From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-11.8 required=3.0 tests=DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI, MENTIONS_GIT_HOSTING,SIGNED_OFF_BY,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4DF4FC433E0 for ; Sat, 4 Jul 2020 13:29:21 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 165EC20885 for ; Sat, 4 Jul 2020 13:29:21 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=paul-moore-com.20150623.gappssmtp.com header.i=@paul-moore-com.20150623.gappssmtp.com header.b="DaBE+q/L" Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1727897AbgGDN3P (ORCPT ); Sat, 4 Jul 2020 09:29:15 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:57150 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1726738AbgGDN3O (ORCPT ); Sat, 4 Jul 2020 09:29:14 -0400 Received: from mail-ed1-x544.google.com (mail-ed1-x544.google.com [IPv6:2a00:1450:4864:20::544]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id EACB2C08C5DF for ; Sat, 4 Jul 2020 06:29:13 -0700 (PDT) Received: by mail-ed1-x544.google.com with SMTP id d18so24652427edv.6 for ; Sat, 04 Jul 2020 06:29:13 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=paul-moore-com.20150623.gappssmtp.com; s=20150623; h=mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date:message-id:subject:to :cc; bh=8IRJl7J7RNznaeWdhi2pz+TO0Qae9LLFxbo2SwQ1/yU=; b=DaBE+q/L1Uo1nr2/MQ9FMGrkMt1wWeFCJ/xGWg6Yx1uCdS/w6jV3R0edeRdvodxsi1 OwyMweBGlVFSlmwMMwouGI2X52/Z0hKqw5YOLeUq4p91LTO/AoMV7XeMWt1BEdrFfctN NQfpbn3W2qy15I7W642OJO6ealc+3h0ESDwWkDNoSupX4sRW1lJSjtCfZU9GNmrJmTce KFIEpZdjyhoDiEhxe0AJdUUN8JBMJq8StzDRPn7eWVK93cF6UxVmR4bDjCKVG3ALC9bC k1FkC5kM1He+dKcOKlr1lXbd9rXQ8ITx5qNTH4H2ALmO0ER3dl699lRh1eWcnGVWOhBO wGGg== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date :message-id:subject:to:cc; bh=8IRJl7J7RNznaeWdhi2pz+TO0Qae9LLFxbo2SwQ1/yU=; b=c4D5hJxFsdVC0/ZhTdDV91jwlMylIXMNS3FwxdLVSsIw4ouDWip+qKNCyaYCh6w/BK QYPhTqU1nQ9feU72JZC4KJXSWWTiEGMHGk1Z8vQxIyhL6oqQVt77yP6LGHiYLIqDgZ1I Ib49p/ZgIAWVrVYvqcN0EultaYjCuSQUoy0YAblw4TYqPnO+adkYNeuNE1BBc0CjPMXL 7HroeK1345iqUUQEM6CUmhmUv6oIkz2OJKIq02chzW1KPFea+gxefefoB1owQftqesuz HiJyeTGg2Mc+Ofkw2pR3hA6NbQEJRjLhLaJmPFbG3EQMaUPGxyP3JXGf91XubvVRd9BS Mraw== X-Gm-Message-State: AOAM531QQTesdkzFMZxOs7SC6HPDB36ydUlG8qyu77o+te3XVBq1U7yc 4bQZ9cVI6jmj4n0/o2hcMSWcOhlRmhcd0sKCt4jG X-Google-Smtp-Source: ABdhPJx94SMJzFxdRPe8MFmpQPE6GdQuK/fWkpI5heYGNo1aaq14PzbQzgKLgznv10JgFp8bt4kwdsVe3sCwAuBceac= X-Received: by 2002:a05:6402:1d89:: with SMTP id dk9mr34213847edb.31.1593869352317; Sat, 04 Jul 2020 06:29:12 -0700 (PDT) MIME-Version: 1.0 References: In-Reply-To: From: Paul Moore Date: Sat, 4 Jul 2020 09:29:01 -0400 Message-ID: Subject: Re: [PATCH ghak90 V9 02/13] audit: add container id To: Richard Guy Briggs Cc: containers@lists.linux-foundation.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Linux-Audit Mailing List , linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, LKML , netdev@vger.kernel.org, netfilter-devel@vger.kernel.org, sgrubb@redhat.com, Ondrej Mosnacek , dhowells@redhat.com, simo@redhat.com, Eric Paris , Serge Hallyn , ebiederm@xmission.com, nhorman@tuxdriver.com, Dan Walsh , mpatel@redhat.com Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Sender: netfilter-devel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: netfilter-devel@vger.kernel.org On Sat, Jun 27, 2020 at 9:22 AM Richard Guy Briggs wrote: > > Implement the proc fs write to set the audit container identifier of a > process, emitting an AUDIT_CONTAINER_OP record to document the event. > > This is a write from the container orchestrator task to a proc entry of > the form /proc/PID/audit_containerid where PID is the process ID of the > newly created task that is to become the first task in a container, or > an additional task added to a container. > > The write expects up to a u64 value (unset: 18446744073709551615). > > The writer must have capability CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL. > > This will produce a record such as this: > type=CONTAINER_OP msg=audit(2018-06-06 12:39:29.636:26949) : op=set opid=2209 contid=123456 old-contid=18446744073709551615 > > The "op" field indicates an initial set. The "opid" field is the > object's PID, the process being "contained". New and old audit > container identifier values are given in the "contid" fields. > > It is not permitted to unset the audit container identifier. > A child inherits its parent's audit container identifier. > > Store the audit container identifier in a refcounted kernel object that > is added to the master list of audit container identifiers. This will > allow multiple container orchestrators/engines to work on the same > machine without danger of inadvertantly re-using an existing identifier. > It will also allow an orchestrator to inject a process into an existing > container by checking if the original container owner is the one > injecting the task. A hash table list is used to optimize searches. > > Please see the github audit kernel issue for the main feature: > https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/90 > Please see the github audit userspace issue for supporting additions: > https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-userspace/issues/51 > Please see the github audit testsuiite issue for the test case: > https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-testsuite/issues/64 > Please see the github audit wiki for the feature overview: > https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/wiki/RFE-Audit-Container-ID > > Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs > Acked-by: Serge Hallyn > Acked-by: Steve Grubb > Acked-by: Neil Horman > Reviewed-by: Ondrej Mosnacek > --- > fs/proc/base.c | 36 +++++++++++ > include/linux/audit.h | 33 ++++++++++ > include/uapi/linux/audit.h | 2 + > kernel/audit.c | 148 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ > kernel/audit.h | 8 +++ > 5 files changed, 227 insertions(+) > > diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c > index d86c0afc8a85..6c17ab32e71b 100644 > --- a/fs/proc/base.c > +++ b/fs/proc/base.c > @@ -1317,6 +1317,40 @@ static ssize_t proc_sessionid_read(struct file * file, char __user * buf, > .read = proc_sessionid_read, > .llseek = generic_file_llseek, > }; > + > +static ssize_t proc_contid_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, > + size_t count, loff_t *ppos) > +{ > + struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); > + u64 contid; > + int rv; > + struct task_struct *task = get_proc_task(inode); > + > + if (!task) > + return -ESRCH; > + if (*ppos != 0) { > + /* No partial writes. */ > + put_task_struct(task); > + return -EINVAL; > + } > + > + rv = kstrtou64_from_user(buf, count, 10, &contid); > + if (rv < 0) { > + put_task_struct(task); > + return rv; > + } > + > + rv = audit_set_contid(task, contid); > + put_task_struct(task); > + if (rv < 0) > + return rv; > + return count; > +} > + > +static const struct file_operations proc_contid_operations = { > + .write = proc_contid_write, > + .llseek = generic_file_llseek, > +}; > #endif > > #ifdef CONFIG_FAULT_INJECTION > @@ -3219,6 +3253,7 @@ static int proc_stack_depth(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns, > #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT > REG("loginuid", S_IWUSR|S_IRUGO, proc_loginuid_operations), > REG("sessionid", S_IRUGO, proc_sessionid_operations), > + REG("audit_containerid", S_IWUSR, proc_contid_operations), > #endif > #ifdef CONFIG_FAULT_INJECTION > REG("make-it-fail", S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR, proc_fault_inject_operations), > @@ -3558,6 +3593,7 @@ static int proc_tid_comm_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask) > #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT > REG("loginuid", S_IWUSR|S_IRUGO, proc_loginuid_operations), > REG("sessionid", S_IRUGO, proc_sessionid_operations), > + REG("audit_containerid", S_IWUSR, proc_contid_operations), > #endif > #ifdef CONFIG_FAULT_INJECTION > REG("make-it-fail", S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR, proc_fault_inject_operations), > diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h > index c2150415f9df..2800d4f1a2a8 100644 > --- a/include/linux/audit.h > +++ b/include/linux/audit.h > @@ -100,9 +100,18 @@ enum audit_nfcfgop { > AUDIT_XT_OP_UNREGISTER, > }; > > +struct audit_contobj { > + struct list_head list; > + u64 id; > + struct task_struct *owner; > + refcount_t refcount; > + struct rcu_head rcu; > +}; > + > struct audit_task_info { > kuid_t loginuid; > unsigned int sessionid; > + struct audit_contobj *cont; > #ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL > struct audit_context *ctx; > #endif > @@ -204,6 +213,15 @@ static inline unsigned int audit_get_sessionid(struct task_struct *tsk) > return tsk->audit->sessionid; > } > > +extern int audit_set_contid(struct task_struct *tsk, u64 contid); > + > +static inline u64 audit_get_contid(struct task_struct *tsk) > +{ > + if (!tsk->audit || !tsk->audit->cont) > + return AUDIT_CID_UNSET; > + return tsk->audit->cont->id; > +} > + > extern u32 audit_enabled; > > extern int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t); > @@ -268,6 +286,11 @@ static inline unsigned int audit_get_sessionid(struct task_struct *tsk) > return AUDIT_SID_UNSET; > } > > +static inline u64 audit_get_contid(struct task_struct *tsk) > +{ > + return AUDIT_CID_UNSET; > +} > + > #define audit_enabled AUDIT_OFF > > static inline int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t) > @@ -692,6 +715,16 @@ static inline bool audit_loginuid_set(struct task_struct *tsk) > return uid_valid(audit_get_loginuid(tsk)); > } > > +static inline bool audit_contid_valid(u64 contid) > +{ > + return contid != AUDIT_CID_UNSET; > +} > + > +static inline bool audit_contid_set(struct task_struct *tsk) > +{ > + return audit_contid_valid(audit_get_contid(tsk)); > +} > + > static inline void audit_log_string(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char *buf) > { > audit_log_n_string(ab, buf, strlen(buf)); > diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h > index 9b6a973f4cc3..859382527210 100644 > --- a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h > +++ b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h > @@ -71,6 +71,7 @@ > #define AUDIT_TTY_SET 1017 /* Set TTY auditing status */ > #define AUDIT_SET_FEATURE 1018 /* Turn an audit feature on or off */ > #define AUDIT_GET_FEATURE 1019 /* Get which features are enabled */ > +#define AUDIT_CONTAINER_OP 1020 /* Define the container id and info */ > > #define AUDIT_FIRST_USER_MSG 1100 /* Userspace messages mostly uninteresting to kernel */ > #define AUDIT_USER_AVC 1107 /* We filter this differently */ > @@ -491,6 +492,7 @@ struct audit_tty_status { > > #define AUDIT_UID_UNSET (unsigned int)-1 > #define AUDIT_SID_UNSET ((unsigned int)-1) > +#define AUDIT_CID_UNSET ((u64)-1) > > /* audit_rule_data supports filter rules with both integer and string > * fields. It corresponds with AUDIT_ADD_RULE, AUDIT_DEL_RULE and > diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c > index 5d8147a29291..6d387793f702 100644 > --- a/kernel/audit.c > +++ b/kernel/audit.c > @@ -138,6 +138,13 @@ struct auditd_connection { > > /* Hash for inode-based rules */ > struct list_head audit_inode_hash[AUDIT_INODE_BUCKETS]; > +/* Hash for contid object lists */ > +struct list_head audit_contid_hash[AUDIT_CONTID_BUCKETS]; > +/* Lock all additions and deletions to the contid hash lists, assignment > + * of container objects to tasks. There should be no need for > + * interaction with tasklist_lock > + */ > +static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(audit_contobj_list_lock); > > static struct kmem_cache *audit_buffer_cache; > > @@ -212,6 +219,33 @@ void __init audit_task_init(void) > 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL); > } > > +/* rcu_read_lock must be held by caller unless new */ > +static struct audit_contobj *_audit_contobj_hold(struct audit_contobj *cont) > +{ > + if (cont) > + refcount_inc(&cont->refcount); > + return cont; > +} > + > +static struct audit_contobj *_audit_contobj_get(struct task_struct *tsk) > +{ > + if (!tsk->audit) > + return NULL; > + return _audit_contobj_hold(tsk->audit->cont); > +} > + > +/* rcu_read_lock must be held by caller */ > +static void _audit_contobj_put(struct audit_contobj *cont) > +{ > + if (!cont) > + return; > + if (refcount_dec_and_test(&cont->refcount)) { > + put_task_struct(cont->owner); > + list_del_rcu(&cont->list); > + kfree_rcu(cont, rcu); > + } > +} > + > /** > * audit_alloc - allocate an audit info block for a task > * @tsk: task > @@ -232,6 +266,9 @@ int audit_alloc(struct task_struct *tsk) > } > info->loginuid = audit_get_loginuid(current); > info->sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current); > + rcu_read_lock(); > + info->cont = _audit_contobj_get(current); > + rcu_read_unlock(); > tsk->audit = info; > > ret = audit_alloc_syscall(tsk); > @@ -246,6 +283,7 @@ int audit_alloc(struct task_struct *tsk) > struct audit_task_info init_struct_audit = { > .loginuid = INVALID_UID, > .sessionid = AUDIT_SID_UNSET, > + .cont = NULL, > #ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL > .ctx = NULL, > #endif > @@ -262,6 +300,9 @@ void audit_free(struct task_struct *tsk) > struct audit_task_info *info = tsk->audit; > > audit_free_syscall(tsk); > + rcu_read_lock(); > + _audit_contobj_put(tsk->audit->cont); > + rcu_read_unlock(); > /* Freeing the audit_task_info struct must be performed after > * audit_log_exit() due to need for loginuid and sessionid. > */ > @@ -1709,6 +1750,9 @@ static int __init audit_init(void) > for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_INODE_BUCKETS; i++) > INIT_LIST_HEAD(&audit_inode_hash[i]); > > + for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_CONTID_BUCKETS; i++) > + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&audit_contid_hash[i]); > + > mutex_init(&audit_cmd_mutex.lock); > audit_cmd_mutex.owner = NULL; > > @@ -2410,6 +2454,110 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t) > return audit_signal_info_syscall(t); > } > > +/* > + * audit_set_contid - set current task's audit contid > + * @task: target task > + * @contid: contid value > + * > + * Returns 0 on success, -EPERM on permission failure. > + * > + * If the original container owner goes away, no task injection is > + * possible to an existing container. > + * > + * Called (set) from fs/proc/base.c::proc_contid_write(). > + */ > +int audit_set_contid(struct task_struct *task, u64 contid) > +{ > + int rc = 0; > + struct audit_buffer *ab; > + struct audit_contobj *oldcont = NULL; > + > + task_lock(task); > + /* Can't set if audit disabled */ > + if (!task->audit) { > + task_unlock(task); > + return -ENOPROTOOPT; > + } > + read_lock(&tasklist_lock); > + /* Don't allow the contid to be unset */ > + if (!audit_contid_valid(contid)) { > + rc = -EINVAL; > + goto unlock; > + } > + /* if we don't have caps, reject */ > + if (!capable(CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL)) { > + rc = -EPERM; > + goto unlock; > + } > + /* if task has children or is not single-threaded, deny */ > + if (!list_empty(&task->children) || > + !(thread_group_leader(task) && thread_group_empty(task))) { > + rc = -EBUSY; > + goto unlock; > + } > + /* if contid is already set, deny */ > + if (audit_contid_set(task)) > + rc = -EEXIST; > +unlock: > + read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); > + rcu_read_lock(); > + oldcont = _audit_contobj_get(task); > + if (!rc) { > + struct audit_contobj *cont = NULL, *newcont = NULL; > + int h = audit_hash_contid(contid); > + > + spin_lock(&audit_contobj_list_lock); > + list_for_each_entry_rcu(cont, &audit_contid_hash[h], list) > + if (cont->id == contid) { > + /* task injection to existing container */ > + if (current == cont->owner) { > + _audit_contobj_hold(cont); > + newcont = cont; > + } else { > + rc = -ENOTUNIQ; > + spin_unlock(&audit_contobj_list_lock); > + goto conterror; > + } > + break; > + } > + if (!newcont) { > + newcont = kmalloc(sizeof(*newcont), GFP_ATOMIC); > + if (newcont) { > + INIT_LIST_HEAD(&newcont->list); > + newcont->id = contid; > + newcont->owner = get_task_struct(current); > + refcount_set(&newcont->refcount, 1); > + list_add_rcu(&newcont->list, > + &audit_contid_hash[h]); > + } else { > + rc = -ENOMEM; > + spin_unlock(&audit_contobj_list_lock); > + goto conterror; > + } > + } > + spin_unlock(&audit_contobj_list_lock); > + task->audit->cont = newcont; > + _audit_contobj_put(oldcont); > + } > +conterror: > + task_unlock(task); > + > + if (!audit_enabled) > + return rc; > + > + ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONTAINER_OP); > + if (!ab) > + return rc; > + > + audit_log_format(ab, > + "op=set opid=%d contid=%llu old-contid=%llu", > + task_tgid_nr(task), contid, oldcont ? oldcont->id : -1); > + _audit_contobj_put(oldcont); > + rcu_read_unlock(); > + audit_log_end(ab); > + return rc; > +} > + > /** > * audit_log_end - end one audit record > * @ab: the audit_buffer > diff --git a/kernel/audit.h b/kernel/audit.h > index 9bee09757068..182fc76ea276 100644 > --- a/kernel/audit.h > +++ b/kernel/audit.h > @@ -210,6 +210,14 @@ static inline int audit_hash_ino(u32 ino) > return (ino & (AUDIT_INODE_BUCKETS-1)); > } > > +#define AUDIT_CONTID_BUCKETS 32 > +extern struct list_head audit_contid_hash[AUDIT_CONTID_BUCKETS]; > + > +static inline int audit_hash_contid(u64 contid) > +{ > + return (contid & (AUDIT_CONTID_BUCKETS-1)); > +} > + > /* Indicates that audit should log the full pathname. */ > #define AUDIT_NAME_FULL -1 > > -- > 1.8.3.1 > -- paul moore www.paul-moore.com