[PATCH AUTOSEL 4.14 05/44] netfilter: ebtables: fix a memory leak bug in compat

[PATCH AUTOSEL 4.14 05/44] netfilter: ebtables: fix a memory leak bug in compat

[Sasha Levin]

From: Wenwen Wang <wenwen@cs.uga.edu>

[ Upstream commit 15a78ba1844a8e052c1226f930133de4cef4e7ad ]

In compat_do_replace(), a temporary buffer is allocated through vmalloc()
to hold entries copied from the user space. The buffer address is firstly
saved to 'newinfo->entries', and later on assigned to 'entries_tmp'. Then
the entries in this temporary buffer is copied to the internal kernel
structure through compat_copy_entries(). If this copy process fails,
compat_do_replace() should be terminated. However, the allocated temporary
buffer is not freed on this path, leading to a memory leak.

To fix the bug, free the buffer before returning from compat_do_replace().

Signed-off-by: Wenwen Wang <wenwen@cs.uga.edu>
Reviewed-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c | 4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c b/net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c
index b967bd51bf1f9..48e364b11e067 100644
--- a/net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c
+++ b/net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c
@@ -2267,8 +2267,10 @@ static int compat_do_replace(struct net *net, void __user *user,
 	state.buf_kern_len = size64;
 
 	ret = compat_copy_entries(entries_tmp, tmp.entries_size, &state);
-	if (WARN_ON(ret < 0))
+	if (WARN_ON(ret < 0)) {
+		vfree(entries_tmp);
 		goto out_unlock;
+	}
 
 	vfree(entries_tmp);
 	tmp.entries_size = size64;
-- 
2.20.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL 4.14 16/44] netfilter: ipset: Fix rename concurrency with listing

[Sasha Levin]

From: Jozsef Kadlecsik <kadlec@netfilter.org>

[ Upstream commit 6c1f7e2c1b96ab9b09ac97c4df2bd9dc327206f6 ]

Shijie Luo reported that when stress-testing ipset with multiple concurrent
create, rename, flush, list, destroy commands, it can result

ipset <version>: Broken LIST kernel message: missing DATA part!

error messages and broken list results. The problem was the rename operation
was not properly handled with respect of listing. The patch fixes the issue.

Reported-by: Shijie Luo <luoshijie1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jozsef Kadlecsik <kadlec@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_core.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_core.c b/net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_core.c
index a3f1dc7cf5382..dbf17d3596a69 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_core.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/ipset/ip_set_core.c
@@ -1128,7 +1128,7 @@ static int ip_set_rename(struct net *net, struct sock *ctnl,
 		return -ENOENT;
 
 	write_lock_bh(&ip_set_ref_lock);
-	if (set->ref != 0) {
+	if (set->ref != 0 || set->ref_netlink != 0) {
 		ret = -IPSET_ERR_REFERENCED;
 		goto out;
 	}
-- 
2.20.1

[PATCH AUTOSEL 4.14 17/44] netfilter: ebtables: also count base chain policies

[Sasha Levin]

From: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>

[ Upstream commit 3b48300d5cc7c7bed63fddb006c4046549ed4aec ]

ebtables doesn't include the base chain policies in the rule count,
so we need to add them manually when we call into the x_tables core
to allocate space for the comapt offset table.

This lead syzbot to trigger:
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 9012 at net/netfilter/x_tables.c:649
xt_compat_add_offset.cold+0x11/0x36 net/netfilter/x_tables.c:649

Reported-by: syzbot+276ddebab3382bbf72db@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: 2035f3ff8eaa ("netfilter: ebtables: compat: un-break 32bit setsockopt when no rules are present")
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c | 28 +++++++++++++++++-----------
 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c b/net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c
index 48e364b11e067..100b4f88179a2 100644
--- a/net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c
+++ b/net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c
@@ -1779,20 +1779,28 @@ static int compat_calc_entry(const struct ebt_entry *e,
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static int ebt_compat_init_offsets(unsigned int number)
+{
+	if (number > INT_MAX)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* also count the base chain policies */
+	number += NF_BR_NUMHOOKS;
+
+	return xt_compat_init_offsets(NFPROTO_BRIDGE, number);
+}
 
 static int compat_table_info(const struct ebt_table_info *info,
 			     struct compat_ebt_replace *newinfo)
 {
 	unsigned int size = info->entries_size;
 	const void *entries = info->entries;
+	int ret;
 
 	newinfo->entries_size = size;
-	if (info->nentries) {
-		int ret = xt_compat_init_offsets(NFPROTO_BRIDGE,
-						 info->nentries);
-		if (ret)
-			return ret;
-	}
+	ret = ebt_compat_init_offsets(info->nentries);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
 
 	return EBT_ENTRY_ITERATE(entries, size, compat_calc_entry, info,
 							entries, newinfo);
@@ -2240,11 +2248,9 @@ static int compat_do_replace(struct net *net, void __user *user,
 
 	xt_compat_lock(NFPROTO_BRIDGE);
 
-	if (tmp.nentries) {
-		ret = xt_compat_init_offsets(NFPROTO_BRIDGE, tmp.nentries);
-		if (ret < 0)
-			goto out_unlock;
-	}
+	ret = ebt_compat_init_offsets(tmp.nentries);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto out_unlock;
 
 	ret = compat_copy_entries(entries_tmp, tmp.entries_size, &state);
 	if (ret < 0)
-- 
2.20.1