm_address_t *daddr, __be32
struct xfrm_state *x;
rcu_read_lock();
- x = __xfrm_state_lookup(net, mark, daddr, spi, proto, family);
+ x = __xfrm_state_lookup(net, mark, NULL, daddr, spi, proto, family);
rcu_read_unlock();
return x;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(xfrm_state_lookup);
struct xfrm_state *
+xfrm_state_lookup_user(struct net *net, const struct xfrm_mark *mark,
+ const xfrm_address_t *daddr, __be32 spi,
+ u8 proto, unsigned short family)
+{
+ struct xfrm_state *x;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ return __xfrm_state_lookup(net, 0, mark, daddr, spi, proto, family);
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ return x;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(xfrm_state_lookup_user);
+
+struct xfrm_state *
xfrm_state_lookup_byaddr(struct net *net, u32 mark,
const xfrm_address_t *daddr, const xfrm_address_t *saddr,
u8 proto, unsigned short family)
@@ -1748,13 +1770,29 @@ xfrm_state_lookup_byaddr(struct net *net, u32 mark,
struct xfrm_state *x;
spin_lock_bh(&net->xfrm.xfrm_state_lock);
- x = __xfrm_state_lookup_byaddr(net, mark, daddr, saddr, proto, family);
+ x = __xfrm_state_lookup_byaddr(net, mark, NULL, daddr, saddr, proto, family);
spin_unlock_bh(&net->xfrm.xfrm_state_lock);
return x;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(xfrm_state_lookup_byaddr);
struct xfrm_state *
+xfrm_state_lookup_byaddr_user(struct net *net, const struct xfrm_mark *mark,
+ const xfrm_address_t *daddr,
+ const xfrm_address_t *saddr,
+ u8 proto, unsigned short family)
+{
+ struct xfrm_state *x;
+
+ spin_lock_bh(&net->xfrm.xfrm_state_lock);
+ x = __xfrm_state_lookup_byaddr(net, 0, mark, daddr, saddr, proto,
+ family);
+ spin_unlock_bh(&net->xfrm.xfrm_state_lock);
+ return x;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(xfrm_state_lookup_byaddr_user);
+
+struct xfrm_state *
xfrm_find_acq(struct net *net, const struct xfrm_mark *mark, u8 mode, u32 reqid,
u32 if_id, u8 proto, const xfrm_address_t *daddr,
const xfrm_address_t *saddr, int create, unsigned short family)
@@ -1897,7 +1935,8 @@ xfrm_state_sort(struct xfrm_state **dst, struct xfrm_state **src, int n,
/* Silly enough, but I'm lazy to build resolution list */
-static struct xfrm_state *__xfrm_find_acq_byseq(struct net *net, u32 mark, u32 seq)
+static struct xfrm_state *
+__xfrm_find_acq_byseq(struct net *net, const struct xfrm_mark *mark, u32 seq)
{
int i;
@@ -1906,7 +1945,7 @@ static struct xfrm_state *__xfrm_find_acq_byseq(struct net *net, u32 mark, u32 s
hlist_for_each_entry(x, net->xfrm.state_bydst+i, bydst) {
if (x->km.seq == seq &&
- (mark & x->mark.m) == x->mark.v &&
+ (mark->v == x->mark.v && mark->m == x->mark.m) &&
x->km.state == XFRM_STATE_ACQ) {
xfrm_state_hold(x);
return x;
@@ -1916,7 +1955,8 @@ static struct xfrm_state *__xfrm_find_acq_byseq(struct net *net, u32 mark, u32 s
return NULL;
}
-struct xfrm_state *xfrm_find_acq_byseq(struct net *net, u32 mark, u32 seq)
+struct xfrm_state *
+xfrm_find_acq_byseq(struct net *net, const struct xfrm_mark *mark, u32 seq)
{
struct xfrm_state *x;
@@ -1972,7 +2012,6 @@ int xfrm_alloc_spi(struct xfrm_state *x, u32 low, u32 high)
int err = -ENOENT;
__be32 minspi = htonl(low);
__be32 maxspi = htonl(high);
- u32 mark = x->mark.v & x->mark.m;
spin_lock_bh(&x->lock);
if (x->km.state == XFRM_STATE_DEAD)
@@ -1985,7 +2024,8 @@ int xfrm_alloc_spi(struct xfrm_state *x, u32 low, u32 high)
err = -ENOENT;
if (minspi == maxspi) {
- x0 = xfrm_state_lookup(net, mark, &x->id.daddr, minspi, x->id.proto, x->props.family);
+ x0 = xfrm_state_lookup_user(net, &x->mark, &x->id.daddr, minspi,
+ x->id.proto, x->props.family);
if (x0) {
xfrm_state_put(x0);
goto unlock;
@@ -1995,7 +2035,9 @@ int xfrm_alloc_spi(struct xfrm_state *x, u32 low, u32 high)
u32 spi = 0;
for (h = 0; h < high-low+1; h++) {
spi = low + prandom_u32()%(high-low+1);
- x0 = xfrm_state_lookup(net, mark, &x->id.daddr, htonl(spi), x->id.proto, x->props.family);
+ x0 = xfrm_state_lookup_user(net, &x->mark, &x->id.daddr,
+ htonl(spi), x->id.proto,
+ x->props.family);
if (x0 == NULL) {
x->id.spi = htonl(spi);
break;
diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
index fbb7d9d0..43a95e4 100644
--- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
+++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
@@ -721,11 +721,13 @@ static struct xfrm_state *xfrm_user_state_lookup(struct net *net,
struct xfrm_state *x = NULL;
struct xfrm_mark m;
int err;
- u32 mark = xfrm_mark_get(attrs, &m);
+
+ xfrm_mark_get(attrs, &m);
if (xfrm_id_proto_match(p->proto, IPSEC_PROTO_ANY)) {
err = -ESRCH;
- x = xfrm_state_lookup(net, mark, &p->daddr, p->spi, p->proto, p->family);
+ x = xfrm_state_lookup_user(net, &m, &p->daddr, p->spi, p->proto,
+ p->family);
} else {
xfrm_address_t *saddr = NULL;
@@ -736,9 +738,8 @@ static struct xfrm_state *xfrm_user_state_lookup(struct net *net,
}
err = -ESRCH;
- x = xfrm_state_lookup_byaddr(net, mark,
- &p->daddr, saddr,
- p->proto, p->family);
+ x = xfrm_state_lookup_byaddr_user(net, &m, &p->daddr, saddr,
+ p->proto, p->family);
}
out:
@@ -1312,7 +1313,6 @@ static int xfrm_alloc_userspi(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh,
xfrm_address_t *daddr;
int family;
int err;
- u32 mark;
struct xfrm_mark m;
u32 if_id = 0;
@@ -1326,13 +1326,13 @@ static int xfrm_alloc_userspi(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh,
x = NULL;
- mark = xfrm_mark_get(attrs, &m);
+ xfrm_mark_get(attrs, &m);
if (attrs[XFRMA_IF_ID])
if_id = nla_get_u32(attrs[XFRMA_IF_ID]);
if (p->info.seq) {
- x = xfrm_find_acq_byseq(net, mark, p->info.seq);
+ x = xfrm_find_acq_byseq(net, &m, p->info.seq);
if (x && !xfrm_addr_equal(&x->id.daddr, daddr, family)) {
xfrm_state_put(x);
x = NULL;
@@ -2043,14 +2043,14 @@ static int xfrm_get_ae(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh,
struct sk_buff *r_skb;
int err;
struct km_event c;
- u32 mark;
struct xfrm_mark m;
struct xfrm_aevent_id *p = nlmsg_data(nlh);
struct xfrm_usersa_id *id = &p->sa_id;
- mark = xfrm_mark_get(attrs, &m);
+ xfrm_mark_get(attrs, &m);
- x = xfrm_state_lookup(net, mark, &id->daddr, id->spi, id->proto, id->family);
+ x = xfrm_state_lookup_user(net, &m, &id->daddr, id->spi, id->proto,
+ id->family);
if (x == NULL)
return -ESRCH;
@@ -2086,7 +2086,6 @@ static int xfrm_new_ae(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh,
struct xfrm_state *x;
struct km_event c;
int err = -EINVAL;
- u32 mark = 0;
struct xfrm_mark m;
struct xfrm_aevent_id *p = nlmsg_data(nlh);
struct nlattr *rp = attrs[XFRMA_REPLAY_VAL];
@@ -2102,9 +2101,10 @@ static int xfrm_new_ae(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh,
if (!(nlh->nlmsg_flags&NLM_F_REPLACE))
return err;
- mark = xfrm_mark_get(attrs, &m);
+ xfrm_mark_get(attrs, &m);
- x = xfrm_state_lookup(net, mark, &p->sa_id.daddr, p->sa_id.spi, p->sa_id.proto, p->sa_id.family);
+ x = xfrm_state_lookup_user(net, &m, &p->sa_id.daddr, p->sa_id.spi,
+ p->sa_id.proto, p->sa_id.family);
if (x == NULL)
return -ESRCH;
@@ -2233,9 +2233,11 @@ static int xfrm_add_sa_expire(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh,
struct xfrm_user_expire *ue = nlmsg_data(nlh);
struct xfrm_usersa_info *p = &ue->state;
struct xfrm_mark m;
- u32 mark = xfrm_mark_get(attrs, &m);
- x = xfrm_state_lookup(net, mark, &p->id.daddr, p->id.spi, p->id.proto, p->family);
+ xfrm_mark_get(attrs, &m);
+
+ x = xfrm_state_lookup_user(net, &m, &p->id.daddr, p->id.spi,
+ p->id.proto, p->family);
err = -ENOENT;
if (x == NULL)
--
2.1.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH ipsec] xfrm: state: match with both mark and mask on user interfaces
2020-06-30 6:15 [PATCH ipsec] xfrm: state: match with both mark and mask on user interfaces Xin Long
@ 2020-06-30 9:08 ` Tobias Brunner
2020-07-06 8:33 ` Xin Long
2020-07-07 13:29 ` Dan Carpenter
1 sibling, 1 reply; 6+ messages in thread
From: Tobias Brunner @ 2020-06-30 9:08 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Xin Long, netdev
Cc: Steffen Klassert, Herbert Xu, David S. Miller, Jamal Hadi Salim,
Sabrina Dubroca
Hi Xin,
> Similar to commit 4f47e8ab6ab79 ("xfrm: policy: match with both mark and
> mask on user interfaces"), this patch is to match both mark and mask for
> state on these user interfaces:
>
> xfrm_state_lookup_byaddr_user
> xfrm_state_lookup_user
> xfrm_state_update
> xfrm_state_find
> xfrm_state_add
> __xfrm_state_lookup_byaddr(struct xfrm_mark)
> __xfrm_state_lookup(struct xfrm_mark)
> xfrm_find_acq_byseq
> xfrm_stateonly_find
>
> mark.v == x->mark.v && mark.m == x->mark.m
I generally agree with matching marks/masks exactly for operations from
userland, and it doesn't introduce any issues in our test suite.
However, xfrm_state_find() is used to find an outbound state based on
the templates in a policy and the marks on both, so it's not directly
userland-facing. Before this change, the mask configured on the state
was a applied to the policy's mark/mask and then compared to the state's
mark. Now, the mark and mask both must match exactly:
> @@ -1051,7 +1061,6 @@ xfrm_state_find(const xfrm_address_t *daddr, const xfrm_address_t *saddr,
> int acquire_in_progress = 0;
> int error = 0;
> struct xfrm_state *best = NULL;
> - u32 mark = pol->mark.v & pol->mark.m;
> unsigned short encap_family = tmpl->encap_family;
> unsigned int sequence;
> struct km_event c;
> @@ -1065,7 +1074,7 @@ xfrm_state_find(const xfrm_address_t *daddr, const xfrm_address_t *saddr,
> hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(x, net->xfrm.state_bydst + h, bydst) {
> if (x->props.family == encap_family &&
> x->props.reqid == tmpl->reqid &&
> - (mark & x->mark.m) == x->mark.v &&
> + (pol->mark.v == x->mark.v && pol->mark.m == x->mark.m) &&
> x->if_id == if_id &&
> !(x->props.flags & XFRM_STATE_WILDRECV) &&
> xfrm_state_addr_check(x, daddr, saddr, encap_family) &&
> @@ -1082,7 +1091,7 @@ xfrm_state_find(const xfrm_address_t *daddr, const xfrm_address_t *saddr,
> hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(x, net->xfrm.state_bydst + h_wildcard, bydst) {
> if (x->props.family == encap_family &&
> x->props.reqid == tmpl->reqid &&
> - (mark & x->mark.m) == x->mark.v &&
> + (pol->mark.v == x->mark.v && pol->mark.m == x->mark.m) &&
> x->if_id == if_id &&
> !(x->props.flags & XFRM_STATE_WILDRECV) &&
> xfrm_addr_equal(&x->id.daddr, daddr, encap_family) &&
While this should usually not be a problem for strongSwan, as we set the
same mark/value on both states and corresponding policies (although the
latter can be disabled as users may want to install policies themselves
or via another daemon e.g. for MIPv6), it might be a limitation for some
use cases. The current code allows sharing states with multiple
policies whose mark/mask doesn't match exactly (i.e. depended on the
masks of both). I wonder if anybody uses it like this, and how others
think about it.
Regards,
Tobias
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH ipsec] xfrm: state: match with both mark and mask on user interfaces
2020-06-30 9:08 ` Tobias Brunner
@ 2020-07-06 8:33 ` Xin Long
2020-07-07 6:17 ` Steffen Klassert
0 siblings, 1 reply; 6+ messages in thread
From: Xin Long @ 2020-07-06 8:33 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Tobias Brunner
Cc: network dev, Steffen Klassert, Herbert Xu, David S. Miller,
Jamal Hadi Salim, Sabrina Dubroca, Jamal Hadi Salim, pwouters
Hi, Tobias
Sorry for late.
On Tue, Jun 30, 2020 at 5:08 PM Tobias Brunner <tobias@strongswan.org> wrote:
>
> Hi Xin,
>
> > Similar to commit 4f47e8ab6ab79 ("xfrm: policy: match with both mark and
> > mask on user interfaces"), this patch is to match both mark and mask for
> > state on these user interfaces:
> >
> > xfrm_state_lookup_byaddr_user
> > xfrm_state_lookup_user
> > xfrm_state_update
> > xfrm_state_find
> > xfrm_state_add
> > __xfrm_state_lookup_byaddr(struct xfrm_mark)
> > __xfrm_state_lookup(struct xfrm_mark)
> > xfrm_find_acq_byseq
> > xfrm_stateonly_find
> >
> > mark.v == x->mark.v && mark.m == x->mark.m
>
> I generally agree with matching marks/masks exactly for operations from
> userland, and it doesn't introduce any issues in our test suite.
> However, xfrm_state_find() is used to find an outbound state based on
> the templates in a policy and the marks on both, so it's not directly
> userland-facing. Before this change, the mask configured on the state
> was a applied to the policy's mark/mask and then compared to the state's
> mark. Now, the mark and mask both must match exactly:
Good catch.
>
> > @@ -1051,7 +1061,6 @@ xfrm_state_find(const xfrm_address_t *daddr, const xfrm_address_t *saddr,
> > int acquire_in_progress = 0;
> > int error = 0;
> > struct xfrm_state *best = NULL;
> > - u32 mark = pol->mark.v & pol->mark.m;
> > unsigned short encap_family = tmpl->encap_family;
> > unsigned int sequence;
> > struct km_event c;
> > @@ -1065,7 +1074,7 @@ xfrm_state_find(const xfrm_address_t *daddr, const xfrm_address_t *saddr,
> > hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(x, net->xfrm.state_bydst + h, bydst) {
> > if (x->props.family == encap_family &&
> > x->props.reqid == tmpl->reqid &&
> > - (mark & x->mark.m) == x->mark.v &&
> > + (pol->mark.v == x->mark.v && pol->mark.m == x->mark.m) &&
> > x->if_id == if_id &&
> > !(x->props.flags & XFRM_STATE_WILDRECV) &&
> > xfrm_state_addr_check(x, daddr, saddr, encap_family) &&
> > @@ -1082,7 +1091,7 @@ xfrm_state_find(const xfrm_address_t *daddr, const xfrm_address_t *saddr,
> > hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(x, net->xfrm.state_bydst + h_wildcard, bydst) {
> > if (x->props.family == encap_family &&
> > x->props.reqid == tmpl->reqid &&
> > - (mark & x->mark.m) == x->mark.v &&
> > + (pol->mark.v == x->mark.v && pol->mark.m == x->mark.m) &&
> > x->if_id == if_id &&
> > !(x->props.flags & XFRM_STATE_WILDRECV) &&
> > xfrm_addr_equal(&x->id.daddr, daddr, encap_family) &&
>
> While this should usually not be a problem for strongSwan, as we set the
> same mark/value on both states and corresponding policies (although the
> latter can be disabled as users may want to install policies themselves
> or via another daemon e.g. for MIPv6), it might be a limitation for some
> use cases. The current code allows sharing states with multiple
> policies whose mark/mask doesn't match exactly (i.e. depended on the
> masks of both). I wonder if anybody uses it like this, and how others
> think about it.
IMHO, the non-exact match "(mark & x->mark.m) == x->mark.v" should be only
for packet flow. "sharing states with multiple policies" should not be the
purpose of xfrm_mark. (Add Jamal to the CC list)
"(((pol->mark.v & pol->mark.m) & x->mark.m) == x->mark.v)" is just strange.
We could do either:
(pol->mark.v == x->mark.v && pol->mark.m == x->mark.m), like this patch.
Or use fl->flowi_mark in xfrm_state_find():
(fl->flowi_mark & x->mark.m) == x->mark.v)
The 1st one will require userland to configure policy and state with the
same xfrm_mark, like strongswan.
The 2nd one will match state with tx packet flow's mark, it's more like
rx packet flow path.
But you're right, either of these may cause slight differences, let's see
how other userland cases use it. (also Add Libreswan's developer, Paul Wouters)
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH ipsec] xfrm: state: match with both mark and mask on user interfaces
2020-07-06 8:33 ` Xin Long
@ 2020-07-07 6:17 ` Steffen Klassert
2020-07-07 9:09 ` Xin Long
0 siblings, 1 reply; 6+ messages in thread
From: Steffen Klassert @ 2020-07-07 6:17 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Xin Long
Cc: Tobias Brunner, network dev, Herbert Xu, David S. Miller,
Jamal Hadi Salim, Sabrina Dubroca, Jamal Hadi Salim, pwouters
On Mon, Jul 06, 2020 at 04:33:53PM +0800, Xin Long wrote:
> >
> > > @@ -1051,7 +1061,6 @@ xfrm_state_find(const xfrm_address_t *daddr, const xfrm_address_t *saddr,
> > > int acquire_in_progress = 0;
> > > int error = 0;
> > > struct xfrm_state *best = NULL;
> > > - u32 mark = pol->mark.v & pol->mark.m;
> > > unsigned short encap_family = tmpl->encap_family;
> > > unsigned int sequence;
> > > struct km_event c;
> > > @@ -1065,7 +1074,7 @@ xfrm_state_find(const xfrm_address_t *daddr, const xfrm_address_t *saddr,
> > > hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(x, net->xfrm.state_bydst + h, bydst) {
> > > if (x->props.family == encap_family &&
> > > x->props.reqid == tmpl->reqid &&
> > > - (mark & x->mark.m) == x->mark.v &&
> > > + (pol->mark.v == x->mark.v && pol->mark.m == x->mark.m) &&
> > > x->if_id == if_id &&
> > > !(x->props.flags & XFRM_STATE_WILDRECV) &&
> > > xfrm_state_addr_check(x, daddr, saddr, encap_family) &&
> > > @@ -1082,7 +1091,7 @@ xfrm_state_find(const xfrm_address_t *daddr, const xfrm_address_t *saddr,
> > > hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(x, net->xfrm.state_bydst + h_wildcard, bydst) {
> > > if (x->props.family == encap_family &&
> > > x->props.reqid == tmpl->reqid &&
> > > - (mark & x->mark.m) == x->mark.v &&
> > > + (pol->mark.v == x->mark.v && pol->mark.m == x->mark.m) &&
> > > x->if_id == if_id &&
> > > !(x->props.flags & XFRM_STATE_WILDRECV) &&
> > > xfrm_addr_equal(&x->id.daddr, daddr, encap_family) &&
> >
> > While this should usually not be a problem for strongSwan, as we set the
> > same mark/value on both states and corresponding policies (although the
> > latter can be disabled as users may want to install policies themselves
> > or via another daemon e.g. for MIPv6), it might be a limitation for some
> > use cases. The current code allows sharing states with multiple
> > policies whose mark/mask doesn't match exactly (i.e. depended on the
> > masks of both). I wonder if anybody uses it like this, and how others
> > think about it.
> IMHO, the non-exact match "(mark & x->mark.m) == x->mark.v" should be only
> for packet flow. "sharing states with multiple policies" should not be the
> purpose of xfrm_mark. (Add Jamal to the CC list)
>
> "(((pol->mark.v & pol->mark.m) & x->mark.m) == x->mark.v)" is just strange.
> We could do either:
> (pol->mark.v == x->mark.v && pol->mark.m == x->mark.m), like this patch.
> Or use fl->flowi_mark in xfrm_state_find():
> (fl->flowi_mark & x->mark.m) == x->mark.v)
>
> The 1st one will require userland to configure policy and state with the
> same xfrm_mark, like strongswan.
>
> The 2nd one will match state with tx packet flow's mark, it's more like
> rx packet flow path.
>
> But you're right, either of these may cause slight differences, let's see
> how other userland cases use it. (also Add Libreswan's developer, Paul Wouters)
We should care that everything that worked before, will still work after
this change. Otherwise we might break someones usecase, even if the
usecase seems to be odd and nobody complains now.
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH ipsec] xfrm: state: match with both mark and mask on user interfaces
2020-07-07 6:17 ` Steffen Klassert
@ 2020-07-07 9:09 ` Xin Long
0 siblings, 0 replies; 6+ messages in thread
From: Xin Long @ 2020-07-07 9:09 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Steffen Klassert
Cc: Tobias Brunner, network dev, Herbert Xu, David S. Miller,
Jamal Hadi Salim, Sabrina Dubroca, Jamal Hadi Salim, pwouters
On Tue, Jul 7, 2020 at 2:17 PM Steffen Klassert
<steffen.klassert@secunet.com> wrote:
>
> On Mon, Jul 06, 2020 at 04:33:53PM +0800, Xin Long wrote:
> > >
> > > > @@ -1051,7 +1061,6 @@ xfrm_state_find(const xfrm_address_t *daddr, const xfrm_address_t *saddr,
> > > > int acquire_in_progress = 0;
> > > > int error = 0;
> > > > struct xfrm_state *best = NULL;
> > > > - u32 mark = pol->mark.v & pol->mark.m;
> > > > unsigned short encap_family = tmpl->encap_family;
> > > > unsigned int sequence;
> > > > struct km_event c;
> > > > @@ -1065,7 +1074,7 @@ xfrm_state_find(const xfrm_address_t *daddr, const xfrm_address_t *saddr,
> > > > hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(x, net->xfrm.state_bydst + h, bydst) {
> > > > if (x->props.family == encap_family &&
> > > > x->props.reqid == tmpl->reqid &&
> > > > - (mark & x->mark.m) == x->mark.v &&
> > > > + (pol->mark.v == x->mark.v && pol->mark.m == x->mark.m) &&
> > > > x->if_id == if_id &&
> > > > !(x->props.flags & XFRM_STATE_WILDRECV) &&
> > > > xfrm_state_addr_check(x, daddr, saddr, encap_family) &&
> > > > @@ -1082,7 +1091,7 @@ xfrm_state_find(const xfrm_address_t *daddr, const xfrm_address_t *saddr,
> > > > hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(x, net->xfrm.state_bydst + h_wildcard, bydst) {
> > > > if (x->props.family == encap_family &&
> > > > x->props.reqid == tmpl->reqid &&
> > > > - (mark & x->mark.m) == x->mark.v &&
> > > > + (pol->mark.v == x->mark.v && pol->mark.m == x->mark.m) &&
> > > > x->if_id == if_id &&
> > > > !(x->props.flags & XFRM_STATE_WILDRECV) &&
> > > > xfrm_addr_equal(&x->id.daddr, daddr, encap_family) &&
> > >
> > > While this should usually not be a problem for strongSwan, as we set the
> > > same mark/value on both states and corresponding policies (although the
> > > latter can be disabled as users may want to install policies themselves
> > > or via another daemon e.g. for MIPv6), it might be a limitation for some
> > > use cases. The current code allows sharing states with multiple
> > > policies whose mark/mask doesn't match exactly (i.e. depended on the
> > > masks of both). I wonder if anybody uses it like this, and how others
> > > think about it.
> > IMHO, the non-exact match "(mark & x->mark.m) == x->mark.v" should be only
> > for packet flow. "sharing states with multiple policies" should not be the
> > purpose of xfrm_mark. (Add Jamal to the CC list)
> >
> > "(((pol->mark.v & pol->mark.m) & x->mark.m) == x->mark.v)" is just strange.
> > We could do either:
> > (pol->mark.v == x->mark.v && pol->mark.m == x->mark.m), like this patch.
> > Or use fl->flowi_mark in xfrm_state_find():
> > (fl->flowi_mark & x->mark.m) == x->mark.v)
> >
> > The 1st one will require userland to configure policy and state with the
> > same xfrm_mark, like strongswan.
> >
> > The 2nd one will match state with tx packet flow's mark, it's more like
> > rx packet flow path.
> >
> > But you're right, either of these may cause slight differences, let's see
> > how other userland cases use it. (also Add Libreswan's developer, Paul Wouters)
>
> We should care that everything that worked before, will still work after
> this change. Otherwise we might break someones usecase, even if the
> usecase seems to be odd and nobody complains now.
Hi, Steffen, You're right.
But what if the current one may cause problems?
policyA: mark(value: 0x11, mask: 0xff)
stateA: mark(value: 0x1, mask: 0xf)
stateB: mark(value: 0x11, mask: 0xff)
stateA is added later than stateB, and ahead of stateB in the list.
So one packet flow with mask 0x11, will get stateA through policyA, like on tx.
But one packet flow with mask 0x11, will get stateB by
xfrm_state_lookup(), like on rx.
I'm not sure if this may be an inconsistency issue.
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH ipsec] xfrm: state: match with both mark and mask on user interfaces
2020-06-30 6:15 [PATCH ipsec] xfrm: state: match with both mark and mask on user interfaces Xin Long
2020-06-30 9:08 ` Tobias Brunner
@ 2020-07-07 13:29 ` Dan Carpenter
1 sibling, 0 replies; 6+ messages in thread
From: Dan Carpenter @ 2020-07-07 13:29 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: kbuild, Xin Long, netdev
Cc: lkp, kbuild-all, Steffen Klassert, Herbert Xu, Jamal Hadi Salim,
Sabrina Dubroca, Tobias Brunner
[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 2081 bytes --]
Hi Xin,
url: https://github.com/0day-ci/linux/commits/Xin-Long/xfrm-state-match-with-both-mark-and-mask-on-user-interfaces/20200630-141906
base: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/klassert/ipsec.git master
config: arm-randconfig-m031-20200701 (attached as .config)
compiler: arm-linux-gnueabi-gcc (GCC) 9.3.0
If you fix the issue, kindly add following tag as appropriate
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
smatch warnings:
net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c:1760 xfrm_state_lookup_user() warn: ignoring unreachable code.
# https://github.com/0day-ci/linux/commit/ef34e2d07ba51ae7e0ff334958449318e025e6b6
git remote add linux-review https://github.com/0day-ci/linux
git remote update linux-review
git checkout ef34e2d07ba51ae7e0ff334958449318e025e6b6
vim +1760 net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c
ef34e2d07ba51ae Xin Long 2020-06-30 1751 struct xfrm_state *
ef34e2d07ba51ae Xin Long 2020-06-30 1752 xfrm_state_lookup_user(struct net *net, const struct xfrm_mark *mark,
ef34e2d07ba51ae Xin Long 2020-06-30 1753 const xfrm_address_t *daddr, __be32 spi,
ef34e2d07ba51ae Xin Long 2020-06-30 1754 u8 proto, unsigned short family)
ef34e2d07ba51ae Xin Long 2020-06-30 1755 {
ef34e2d07ba51ae Xin Long 2020-06-30 1756 struct xfrm_state *x;
ef34e2d07ba51ae Xin Long 2020-06-30 1757
ef34e2d07ba51ae Xin Long 2020-06-30 1758 rcu_read_lock();
ef34e2d07ba51ae Xin Long 2020-06-30 1759 return __xfrm_state_lookup(net, 0, mark, daddr, spi, proto, family);
^^^^^^^
Should be "x = __xfrm_state_lookup();"
ef34e2d07ba51ae Xin Long 2020-06-30 @1760 rcu_read_unlock();
ef34e2d07ba51ae Xin Long 2020-06-30 1761 return x;
ef34e2d07ba51ae Xin Long 2020-06-30 1762 }
ef34e2d07ba51ae Xin Long 2020-06-30 1763 EXPORT_SYMBOL(xfrm_state_lookup_user);
---
0-DAY CI Kernel Test Service, Intel Corporation
https://lists.01.org/hyperkitty/list/kbuild-all@lists.01.org
[-- Attachment #2: .config.gz --]
[-- Type: application/gzip, Size: 27431 bytes --]
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
end of thread, other threads:[~2020-07-07 13:31 UTC | newest]
Thread overview: 6+ messages (download: mbox.gz / follow: Atom feed)
-- links below jump to the message on this page --
2020-06-30 6:15 [PATCH ipsec] xfrm: state: match with both mark and mask on user interfaces Xin Long
2020-06-30 9:08 ` Tobias Brunner
2020-07-06 8:33 ` Xin Long
2020-07-07 6:17 ` Steffen Klassert
2020-07-07 9:09 ` Xin Long
2020-07-07 13:29 ` Dan Carpenter
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