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From: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
To: annie li <annie.li@oracle.com>
Cc: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>, <ian.campbell@citrix.com>,
	<netdev@vger.kernel.org>, <xen-devel@lists.xen.org>,
	<andrew.bennieston@citrix.com>, <davem@davemloft.net>
Subject: Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH net-next v2] xen-netfront: clean up code in xennet_release_rx_bufs
Date: Fri, 17 Jan 2014 17:50:43 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <52D96D73.1030803@citrix.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <52D94F8C.7060509@oracle.com>

On 17/01/14 15:43, annie li wrote:
> 
> No, I am trying to implement 2 patches.

I don't understand the need for two patches here, particularly when
the first patch introduces a security issue.  You can fold the following 
(untested) patch into your v2 patch and give it a try?

Thanks.

David

8<----------------------
xen-netfront: prevent unsafe reuse of rx buf pages after uninit

---
 drivers/net/xen-netfront.c |   21 +++++++++++++++++----
 1 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/net/xen-netfront.c b/drivers/net/xen-netfront.c
index 692589e..47aa599 100644
--- a/drivers/net/xen-netfront.c
+++ b/drivers/net/xen-netfront.c
@@ -1134,19 +1134,32 @@ static void xennet_release_tx_bufs(struct netfront_info *np)
 
 static void xennet_release_rx_bufs(struct netfront_info *np)
 {
-	struct sk_buff *skb;
 	int id, ref;
 
 	spin_lock_bh(&np->rx_lock);
 
 	for (id = 0; id < NET_RX_RING_SIZE; id++) {
+		struct sk_buff *skb;
+		skb_frag_t *frag;
+		const struct page *page;
+
+		skb = np->rx_skbs[id];
+		if (!skb)
+			continue;
+
 		ref = np->grant_rx_ref[id];
 		if (ref == GRANT_INVALID_REF)
 			continue;
 
-		skb = np->rx_skbs[id];
-		gnttab_end_foreign_access_ref(ref, 0);
-		gnttab_release_grant_reference(&np->gref_rx_head, ref);
+		frag = &skb_shinfo(skb)->frags[0];
+		page = skb_frag_page(frag);
+
+		/* gnttab_end_foreign_access() needs a page ref until
+		 * foreign access is ended (which may be deferred).
+		 */
+		get_page(page);
+
+		gnttab_end_foreign_access(ref, 0, page);
 		np->grant_rx_ref[id] = GRANT_INVALID_REF;
 
 		kfree_skb(skb);
-- 
1.7.2.5

  reply	other threads:[~2014-01-17 17:50 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 13+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2014-01-15 23:57 [Xen-devel][PATCH net-next v2] xen-netfront: clean up code in xennet_release_rx_bufs Annie Li
2014-01-16 11:10 ` David Vrabel
2014-01-16 13:42   ` annie li
2014-01-17  1:25     ` David Miller
2014-01-17  6:25   ` [Xen-devel] [PATCH " annie li
2014-01-17  6:58     ` annie li
2014-01-17 12:08     ` Wei Liu
2014-01-17 12:32       ` annie li
2014-01-17 14:02         ` Wei Liu
2014-01-17 15:43           ` annie li
2014-01-17 17:50             ` David Vrabel [this message]
2014-01-20  2:33               ` annie li
2014-01-17 15:40       ` David Vrabel

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