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From: Jiri Pirko <jiri@resnulli.us>
To: Thinh Tran <thinhtr@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: jacob.e.keller@intel.com, kuba@kernel.org,
	netdev@vger.kernel.org, VENKATA.SAI.DUGGI@ibm.com,
	abdhalee@in.ibm.com, aelior@marvell.com, davem@davemloft.net,
	drc@linux.vnet.ibm.com, edumazet@google.com, manishc@marvell.com,
	pabeni@redhat.com, simon.horman@corigine.com,
	skalluru@marvell.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v11] net/bnx2x: Prevent access to a freed page in page_pool
Date: Mon, 18 Mar 2024 12:46:36 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <ZfgpnMtB0nDbMVJa@nanopsycho> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240315205535.1321-1-thinhtr@linux.ibm.com>

Fri, Mar 15, 2024 at 09:55:35PM CET, thinhtr@linux.ibm.com wrote:
>Fix race condition leading to system crash during EEH error handling
>
>During EEH error recovery, the bnx2x driver's transmit timeout logic
>could cause a race condition when handling reset tasks. The
>bnx2x_tx_timeout() schedules reset tasks via bnx2x_sp_rtnl_task(),
>which ultimately leads to bnx2x_nic_unload(). In bnx2x_nic_unload()
>SGEs are freed using bnx2x_free_rx_sge_range(). However, this could
>overlap with the EEH driver's attempt to reset the device using
>bnx2x_io_slot_reset(), which also tries to free SGEs. This race 
>condition can result in system crashes due to accessing freed memory
>locations in bnx2x_free_rx_sge()
>
>799  static inline void bnx2x_free_rx_sge(struct bnx2x *bp,
>800				struct bnx2x_fastpath *fp, u16 index)
>801  {
>802	struct sw_rx_page *sw_buf = &fp->rx_page_ring[index];
>803     struct page *page = sw_buf->page;
>....
>where sw_buf was set to NULL after the call to dma_unmap_page() 
>by the preceding thread.
>
>
>[  793.003930] EEH: Beginning: 'slot_reset'
>[  793.003937] PCI 0011:01:00.0#10000: EEH: Invoking bnx2x->slot_reset()
>[  793.003939] bnx2x: [bnx2x_io_slot_reset:14228(eth1)]IO slot reset initializing...
>[  793.004037] bnx2x 0011:01:00.0: enabling device (0140 -> 0142)
>[  793.008839] bnx2x: [bnx2x_io_slot_reset:14244(eth1)]IO slot reset --> driver unload
>[  793.122134] Kernel attempted to read user page (0) - exploit attempt? (uid: 0)
>[  793.122143] BUG: Kernel NULL pointer dereference on read at 0x00000000
>[  793.122147] Faulting instruction address: 0xc0080000025065fc
>[  793.122152] Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1]
>.....
>[  793.122315] Call Trace:
>[  793.122318] [c000000003c67a20] [c00800000250658c] bnx2x_io_slot_reset+0x204/0x610 [bnx2x] (unreliable)
>[  793.122331] [c000000003c67af0] [c0000000000518a8] eeh_report_reset+0xb8/0xf0
>[  793.122338] [c000000003c67b60] [c000000000052130] eeh_pe_report+0x180/0x550
>[  793.122342] [c000000003c67c70] [c00000000005318c] eeh_handle_normal_event+0x84c/0xa60
>[  793.122347] [c000000003c67d50] [c000000000053a84] eeh_event_handler+0xf4/0x170
>[  793.122352] [c000000003c67da0] [c000000000194c58] kthread+0x1c8/0x1d0
>[  793.122356] [c000000003c67e10] [c00000000000cf64] ret_from_kernel_thread+0x5c/0x64
>
>To solve this issue, we need to verify page pool allocations before
>freeing.
>
>Fixes: 4cace675d687 ("bnx2x: Alloc 4k fragment for each rx ring buffer element")
>
>Signed-off-by: Thinh Tran <thinhtr@linux.ibm.com>

Reviewed-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@nvidia.com>

  reply	other threads:[~2024-03-18 11:46 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-03-15 20:55 [PATCH v11] net/bnx2x: Prevent access to a freed page in page_pool Thinh Tran
2024-03-18 11:46 ` Jiri Pirko [this message]
2024-03-20  3:10 ` patchwork-bot+netdevbpf

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