From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-15.8 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,FREEMAIL_FORGED_FROMDOMAIN,FREEMAIL_FROM, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER,INCLUDES_PATCH, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,USER_AGENT_GIT autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9987BC432BE for ; Mon, 9 Aug 2021 21:36:20 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7EF7E6023B for ; Mon, 9 Aug 2021 21:36:20 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S236648AbhHIVgk (ORCPT ); Mon, 9 Aug 2021 17:36:40 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:58604 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S236431AbhHIVgU (ORCPT ); Mon, 9 Aug 2021 17:36:20 -0400 Received: from mail-ed1-x52b.google.com (mail-ed1-x52b.google.com [IPv6:2a00:1450:4864:20::52b]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id DE604C0617A0; Mon, 9 Aug 2021 14:35:58 -0700 (PDT) Received: by mail-ed1-x52b.google.com with SMTP id cf5so26817612edb.2; Mon, 09 Aug 2021 14:35:58 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20161025; h=from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to:references :mime-version:content-transfer-encoding; bh=PUqAlLNH4YeN3rVIdjP870cOs6LUxkdfXIiMuoP0+Is=; b=oWevK1wL/j6cgww4o6hyzrDD8dQCrAS/y+o0EtOyWjOY7BDIMroOQybLqmpJOB8SCf a9asCYzcjAq6uS2WqwsIzMnnyIO6ahqNwb9f2BiNthsZOMfu5oZbIp/lpkT7nRUb1xW/ 4Kmdw/kGfNzGR4XdKbUy/XgfWkAE5BfgpP0HmQHllzau+CPx/ZE+ZuK4DNyvAahdxZlN oOyARjtNX/ux7Tp2G43J8CLgJw29JtoQJHtzGFre/nxsdu/jg294EwN5zVX2ZJ5VLrl+ qXAYw9Yh4RwHcdqW8B+oGwrvbHUon6FB1aeJvXSLXm1ukET7z00unSqf3zWjgFZy0CRe PhaQ== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to :references:mime-version:content-transfer-encoding; bh=PUqAlLNH4YeN3rVIdjP870cOs6LUxkdfXIiMuoP0+Is=; b=QGebICGeRXc1NGwEK056vCjPuOp/ZQWp35kbeNk7qNCIoIZMwbY/bIxwycEY3RzANJ IDNcPC86FJ13IdWwTDriRy74LwoL0bzkHHY47RPa9+z+mELY2JubsEqpl4T2x0D2FvB1 HULTrLkGEcCqQHhk9vGVNgW85PSJPKP8IP6Q3fg/kplpZOV5gxb5Hf8+tT2SS41cnHzG zYJ/78+s1vKl+KX06z+1/XK261NRYiSwtc4n4w9stDK7oLkn+wZyNptw03attuU2GMa7 udRtSoghKzSA6Ee7lj3/95hKuO10KWZaVWKpuAc0BG6L9g4E1CVvWpV+rzbJjtXOMHp8 6ofw== X-Gm-Message-State: AOAM5308O0FekEM2QBWR505SLVvcR7EsriSJri+7EMIGKDRcL5/btLVf Ele6ZrH4nj2SZU3G3gswtvE= X-Google-Smtp-Source: ABdhPJxs98lcTKdbiwlj5KLON0kuBiZw2trNEBqNZK3t2eFbjUMnnmEgPj3MFH5bCJ5rRCoh7EWN3A== X-Received: by 2002:a05:6402:424c:: with SMTP id g12mr446165edb.121.1628544956484; Mon, 09 Aug 2021 14:35:56 -0700 (PDT) Received: from localhost.localdomain ([2a04:241e:502:1d80:688d:23e:82c6:84aa]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id v24sm5542932edt.41.2021.08.09.14.35.54 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Mon, 09 Aug 2021 14:35:56 -0700 (PDT) From: Leonard Crestez To: Eric Dumazet , "David S. Miller" , Herbert Xu , Kuniyuki Iwashima , David Ahern Cc: Hideaki YOSHIFUJI , Jakub Kicinski , Yuchung Cheng , Francesco Ruggeri , Mat Martineau , Christoph Paasch , Ivan Delalande , Priyaranjan Jha , Menglong Dong , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org Subject: [RFCv2 6/9] tcp: authopt: Add key selection controls Date: Tue, 10 Aug 2021 00:35:35 +0300 Message-Id: X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: netdev@vger.kernel.org The RFC requires that TCP can report the keyid and rnextkeyid values being sent or received, implement this via getsockopt values. The RFC also requires that user can select the sending key and that the sending key is automatically switched based on rnextkeyid. These requirements can conflict so we implement both and add a flag which specifies if user or peer request takes priority. Also add an option to control rnextkeyid explicitly from userspace. Signed-off-by: Leonard Crestez --- Documentation/networking/tcp_authopt.rst | 25 +++++++++++ include/net/tcp_authopt.h | 8 ++++ include/uapi/linux/tcp.h | 31 +++++++++++++ net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c | 57 ++++++++++++++++++++++-- 4 files changed, 117 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/Documentation/networking/tcp_authopt.rst b/Documentation/networking/tcp_authopt.rst index 484f66f41ad5..cded87a70d05 100644 --- a/Documentation/networking/tcp_authopt.rst +++ b/Documentation/networking/tcp_authopt.rst @@ -35,10 +35,35 @@ Keys can be bound to remote addresses in a way that is similar to TCP_MD5. RFC5925 requires that key ids do not overlap when tcp identifiers (addr/port) overlap. This is not enforced by linux, configuring ambiguous keys will result in packet drops and lost connections. +Key selection +------------- + +On getsockopt(TCP_AUTHOPT) information is provided about keyid/rnextkeyid in +the last send packet and about the keyid/rnextkeyd in the last valid received +packet. + +By default the sending keyid is selected to match the "rnextkeyid" value sent +by the remote side. If that keyid is not available (or for new connections) a +random matching key is selected. + +If the `TCP_AUTHOPT_LOCK_KEYID` is set then the sending key is selected by the +`tcp_authopt.send_local_id` field and rnextkeyid is ignored. If no key with +local_id == send_local_id is configured then a random matching key is +selected. + +The current sending key is cached in the socket and will not change unless +requested by remote rnextkeyid or by setsockopt. + +The rnextkeyid value sent on the wire is usually the recv_id of the current +key used for sending. If the TCP_AUTHOPT_LOCK_RNEXTKEY flag is set in +`tcp_authopt.flags` the value of `tcp_authopt.send_rnextkeyid` is send +instead. This can be used to implement smooth rollover: the peer will switch +its keyid to the received rnextkeyid when it is available. + ABI Reference ============= .. kernel-doc:: include/uapi/linux/tcp.h :identifiers: tcp_authopt tcp_authopt_flag tcp_authopt_key tcp_authopt_key_flag tcp_authopt_alg diff --git a/include/net/tcp_authopt.h b/include/net/tcp_authopt.h index 28ebc77473a4..759635346874 100644 --- a/include/net/tcp_authopt.h +++ b/include/net/tcp_authopt.h @@ -25,11 +25,19 @@ struct tcp_authopt_key_info { /* Per-socket information regarding tcp_authopt */ struct tcp_authopt_info { /* List of tcp_authopt_key_info */ struct hlist_head head; + /* Current send_key, cached. + * Once a key is found it only changes by user or remote request. + */ + struct tcp_authopt_key_info *send_key; u32 flags; + u32 local_send_id; + u8 send_rnextkeyid; + u8 recv_keyid; + u8 recv_rnextkeyid; u32 src_isn; u32 dst_isn; struct rcu_head rcu; }; diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/tcp.h b/include/uapi/linux/tcp.h index bc47664156eb..c04f5166ab33 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/tcp.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/tcp.h @@ -346,10 +346,24 @@ struct tcp_diag_md5sig { /** * enum tcp_authopt_flag - flags for `tcp_authopt.flags` */ enum tcp_authopt_flag { + /** + * @TCP_AUTHOPT_FLAG_LOCK_KEYID: keyid controlled by sockopt + * + * If this is set `tcp_authopt.local_send_id` is used to determined sending + * key. Otherwise a key with send_id == recv_rnextkeyid is preferred. + */ + TCP_AUTHOPT_FLAG_LOCK_KEYID = (1 << 0), + /** + * @TCP_AUTHOPT_FLAG_LOCK_RNEXTKEYID: Override rnextkeyid from userspace + * + * If this is set then `tcp_authopt.send_rnextkeyid` is sent on outbound + * packets. Other the recv_id of the current sending key is sent. + */ + TCP_AUTHOPT_FLAG_LOCK_RNEXTKEYID = (1 << 1), /** * @TCP_AUTHOPT_FLAG_REJECT_UNEXPECTED: * Configure behavior of segments with TCP-AO coming from hosts for which no * key is configured. The default recommended by RFC is to silently accept * such connections. @@ -361,10 +375,27 @@ enum tcp_authopt_flag { * struct tcp_authopt - Per-socket options related to TCP Authentication Option */ struct tcp_authopt { /** @flags: Combination of &enum tcp_authopt_flag */ __u32 flags; + /** + * @local_send_id: `tcp_authopt_key.local_id` of preferred send key + * + * This is only used if `TCP_AUTHOPT_FLAG_LOCK_KEYID` is set + */ + __u32 local_send_id; + /** + * @send_rnextkeyid: The rnextkeyid to send in packets + * + * This is controlled by the user iff TCP_AUTHOPT_FLAG_LOCK_RNEXTKEYID is + * set. Otherwise rnextkeyid is the recv_id of the current key + */ + __u8 send_rnextkeyid; + /** @recv_keyid: A recently-received keyid value. Only for getsockopt. */ + __u8 recv_keyid; + /** @recv_rnextkeyid: A recently-received rnextkeyid value. Only for getsockopt. */ + __u8 recv_rnextkeyid; }; /** * enum tcp_authopt_key_flag - flags for `tcp_authopt.flags` * diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c index 493461e46460..40412d9ea04e 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c @@ -215,17 +215,44 @@ struct tcp_authopt_key_info *tcp_authopt_lookup_send(struct tcp_authopt_info *in */ struct tcp_authopt_key_info *tcp_authopt_select_key(const struct sock *sk, const struct sock *addr_sk, u8 *rnextkeyid) { + struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key, *new_key; struct tcp_authopt_info *info; info = rcu_dereference(tcp_sk(sk)->authopt_info); if (!info) return NULL; - return tcp_authopt_lookup_send(info, addr_sk, -1); + key = info->send_key; + if (info->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_FLAG_LOCK_KEYID) { + int local_send_id = info->local_send_id; + + if (local_send_id && (!key || key->local_id != local_send_id)) + new_key = __tcp_authopt_key_info_lookup(sk, info, local_send_id); + } else { + if (!key || key->send_id != info->recv_rnextkeyid) + new_key = tcp_authopt_lookup_send(info, addr_sk, info->recv_rnextkeyid); + } + if (!key && !new_key) + new_key = tcp_authopt_lookup_send(info, addr_sk, -1); + + // Change current key. + if (key != new_key && new_key) { + key = new_key; + info->send_key = key; + } + + if (key) { + if (info->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_FLAG_LOCK_RNEXTKEYID) + *rnextkeyid = info->send_rnextkeyid; + else + *rnextkeyid = info->send_rnextkeyid = key->recv_id; + } + + return key; } static struct tcp_authopt_info *__tcp_authopt_info_get_or_create(struct sock *sk) { struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk); @@ -262,11 +289,17 @@ int tcp_set_authopt(struct sock *sk, sockptr_t optval, unsigned int optlen) info = __tcp_authopt_info_get_or_create(sk); if (IS_ERR(info)) return PTR_ERR(info); - info->flags = opt.flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_FLAG_REJECT_UNEXPECTED); + info->flags = opt.flags & + (TCP_AUTHOPT_FLAG_LOCK_KEYID | + TCP_AUTHOPT_FLAG_LOCK_RNEXTKEYID | + TCP_AUTHOPT_FLAG_REJECT_UNEXPECTED); + info->local_send_id = opt.local_send_id; + if (opt.flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_FLAG_LOCK_RNEXTKEYID) + info->send_rnextkeyid = opt.send_rnextkeyid; return 0; } int tcp_get_authopt_val(struct sock *sk, struct tcp_authopt *opt) @@ -277,11 +310,17 @@ int tcp_get_authopt_val(struct sock *sk, struct tcp_authopt *opt) WARN_ON(!lockdep_sock_is_held(sk)); memset(opt, 0, sizeof(*opt)); info = rcu_dereference_check(tp->authopt_info, lockdep_sock_is_held(sk)); if (!info) return -EINVAL; - opt->flags = info->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_FLAG_REJECT_UNEXPECTED; + if (info->send_key) + opt->local_send_id = info->send_key->local_id; + else + opt->local_send_id = 0; + opt->send_rnextkeyid = info->send_rnextkeyid; + opt->recv_keyid = info->recv_keyid; + opt->recv_rnextkeyid = info->recv_rnextkeyid; return 0; } static void tcp_authopt_key_free_rcu(struct rcu_head *rcu) @@ -295,10 +334,12 @@ static void tcp_authopt_key_free_rcu(struct rcu_head *rcu) static void tcp_authopt_key_del(struct sock *sk, struct tcp_authopt_info *info, struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key) { hlist_del_rcu(&key->node); + if (info->send_key == key) + info->send_key = NULL; atomic_sub(sizeof(*key), &sk->sk_omem_alloc); call_rcu(&key->rcu, tcp_authopt_key_free_rcu); } /* free info and keys but don't touch tp->authopt_info */ @@ -440,10 +481,11 @@ int __tcp_authopt_openreq(struct sock *newsk, const struct sock *oldsk, struct r return -ENOMEM; sk_nocaps_add(newsk, NETIF_F_GSO_MASK); new_info->src_isn = tcp_rsk(req)->snt_isn; new_info->dst_isn = tcp_rsk(req)->rcv_isn; + new_info->local_send_id = old_info->local_send_id; INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&new_info->head); err = tcp_authopt_clone_keys(newsk, oldsk, new_info, old_info); if (err) { __tcp_authopt_info_free(newsk, new_info); return err; @@ -1016,11 +1058,11 @@ int __tcp_authopt_inbound_check(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, struct tcp if (info->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_FLAG_REJECT_UNEXPECTED) { net_info_ratelimited("TCP Authentication Unexpected: Rejected\n"); return -EINVAL; } else { net_info_ratelimited("TCP Authentication Unexpected: Accepted\n"); - return 0; + goto accept; } } /* bad inbound key len */ if (key->maclen + 4 != opt->len) @@ -1033,7 +1075,14 @@ int __tcp_authopt_inbound_check(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, struct tcp if (memcmp(macbuf, opt->mac, key->maclen)) { net_info_ratelimited("TCP Authentication Failed\n"); return -EINVAL; } +accept: + /* Doing this for all valid packets will results in keyids temporarily + * flipping back and forth if packets are reordered or retransmitted. + */ + info->recv_keyid = opt->keyid; + info->recv_rnextkeyid = opt->rnextkeyid; + return 0; } -- 2.25.1