From: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
To: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>,
Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org, Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-nvdimm <linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 02/11] libnvdimm/security: change clear text nvdimm keys to encrypted keys
Date: Mon, 12 Nov 2018 08:42:43 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <bf917ee9-1795-9c10-ecec-28c7d5d68345@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1541966975.3734.78.camel@linux.ibm.com>
On 11/11/2018 1:09 PM, Mimi Zohar wrote:
>>> Traditionally there is a single master key for the system, which would
>>> be sealed to a set of boot time PCR values. After decrypting all of
>>> the encrypted keys, the master key would be removed from the keyring
>>> and a PCR extended. Extending a PCR would prevent the master key from
>>> being unsealed again and used to decrypt encrypted keys, without
>>> rebooting the system. Normally this would be done before pivoting
>>> root.
>>>
>>> If you're not referring to the system master key and are intentionally
>>> limiting usage to TPM 2.0, more details on the master key security
>>> requirements should be included.
>> Oh, interesting point. I think we had been assuming a local +
>> unsealed-at-runtime nvdimm master key rather than a system-wide master
>> key. Yes, we need to rethink this in terms of supporting a sealed
>> system-key. This would seem to limit security actions, outside of
>> unlock, to always requiring a reboot. I.e. the nominal case is that we
>> boot up and unlock the DIMMs, but any subsequent security operation
>> like erase, or change-passphrase would require rebooting into an
>> environment where the system-master key is unsealed. I do think
>> re-provisioning keys and erasing DIMM contents are sufficiently
>> exceptional events that a reboot requirement is tolerable.
>> Is there already existing tooling around this to be able to schedule
>> master-key related actions to be deferred to an initrd environment?
> There's the original dracut support for loading a masterkey, which is
> used by the EVM and ecryptfs dracut modules. After the last usage,
> the masterkey needs to be removed from the keyring.
How does one generate new encrypted keys with the system masterkey
removed from the keyring?
>
> Different people over the years have wanted to add support for
> calculating the boot time expected PCRs values in order to reseal keys
> (trusted key update), but I haven't looked to see if there are any
> open source tools available.
>
> Mimi
>
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-11-12 15:42 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 34+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-11-09 22:13 [PATCH 00/11] Additional patches for nvdimm security support Dave Jiang
2018-11-09 22:13 ` [PATCH 01/11] keys-encrypted: add nvdimm key format type to encrypted keys Dave Jiang
2018-11-27 7:20 ` Dan Williams
2018-11-27 16:20 ` Dave Jiang
2018-11-27 18:24 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-11-27 19:10 ` Dan Williams
2018-11-27 19:35 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-11-27 19:48 ` Dan Williams
2018-11-27 20:10 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-11-27 20:15 ` Dave Jiang
2018-11-09 22:13 ` [PATCH 02/11] libnvdimm/security: change clear text nvdimm keys " Dave Jiang
2018-11-10 1:45 ` Dan Williams
2018-11-11 17:27 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-11-11 19:20 ` Dan Williams
2018-11-11 20:09 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-11-12 15:42 ` Dave Jiang [this message]
2018-11-12 18:49 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-11-12 20:13 ` Dave Jiang
2018-11-12 15:45 ` Dave Jiang
2018-11-12 19:04 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-11-09 22:14 ` [PATCH 03/11] libnvdimm/security: add override module param for key self verification Dave Jiang
2018-11-09 22:14 ` [PATCH 04/11] libnvdimm/security: introduce NDD_SECURITY_BUSY flag Dave Jiang
2018-11-09 22:14 ` [PATCH 05/11] acpi/nfit, libnvdimm/security: Add security DSM overwrite support Dave Jiang
2018-11-09 22:14 ` [PATCH 06/11] tools/testing/nvdimm: Add overwrite support for nfit_test Dave Jiang
2018-11-09 22:14 ` [PATCH 07/11] libnvdimm/security: add overwrite status notification Dave Jiang
2018-11-10 2:59 ` Elliott, Robert (Persistent Memory)
2018-11-12 20:26 ` Dave Jiang
2018-11-09 22:14 ` [PATCH 08/11] libnvdimm/security: add documentation for ovewrite Dave Jiang
2018-11-09 22:14 ` [PATCH 09/11] acpi/nfit, libnvdimm/security: add Intel DSM 1.8 master passphrase support Dave Jiang
2018-11-25 21:24 ` Dan Williams
2018-11-09 22:14 ` [PATCH 10/11] tools/testing/nvdimm: add Intel DSM 1.8 support for nfit_test Dave Jiang
2018-11-10 3:15 ` Elliott, Robert (Persistent Memory)
2018-11-12 20:27 ` Dave Jiang
2018-11-09 22:14 ` [PATCH 11/11] acpi/nfit: prevent indiscriminate DSM payload dumping for security DSMs Dave Jiang
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