From: "Konstantin Meskhidze (A)" <konstantin.meskhidze@huawei.com>
To: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>
Cc: <willemdebruijn.kernel@gmail.com>, <gnoack3000@gmail.com>,
<linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>, <netdev@vger.kernel.org>,
<netfilter-devel@vger.kernel.org>, <yusongping@huawei.com>,
<artem.kuzin@huawei.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 09/13] landlock: Add network rules and TCP hooks support
Date: Tue, 4 Apr 2023 12:33:37 +0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <ae266792-3fd6-7c42-8ca0-a5cbd29c6789@huawei.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <01bdfa52-3bac-4703-6caa-d83ea5990c87@digikod.net>
3/31/2023 8:30 PM, Mickaël Salaün пишет:
>
> On 31/03/2023 19:24, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
>>
>> On 23/03/2023 09:52, Konstantin Meskhidze wrote:
>>> This commit adds network rules support in the ruleset management
>>> helpers and the landlock_create_ruleset syscall.
>>> Refactor user space API to support network actions. Add new network
>>> access flags, network rule and network attributes. Increment Landlock
>>> ABI version. Expand access_masks_t to u32 to be sure network access
>>> rights can be stored. Implement socket_bind() and socket_connect()
>>> LSM hooks, which enable to restrict TCP socket binding and connection
>>> to specific ports.
>>>
>>> Signed-off-by: Konstantin Meskhidze <konstantin.meskhidze@huawei.com>
>>> ---
>>>
>>> Changes since v9:
>>> * Changes UAPI port field to __u64.
>>> * Moves shared code into check_socket_access().
>>> * Adds get_raw_handled_net_accesses() and
>>> get_current_net_domain() helpers.
>>> * Minor fixes.
>>>
>>> Changes since v8:
>>> * Squashes commits.
>>> * Refactors commit message.
>>> * Changes UAPI port field to __be16.
>>> * Changes logic of bind/connect hooks with AF_UNSPEC families.
>>> * Adds address length checking.
>>> * Minor fixes.
>>>
>>> Changes since v7:
>>> * Squashes commits.
>>> * Increments ABI version to 4.
>>> * Refactors commit message.
>>> * Minor fixes.
>>>
>>> Changes since v6:
>>> * Renames landlock_set_net_access_mask() to landlock_add_net_access_mask()
>>> because it OR values.
>>> * Makes landlock_add_net_access_mask() more resilient incorrect values.
>>> * Refactors landlock_get_net_access_mask().
>>> * Renames LANDLOCK_MASK_SHIFT_NET to LANDLOCK_SHIFT_ACCESS_NET and use
>>> LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS as value.
>>> * Updates access_masks_t to u32 to support network access actions.
>>> * Refactors landlock internal functions to support network actions with
>>> landlock_key/key_type/id types.
>>>
>>> Changes since v5:
>>> * Gets rid of partial revert from landlock_add_rule
>>> syscall.
>>> * Formats code with clang-format-14.
>>>
>>> Changes since v4:
>>> * Refactors landlock_create_ruleset() - splits ruleset and
>>> masks checks.
>>> * Refactors landlock_create_ruleset() and landlock mask
>>> setters/getters to support two rule types.
>>> * Refactors landlock_add_rule syscall add_rule_path_beneath
>>> function by factoring out get_ruleset_from_fd() and
>>> landlock_put_ruleset().
>>>
>>> Changes since v3:
>>> * Splits commit.
>>> * Adds network rule support for internal landlock functions.
>>> * Adds set_mask and get_mask for network.
>>> * Adds rb_root root_net_port.
>>>
>>> ---
>>> include/uapi/linux/landlock.h | 49 +++++
>>> security/landlock/Kconfig | 1 +
>>> security/landlock/Makefile | 2 +
>>> security/landlock/limits.h | 6 +-
>>> security/landlock/net.c | 198 +++++++++++++++++++
>>> security/landlock/net.h | 26 +++
>>> security/landlock/ruleset.c | 52 ++++-
>>> security/landlock/ruleset.h | 63 +++++-
>>> security/landlock/setup.c | 2 +
>>> security/landlock/syscalls.c | 72 ++++++-
>>> tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c | 2 +-
>>> 11 files changed, 450 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
>>> create mode 100644 security/landlock/net.c
>>> create mode 100644 security/landlock/net.h
>>
>> [...]
>>
>>> diff --git a/security/landlock/net.c b/security/landlock/net.c
>>
>> [...]
>>
>>> +static int check_addrlen(const struct sockaddr *const address, int addrlen)
>>
>> const int addrlen
>>
>>> +{
>>> + if (addrlen < offsetofend(struct sockaddr, sa_family))
>>> + return -EINVAL;
>>> + switch (address->sa_family) {
>>> + case AF_UNSPEC:
>>> + case AF_INET:
>>> + if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
>>> + return -EINVAL;
>>> + return 0;
>>> +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
>>> + case AF_INET6:
>>> + if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
>>> + return -EINVAL;
>>> + return 0;
>>> +#endif
>>> + }
>>> + WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
>>> + return 0;
>>> +}
>>> +
>>> +static u16 get_port(const struct sockaddr *const address)
>>> +{
>>> + /* Gets port value in host byte order. */
>>> + switch (address->sa_family) {
>>> + case AF_UNSPEC:
>>> + case AF_INET: {
>>> + const struct sockaddr_in *const sockaddr =
>>> + (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
>>> + return ntohs(sockaddr->sin_port);
>>
>> Storing ports in big endian (in rulesets) would avoid converting them
>> every time the kernel checks a socket port. The above comment should
>> then be updated too.
>
> You can then return a __be16 type here and at least also use __be16 in
> check_socket_access().
Do you mean we need to do port converting __be16 -> u16 in
check_socket_access()???
>
>>
>>
>>> + }
>>> +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
>>> + case AF_INET6: {
>>> + const struct sockaddr_in6 *const sockaddr_ip6 =
>>> + (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
>>> + return ntohs(sockaddr_ip6->sin6_port);
>>> + }
>>> +#endif
>>> + }
>>> + WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
>>> + return 0;
>>> +}
>>> +
>>> +static int check_socket_access(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen, u16 port,
>>> + access_mask_t access_request)
>>> +{
>>> + int ret;
>>> + bool allowed = false;
>>> + layer_mask_t layer_masks[LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_NET] = {};
>>> + const struct landlock_rule *rule;
>>> + access_mask_t handled_access;
>>> + const struct landlock_id id = {
>>> + .key.data = port,
>>> + .type = LANDLOCK_KEY_NET_PORT,
>>> + };
>>> + const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain = get_current_net_domain();
>>> +
>>> + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!domain))
>>> + return 0;
>>> + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(domain->num_layers < 1))
>>> + return -EACCES;
>>> + /* Check if it's a TCP socket. */
>>> + if (sock->type != SOCK_STREAM)
>>> + return 0;
>>> +
>>> + ret = check_addrlen(address, addrlen);
>>> + if (ret)
>>> + return ret;
>>> +
>>> + switch (address->sa_family) {
>>> + case AF_UNSPEC:
>>> + /*
>>> + * Connecting to an address with AF_UNSPEC dissolves the TCP
>>> + * association, which have the same effect as closing the
>>> + * connection while retaining the socket object (i.e., the file
>>> + * descriptor). As for dropping privileges, closing
>>> + * connections is always allowed.
>>> + */
>>> + if (access_request == LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP)
>>> + return 0;
>>> +
>>> + /*
>>> + * For compatibility reason, accept AF_UNSPEC for bind
>>> + * accesses (mapped to AF_INET) only if the address is
>>> + * INADDR_ANY (cf. __inet_bind). Checking the address is
>>> + * required to not wrongfully return -EACCES instead of
>>> + * -EAFNOSUPPORT.
>>> + */
>>> + if (access_request == LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP) {
>>> + const struct sockaddr_in *const sockaddr =
>>> + (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
>>> +
>>> + if (sockaddr->sin_addr.s_addr != htonl(INADDR_ANY))
>>> + return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
>>> + }
>>> +
>>> + fallthrough;
>>> + case AF_INET:
>>> +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
>>> + case AF_INET6:
>>> +#endif
>>> + rule = landlock_find_rule(domain, id);
>>> + handled_access = landlock_init_layer_masks(
>>> + domain, access_request, &layer_masks,
>>> + LANDLOCK_KEY_NET_PORT);
>>> + allowed = landlock_unmask_layers(rule, handled_access,
>>> + &layer_masks,
>>> + ARRAY_SIZE(layer_masks));
>>> + }
>>> + return allowed ? 0 : -EACCES;
>>> +}
>>> +
>>> +static int hook_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address,
>>> + int addrlen)
>>> +{
>>> + return check_socket_access(sock, address, addrlen, get_port(address),
>>> + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP);
>>> +}
>>> +
>>> +static int hook_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address,
>>> + int addrlen)
>>> +{
>>> + return check_socket_access(sock, address, addrlen, get_port(address),
>>> + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP);
>>> +}
>>
>> [...]
> .
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-04-04 9:33 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 48+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-03-23 8:52 [PATCH v10 00/13] Network support for Landlock Konstantin Meskhidze
2023-03-23 8:52 ` [PATCH v10 01/13] landlock: Make ruleset's access masks more generic Konstantin Meskhidze
2023-03-23 8:52 ` [PATCH v10 02/13] landlock: Allow filesystem layout changes for domains without such rule type Konstantin Meskhidze
2023-04-16 16:09 ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-04-20 11:42 ` Konstantin Meskhidze (A)
2023-04-20 17:32 ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-04-21 7:54 ` Konstantin Meskhidze (A)
2023-03-23 8:52 ` [PATCH v10 03/13] landlock: Remove unnecessary inlining Konstantin Meskhidze
2023-04-16 16:09 ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-04-20 11:45 ` Konstantin Meskhidze (A)
2023-03-23 8:52 ` [PATCH v10 04/13] landlock: Refactor landlock_find_rule/insert_rule Konstantin Meskhidze
2023-03-23 8:52 ` [PATCH v10 05/13] landlock: Refactor merge/inherit_ruleset functions Konstantin Meskhidze
2023-04-16 16:09 ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-04-20 11:46 ` Konstantin Meskhidze (A)
2023-03-23 8:52 ` [PATCH v10 06/13] landlock: Move and rename layer helpers Konstantin Meskhidze
2023-03-23 8:52 ` [PATCH v10 07/13] landlock: Refactor " Konstantin Meskhidze
2023-04-16 16:11 ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-04-20 16:05 ` Konstantin Meskhidze (A)
2023-03-23 8:52 ` [PATCH v10 08/13] landlock: Refactor landlock_add_rule() syscall Konstantin Meskhidze
2023-03-23 8:52 ` [PATCH v10 09/13] landlock: Add network rules and TCP hooks support Konstantin Meskhidze
2023-03-31 17:24 ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-03-31 17:30 ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-04-04 9:33 ` Konstantin Meskhidze (A) [this message]
2023-04-04 9:31 ` Konstantin Meskhidze (A)
2023-04-04 16:42 ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-04-04 17:02 ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-04-05 19:19 ` Konstantin Meskhidze (A)
2023-04-06 10:31 ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-04-06 10:37 ` Konstantin Meskhidze (A)
2023-04-05 17:42 ` Konstantin Meskhidze (A)
2023-04-06 10:28 ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-04-06 10:30 ` Konstantin Meskhidze (A)
2023-04-16 16:11 ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-04-21 9:39 ` Konstantin Meskhidze (A)
2023-04-26 14:15 ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-03-23 8:52 ` [PATCH v10 10/13] selftests/landlock: Share enforce_ruleset() Konstantin Meskhidze
2023-04-16 16:12 ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-04-20 16:06 ` Konstantin Meskhidze (A)
2023-03-23 8:52 ` [PATCH v10 11/13] selftests/landlock: Add 10 new test suites dedicated to network Konstantin Meskhidze
2023-04-16 16:13 ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-04-21 10:02 ` Konstantin Meskhidze (A)
2023-04-26 19:10 ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-03-23 8:52 ` [PATCH v10 12/13] samples/landlock: Add network demo Konstantin Meskhidze
2023-04-16 16:13 ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-04-21 10:04 ` Konstantin Meskhidze (A)
2023-03-23 8:52 ` [PATCH v10 13/13] landlock: Document Landlock's network support Konstantin Meskhidze
2023-04-16 16:13 ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-04-21 10:07 ` Konstantin Meskhidze (A)
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