netdev.vger.kernel.org archive mirror
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
To: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>,
	Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
	davem@davemloft.net, netdev@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kernel-team@fb.com,
	"stable@vger.kernel.org" <stable@vger.kernel.org>,
	"dave.hansen@linux.intel.com" <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 bpf] bpf: introduce BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON config
Date: Mon, 29 Jan 2018 00:40:47 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <ed621015-cbe8-432c-82da-5b258d48ce1c@iogearbox.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180128144504.GB19937@kroah.com>

On 01/28/2018 03:45 PM, Greg KH wrote:
> On Wed, Jan 24, 2018 at 11:10:50AM +0100, Daniel Borkmann wrote:
>> On 01/24/2018 11:07 AM, David Woodhouse wrote:
>>> On Tue, 2018-01-09 at 22:39 +0100, Daniel Borkmann wrote:
>>>> On 01/09/2018 07:04 PM, Alexei Starovoitov wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> The BPF interpreter has been used as part of the spectre 2 attack CVE-2017-5715.
>>>>>
>>>>> A quote from goolge project zero blog:
>>>>> "At this point, it would normally be necessary to locate gadgets in
>>>>> the host kernel code that can be used to actually leak data by reading
>>>>> from an attacker-controlled location, shifting and masking the result
>>>>> appropriately and then using the result of that as offset to an
>>>>> attacker-controlled address for a load. But piecing gadgets together
>>>>> and figuring out which ones work in a speculation context seems annoying.
>>>>> So instead, we decided to use the eBPF interpreter, which is built into
>>>>> the host kernel - while there is no legitimate way to invoke it from inside
>>>>> a VM, the presence of the code in the host kernel's text section is sufficient
>>>>> to make it usable for the attack, just like with ordinary ROP gadgets."
>>>>>
>>>>> To make attacker job harder introduce BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON config
>>>>> option that removes interpreter from the kernel in favor of JIT-only mode.
>>>>> So far eBPF JIT is supported by:
>>>>> x64, arm64, arm32, sparc64, s390, powerpc64, mips64
>>>>>
>>>>> The start of JITed program is randomized and code page is marked as read-only.
>>>>> In addition "constant blinding" can be turned on with net.core.bpf_jit_harden
>>>>>
>>>>> v2->v3:
>>>>> - move __bpf_prog_ret0 under ifdef (Daniel)
>>>>>
>>>>> v1->v2:
>>>>> - fix init order, test_bpf and cBPF (Daniel's feedback)
>>>>> - fix offloaded bpf (Jakub's feedback)
>>>>> - add 'return 0' dummy in case something can invoke prog->bpf_func
>>>>> - retarget bpf tree. For bpf-next the patch would need one extra hunk.
>>>>>   It will be sent when the trees are merged back to net-next
>>>>>
>>>>> Considered doing:
>>>>>   int bpf_jit_enable __read_mostly = BPF_EBPF_JIT_DEFAULT;
>>>>> but it seems better to land the patch as-is and in bpf-next remove
>>>>> bpf_jit_enable global variable from all JITs, consolidate in one place
>>>>> and remove this jit_init() function.
>>>>>
>>>>> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
>>>>
>>>> Applied to bpf tree, thanks Alexei!
>>>
>>> For stable too?
>>
>> Yes, this will go into stable as well; batch of backports will come Thurs/Fri.
> 
> Any word on these?  Worse case, a simple list of git commit ids to
> backport is all I need.

Sorry for the delay! There are various conflicts all over the place, so I had
to backport manually. I just flushed out tested 4.14 batch, I'll see to get 4.9
out hopefully tonight as well, and the rest for 4.4 on Mon.

  reply	other threads:[~2018-01-28 23:40 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 10+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-01-09 18:04 [PATCH v3 bpf] bpf: introduce BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON config Alexei Starovoitov
2018-01-09 21:39 ` Daniel Borkmann
2018-01-24 10:07   ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-24 10:10     ` Daniel Borkmann
2018-01-28 14:45       ` Greg KH
2018-01-28 23:40         ` Daniel Borkmann [this message]
2018-01-29 12:31           ` Greg KH
2018-01-29 15:36           ` Daniel Borkmann
2018-01-29 17:36             ` Greg KH
2018-01-29 20:25               ` Daniel Borkmann

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=ed621015-cbe8-432c-82da-5b258d48ce1c@iogearbox.net \
    --to=daniel@iogearbox.net \
    --cc=ast@kernel.org \
    --cc=dave.hansen@linux.intel.com \
    --cc=davem@davemloft.net \
    --cc=dwmw2@infradead.org \
    --cc=gregkh@linuxfoundation.org \
    --cc=kernel-team@fb.com \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=netdev@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=stable@vger.kernel.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).