From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
To: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Networking <netdev@vger.kernel.org>, bpf <bpf@vger.kernel.org>,
Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>,
Kernel Team <Kernel-team@fb.com>,
Lorenz Bauer <lmb@cloudflare.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
Linux API <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>,
LSM List <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 bpf-next 1/4] bpf: unprivileged BPF access via /dev/bpf
Date: Tue, 13 Aug 2019 16:06:00 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CALCETrVT-dDXQGukGs5S1DkzvQv9_e=axzr_GyEd2c4T4z8Qng@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190813215823.3sfbakzzjjykyng2@ast-mbp>
On Tue, Aug 13, 2019 at 2:58 PM Alexei Starovoitov
<alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> On Tue, Aug 06, 2019 at 10:24:25PM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> > >
> > > Inside containers and inside nested containers we need to start processes
> > > that will use bpf. All of the processes are trusted.
> >
> > Trusted by whom? In a non-nested container, the container manager
> > *might* be trusted by the outside world. In a *nested* container,
> > unless the inner container management is controlled from outside the
> > outer container, it's not trusted. I don't know much about how
> > Facebook's containers work, but the LXC/LXD/Podman world is moving
> > very strongly toward user namespaces and maximally-untrusted
> > containers, and I think bpf() should work in that context.
>
> agree that containers (namespaces) reduce amount of trust necessary
> for apps to run, but the end goal is not security though.
> Linux has become a single user system.
> If user can ssh into the host they can become root.
> If arbitrary code can run on the host it will be break out of any sandbox.
I would argue that this is a reasonable assumption to make if you're
designing a system using Linux, but it's not a valid assumption to
make as kernel developers. Otherwise we should just give everyone
CAP_SYS_ADMIN and call it a day. There really is a difference between
root and non-root.
> Containers are not providing the level of security that is enough
> to run arbitrary code. VMs can do it better, but cpu bugs don't make it easy.
> Containers are used to make production systems safer.
> Some people call it more 'secure', but it's clearly not secure for
> arbitrary code and that is what kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled allows.
> When we say 'unprivileged bpf' we really mean arbitrary malicious bpf program.
> It's been a constant source of pain. The constant blinding, randomization,
> verifier speculative analysis, all spectre v1, v2, v4 mitigations
> are simply not worth it. It's a lot of complex kernel code without users.
Seccomp really will want eBPF some day, and it should work without
privilege. Maybe it should be a restricted subset of eBPF, and
Spectre will always be an issue until dramatically better hardware
shows up, but I think people will want the ability for regular
programs to load eBPF seccomp programs.
> Hence I prefer this /dev/bpf mechanism to be as simple a possible.
> The applications that will use it are going to be just as trusted as systemd.
I still don't understand your systemd example. systemd --users is not
trusted systemwide in any respect. The main PID 1 systemd is root.
No matter how you dice it, granting a user systemd instance extra bpf
access is tantamount to granting the user extra bpf access in general.
It sounds to me like you're thinking of eBPF as a feature a bit like
unprivileged user namespaces: *in principle*, it's supposed to be safe
to give any unprivileged process the ability to use it, and you
consider security flaws in it to be bugs worth fixing. But you think
it's a large attack surface and that most unprivileged programs
shouldn't be allowed to use it. Is that reasonable?
>
> > > To solve your concern of bypassing all capable checks...
> > > How about we do /dev/bpf/full_verifier first?
> > > It will replace capable() checks in the verifier only.
> >
> > I'm not convinced that "in the verifier" is the right distinction.
> > Telling administrators that some setting lets certain users bypass
> > bpf() verifier checks doesn't have a clear enough meaning.
>
> linux is a single user system. there are no administrators any more.
> No doubt, folks will disagree, but that game is over.
> At least on bpf side it's done.
>
> > I propose,
> > instead, that the current capable() checks be divided into three
> > categories:
>
> I don't see a use case for these categories.
> All bpf programs extend the kernel in some way.
> The kernel vs user is one category.
> Conceptually CAP_BPF is enough. It would be similar to CAP_NET_ADMIN.
> When application has CAP_NET_ADMIN it covers all of networking knobs.
> There is no use case that would warrant fine grain CAP_ROUTE_ADMIN,
> CAP_ETHTOOL_ADMIN, CAP_ETH0_ADMIN, etc.
> Similarly CAP_BPF as the only knob is enough.
> The only disadvantage of CAP_BPF is that it's not possible to
> pass it from one systemd-like daemon to another systemd-like daemon.
> Hence /dev/bpf idea and passing file descriptor.
>
> > This type of thing actually fits quite nicely into an idea I've been
> > thinking about for a while called "implicit rights". In very brief
> > summary, there would be objects called /dev/rights/xyz, where xyz is
> > the same of a "right". If there is a readable object of the right
> > type at the literal path "/dev/rights/xyz", then you have right xyz.
> > There's a bit more flexibility on top of this. BPF could use
> > /dev/rights/bpf/maptypes/lpm and
> > /dev/rights/bpf/verifier/bounded_loops, for example. Other non-BPF
> > use cases include a biggie:
> > /dev/rights/namespace/create_unprivileged_userns.
> > /dev/rights/bind_port/80 would be nice, too.
>
> The concept of "implicit rights" is very nice and I'm sure it will
> be a good fit somewhere, but I don't see why use it in bpf space.
> There is no use case for fine grain partition of bpf features.
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-08-13 23:06 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 92+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-06-27 20:19 [PATCH v2 bpf-next 0/4] sys_bpf() access control via /dev/bpf Song Liu
2019-06-27 20:19 ` [PATCH v2 bpf-next 1/4] bpf: unprivileged BPF access " Song Liu
2019-06-27 23:40 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-06-27 23:42 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-06-28 10:28 ` Christian Brauner
2019-06-28 9:05 ` Lorenz Bauer
2019-06-28 19:04 ` Song Liu
2019-06-30 0:12 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-07-01 9:03 ` Song Liu
2019-07-02 1:59 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-07-02 18:24 ` Kees Cook
2019-07-02 21:32 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-07-02 23:48 ` Song Liu
2019-07-22 20:53 ` Song Liu
2019-07-23 10:45 ` Lorenz Bauer
2019-07-23 15:11 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-07-23 22:56 ` Song Liu
2019-07-24 1:40 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-07-24 6:30 ` Song Liu
2019-07-27 18:20 ` Song Liu
2019-07-30 5:07 ` Song Liu
2019-07-30 20:24 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-07-31 8:10 ` Song Liu
2019-07-31 19:09 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-08-02 7:21 ` Song Liu
2019-08-04 22:16 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-08-05 0:08 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-08-05 5:47 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-08-05 7:36 ` Song Liu
2019-08-05 17:23 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-08-05 19:21 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2019-08-05 21:25 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-08-05 22:21 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-08-06 1:11 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2019-08-07 5:24 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-08-07 9:03 ` Lorenz Bauer
2019-08-07 13:52 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-08-13 21:58 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2019-08-13 22:26 ` Daniel Colascione
2019-08-13 23:24 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-08-13 23:06 ` Andy Lutomirski [this message]
2019-08-14 0:57 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2019-08-14 17:51 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-08-14 22:05 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2019-08-14 22:30 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-08-14 23:33 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2019-08-14 23:59 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-08-15 0:36 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2019-08-15 11:24 ` Jordan Glover
2019-08-15 17:28 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2019-08-15 18:36 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-08-15 23:08 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2019-08-16 9:34 ` Jordan Glover
2019-08-16 9:59 ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-08-16 11:33 ` Jordan Glover
2019-08-16 19:52 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2019-08-16 20:28 ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-08-17 15:02 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2019-08-17 15:44 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-08-19 9:15 ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-08-19 17:27 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2019-08-19 17:38 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-08-15 18:43 ` Jordan Glover
2019-08-15 19:46 ` Kees Cook
2019-08-15 23:46 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2019-08-16 0:54 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-08-16 5:56 ` Song Liu
2019-08-16 21:45 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2019-08-16 22:22 ` Christian Brauner
2019-08-17 15:08 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2019-08-17 15:16 ` Christian Brauner
2019-08-17 15:36 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2019-08-17 15:42 ` Christian Brauner
2019-08-22 14:17 ` Daniel Borkmann
2019-08-22 15:16 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-08-22 15:17 ` RFC: very rough draft of a bpf permission model Andy Lutomirski
2019-08-22 23:26 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2019-08-23 23:09 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-08-26 22:36 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2019-08-27 0:05 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-08-27 0:34 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2019-08-22 22:48 ` [PATCH v2 bpf-next 1/4] bpf: unprivileged BPF access via /dev/bpf Alexei Starovoitov
2019-07-30 20:20 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-07-31 7:44 ` Song Liu
2019-06-28 9:01 ` Lorenz Bauer
2019-06-28 19:10 ` Song Liu
2019-07-01 9:34 ` Lorenz Bauer
2019-07-02 19:22 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2019-07-03 7:28 ` Greg KH
2019-06-27 20:19 ` [PATCH v2 bpf-next 2/4] bpf: sync tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h Song Liu
2019-06-27 20:19 ` [PATCH v2 bpf-next 3/4] libbpf: add libbpf_[enable|disable]_sys_bpf() Song Liu
2019-06-27 20:19 ` [PATCH v2 bpf-next 4/4] bpftool: use libbpf_[enable|disable]_sys_bpf() Song Liu
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