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d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date :message-id:subject:to:cc; bh=zGaoYWpZqQThaCeamoLFUvuaep53rUnIcLcyCp5w/vg=; b=PUY0xv5ISAVxHHHtwGqe1fjkeOUcvG3v23LBn7KoE1R2IBILs+nZk6yNKBbwUua+6y EP9i12bWrMye6TSvQJqU/OcLn+3Z4ZbBVgncUvEKOeyBI9PzrdZp5s00ilunCd/iv09I UUIYU4iolGKvjZrRC0yxwHdCnSGVyA88/7ty5lr67Jm1N8IG+WLgiGelD9pMpa2FR6T+ OWnyi8v/pne66p5MxMUjxAq4syz2uDqC3heQ8pllqFGUdB1S40xpsdX3hXD1FEue8eGY J2+rHsDzZGZAzRhoeO2QPwoH/xG28TPC7x2UslYKdvtR2107NuMxITVhGUcgmlhMqJqx ranA== X-Gm-Message-State: APjAAAW7+10PZNBpTU9OLNPiUopEZFWmTi3oB5/7p+5PIr0b4SXYc6wl rgRBAingsmDmsp2lcOXeFGQPLn+8gkZsNhxqo7Xp X-Google-Smtp-Source: APXvYqzA1he5CqqTYdGxCaEGH42J2+OT0TC3I1+seVKjcqbN4107AbF/Fb/yxBclhcMIQ95Q2dNrHCvd5kXZOEP8NA8= X-Received: by 2002:a2e:92cc:: with SMTP id k12mr2501807ljh.16.1559143756865; Wed, 29 May 2019 08:29:16 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 References: <9edad39c40671fb53f28d76862304cc2647029c6.1554732921.git.rgb@redhat.com> <20190529145742.GA8959@cisco> In-Reply-To: <20190529145742.GA8959@cisco> From: Paul Moore Date: Wed, 29 May 2019 11:29:05 -0400 Message-ID: Subject: Re: [PATCH ghak90 V6 02/10] audit: add container id To: Tycho Andersen Cc: Richard Guy Briggs , containers@lists.linux-foundation.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Linux-Audit Mailing List , linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, LKML , netdev@vger.kernel.org, netfilter-devel@vger.kernel.org, sgrubb@redhat.com, omosnace@redhat.com, dhowells@redhat.com, simo@redhat.com, Eric Paris , Serge Hallyn , ebiederm@xmission.com, nhorman@tuxdriver.com Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Sender: netfilter-devel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: netfilter-devel@vger.kernel.org On Wed, May 29, 2019 at 10:57 AM Tycho Andersen wrote: > > On Mon, Apr 08, 2019 at 11:39:09PM -0400, Richard Guy Briggs wrote: > > It is not permitted to unset the audit container identifier. > > A child inherits its parent's audit container identifier. > > ... > > > /** > > + * audit_set_contid - set current task's audit contid > > + * @contid: contid value > > + * > > + * Returns 0 on success, -EPERM on permission failure. > > + * > > + * Called (set) from fs/proc/base.c::proc_contid_write(). > > + */ > > +int audit_set_contid(struct task_struct *task, u64 contid) > > +{ > > + u64 oldcontid; > > + int rc = 0; > > + struct audit_buffer *ab; > > + uid_t uid; > > + struct tty_struct *tty; > > + char comm[sizeof(current->comm)]; > > + > > + task_lock(task); > > + /* Can't set if audit disabled */ > > + if (!task->audit) { > > + task_unlock(task); > > + return -ENOPROTOOPT; > > + } > > + oldcontid = audit_get_contid(task); > > + read_lock(&tasklist_lock); > > + /* Don't allow the audit containerid to be unset */ > > + if (!audit_contid_valid(contid)) > > + rc = -EINVAL; > > + /* if we don't have caps, reject */ > > + else if (!capable(CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL)) > > + rc = -EPERM; > > + /* if task has children or is not single-threaded, deny */ > > + else if (!list_empty(&task->children)) > > + rc = -EBUSY; > > + else if (!(thread_group_leader(task) && thread_group_empty(task))) > > + rc = -EALREADY; > > + read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); > > + if (!rc) > > + task->audit->contid = contid; > > + task_unlock(task); > > + > > + if (!audit_enabled) > > + return rc; > > ...but it is allowed to change it (assuming > capable(CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL), of course)? Seems like this might be more > immediately useful since we still live in the world of majority > privileged containers if we didn't allow changing it, in addition to > un-setting it. The idea is that only container orchestrators should be able to set/modify the audit container ID, and since setting the audit container ID can have a significant effect on the records captured (and their routing to multiple daemons when we get there) modifying the audit container ID is akin to modifying the audit configuration which is why it is gated by CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL. The current thinking is that you would only change the audit container ID from one set/inherited value to another if you were nesting containers, in which case the nested container orchestrator would need to be granted CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL (which everyone to date seems to agree is a workable compromise). We did consider allowing for a chain of nested audit container IDs, but the implications of doing so are significant (implementation mess, runtime cost, etc.) so we are leaving that out of this effort. >From a practical perspective, un-setting the audit container ID is pretty much the same as changing it from one set value to another so most of the above applies to that case as well. -- paul moore www.paul-moore.com