From: KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org>
To: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
Frederick Lawler <fred@cloudflare.com>,
Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>,
revest@chromium.org, jackmanb@chromium.org, ast@kernel.org,
daniel@iogearbox.net, andrii@kernel.org, songliubraving@fb.com,
yhs@fb.com, john.fastabend@gmail.com, jmorris@namei.org,
serge@hallyn.com, stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com,
eparis@parisplace.org, shuah@kernel.org, brauner@kernel.org,
ebiederm@xmission.com, bpf@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
netdev@vger.kernel.org, kernel-team@cloudflare.com,
cgzones@googlemail.com, karl@bigbadwolfsecurity.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 0/4] Introduce security_create_user_ns()
Date: Tue, 2 Aug 2022 23:27:10 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CACYkzJ5EH5t+-jC=FkLxJHQwrkVVPBdR3jAnEFPm-KVmLxBQjQ@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAHC9VhS9NN9a0=4ANwOf1e74+mKMD5BwE+rKhXcno3dtrZ7GVg@mail.gmail.com>
On Mon, Aug 1, 2022 at 6:35 PM Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> wrote:
>
> On Mon, Aug 1, 2022 at 11:25 AM Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> wrote:
> > On 8/1/2022 6:13 AM, Frederick Lawler wrote:
> > > On 7/22/22 7:20 AM, Paul Moore wrote:
> > >> On July 22, 2022 2:12:03 AM Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> wrote:
> > >>
> > >>> On Thu, Jul 21, 2022 at 12:28:04PM -0500, Frederick Lawler wrote:
> > >>>> While creating a LSM BPF MAC policy to block user namespace
> > >>>> creation, we
> > >>>> used the LSM cred_prepare hook because that is the closest hook to
> > >>>> prevent
> > >>>> a call to create_user_ns().
> > >>>>
> > >>>> The calls look something like this:
> > >>>>
> > >>>> cred = prepare_creds()
> > >>>> security_prepare_creds()
> > >>>> call_int_hook(cred_prepare, ...
> > >>>> if (cred)
> > >>>> create_user_ns(cred)
> > >>>>
> > >>>> We noticed that error codes were not propagated from this hook and
> > >>>> introduced a patch [1] to propagate those errors.
> > >>>>
> > >>>> The discussion notes that security_prepare_creds()
> > >>>> is not appropriate for MAC policies, and instead the hook is
> > >>>> meant for LSM authors to prepare credentials for mutation. [2]
> > >>>>
> > >>>> Ultimately, we concluded that a better course of action is to
> > >>>> introduce
> > >>>> a new security hook for LSM authors. [3]
> > >>>>
> > >>>> This patch set first introduces a new security_create_user_ns()
> > >>>> function
> > >>>> and userns_create LSM hook, then marks the hook as sleepable in BPF.
> > >>> Patch 1 and 4 still need review from the lsm/security side.
> > >>
> > >>
> > >> This patchset is in my review queue and assuming everything checks
> > >> out, I expect to merge it after the upcoming merge window closes.
> > >>
> > >> I would also need an ACK from the BPF LSM folks, but they're CC'd on
> > >> this patchset.
> > >
> > > Based on last weeks comments, should I go ahead and put up v4 for
> > > 5.20-rc1 when that drops, or do I need to wait for more feedback?
> >
> > As the primary consumer of this hook is BPF I would really expect their
> > reviewed-by before accepting this.
>
> We love all our in-tree LSMs equally. As long as there is at least
> one LSM which provides an implementation and has ACK'd the hook, and
> no other LSMs have NACK'd the hook, then I have no problem merging it.
> I doubt it will be necessary in this case, but if we need to tweak the
> hook in the future we can definitely do that; we've done this in the
> past when it has made sense.
>
> As a reminder, the LSM hooks are *not* part of the "don't break
> userspace" promise. I know it gets a little muddy with the way the
That's correct. Also, with BPF LSM, we encourage users to
build the application / bpf program logic to be resilient to changes
in the LSM hooks.
I am happy to share how we've done it, if folks are interested.
- KP
> BPF LSM works, but just as we don't want to allow one LSM to impact
> the runtime controls on another, we don't want to allow one LSM to
> freeze the hooks for everyone.
>
> --
> paul-moore.com
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-08-02 21:28 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 25+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-07-21 17:28 [PATCH v3 0/4] Introduce security_create_user_ns() Frederick Lawler
2022-07-21 17:28 ` [PATCH v3 1/4] security, lsm: " Frederick Lawler
2022-07-22 8:21 ` Christian Brauner
2022-07-21 17:28 ` [PATCH v3 2/4] bpf-lsm: Make bpf_lsm_userns_create() sleepable Frederick Lawler
2022-07-22 8:18 ` Christian Brauner
2022-07-21 17:28 ` [PATCH v3 3/4] selftests/bpf: Add tests verifying bpf lsm userns_create hook Frederick Lawler
2022-07-22 6:07 ` Martin KaFai Lau
2022-07-22 13:41 ` Frederick Lawler
2022-07-22 8:15 ` Christian Brauner
2022-07-21 17:28 ` [PATCH v3 4/4] selinux: Implement " Frederick Lawler
2022-07-22 6:11 ` [PATCH v3 0/4] Introduce security_create_user_ns() Martin KaFai Lau
2022-07-22 12:20 ` Paul Moore
2022-08-01 13:13 ` Frederick Lawler
2022-08-01 15:19 ` Paul Moore
2022-08-02 21:24 ` KP Singh
2022-08-03 1:49 ` Paul Moore
2022-08-01 15:25 ` Casey Schaufler
2022-08-01 16:34 ` Paul Moore
2022-08-02 21:27 ` KP Singh [this message]
2022-08-02 21:33 ` Eric W. Biederman
2022-08-03 15:20 ` Frederick Lawler
2022-07-22 17:05 ` Eric W. Biederman
2022-07-25 22:53 ` Paul Moore
2022-07-26 12:02 ` Djalal Harouni
2022-07-26 14:41 ` Ignat Korchagin
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