From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-0.6 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,FREEMAIL_FORGED_FROMDOMAIN,FREEMAIL_FROM, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,HTML_MESSAGE,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE, SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED autolearn=no autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1EA30C2D0A3 for ; Tue, 3 Nov 2020 17:21:44 +0000 (UTC) Received: from lists.ozlabs.org (lists.ozlabs.org [203.11.71.2]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 3435220E65 for ; Tue, 3 Nov 2020 17:21:42 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=gmail.com header.i=@gmail.com header.b="PUnKp+h0" DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mail.kernel.org 3435220E65 Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=none dis=none) header.from=gmail.com Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=openbmc-bounces+openbmc=archiver.kernel.org@lists.ozlabs.org Received: from bilbo.ozlabs.org (lists.ozlabs.org [IPv6:2401:3900:2:1::3]) by lists.ozlabs.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4CQc5c6467zDqjW for ; Wed, 4 Nov 2020 04:21:40 +1100 (AEDT) Authentication-Results: lists.ozlabs.org; spf=pass (sender SPF authorized) smtp.mailfrom=gmail.com (client-ip=2607:f8b0:4864:20::e2f; helo=mail-vs1-xe2f.google.com; envelope-from=deepak.kodihalli.83@gmail.com; receiver=) Authentication-Results: lists.ozlabs.org; dmarc=pass (p=none dis=none) header.from=gmail.com Authentication-Results: lists.ozlabs.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key; unprotected) header.d=gmail.com header.i=@gmail.com header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=20161025 header.b=PUnKp+h0; dkim-atps=neutral Received: from mail-vs1-xe2f.google.com (mail-vs1-xe2f.google.com [IPv6:2607:f8b0:4864:20::e2f]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature RSA-PSS (2048 bits) server-digest SHA256) (No client certificate requested) by lists.ozlabs.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 4CQc4807RYzDqHY for ; Wed, 4 Nov 2020 04:20:23 +1100 (AEDT) Received: by mail-vs1-xe2f.google.com with SMTP id h5so9888084vsp.3 for ; Tue, 03 Nov 2020 09:20:23 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20161025; h=mime-version:from:date:message-id:subject:to; bh=2kmVfDRdXyNEqEcMZsm57rJeM8KAsiQflBkNHo4MBXk=; b=PUnKp+h0kRzcRsl5tmch4QmLxDfppk9R3QZe+s07n5F8w/bme5DwRdVQBJ3i02Ya+2 I/wMfxu3Cu1sNtTIxy3fQeCIyI4MRJXXXuYN9hlpPFFeWZ3x+fftUMu2Sae0fSwEDj04 g3v0I0wbtUSMM0mn/zS184WnXl+Kl1AbwxM9x4geRBIa25ZTMzzn8N1Ujy/IgdEzL3Yr xp1F+fHSTCM7it91Zh+WNylkBq44aQp8/hqtSxHW7Rp3d/K6Brym5rSn1dofN/K4QPl4 Ai1dSp0muI6WnkmAi5nOucMiRRneRgts3igZty3sdt3DQz9Q74Y5C3o8FoIc1PT2zmZu I0+w== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:from:date:message-id:subject:to; bh=2kmVfDRdXyNEqEcMZsm57rJeM8KAsiQflBkNHo4MBXk=; b=ghJqV9358FrEdhK7Eicx8HAtFbyYvdQ8pwMTuOMp49+Le8VC2VMuaN/xrEycUdK2mM Fi4lMmBYCtB44gSh3upKfXSYUulxGJFQJKxOA5/0YZ3e186RpkdLn7xMlJQ2uEZsvhws NNiksMBYPI6vwlDjk4mcVUIoNKIOMMspO89iiYCag/sZNHJHRcJcHxsRlMQ6/L9lyY+i ujQ6fGaps4QShCfdvTntxYya5B4uulIltDZ1SHWZeBuQ5ym8N4RVSM0wT3Jssfpv2SQk q1YhhO3DHSpz8C0kqipTJL/93NbYtI2mDrwffV8A0PrVP/XonyQuLQY0Fe9UE5UTyrzZ mZJQ== X-Gm-Message-State: AOAM533VJrHuDO8bayfFIFgG2Gym4ULeSNgEM6jsAaIQHMFZsIQv7eIn MB7Id8+HWWo+qD2YgduJg0bPzdoSKNXqn6MBMcLdy2uw6k9DL0pO X-Google-Smtp-Source: ABdhPJzc81WtQvRoZKzerClDJGSAUqGd8wlUWunO2hVS8/yc1Ck6oOx3ypq7N15jxiRN3MU7qSRbZjyK5XcHai2djC8= X-Received: by 2002:a67:a603:: with SMTP id p3mr19958022vse.4.1604424019387; Tue, 03 Nov 2020 09:20:19 -0800 (PST) MIME-Version: 1.0 From: Deepak Kodihalli Date: Tue, 3 Nov 2020 22:50:07 +0530 Message-ID: Subject: Secure boot/signed images and GPL code To: openbmc@lists.ozlabs.org, cjengel@us.ibm.com, joel@jms.id.au, joseph-reynolds@charter.net Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="000000000000beaa0c05b337130d" X-BeenThere: openbmc@lists.ozlabs.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: Development list for OpenBMC List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Errors-To: openbmc-bounces+openbmc=archiver.kernel.org@lists.ozlabs.org Sender: "openbmc" --000000000000beaa0c05b337130d Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Hi, Does secure boot on the BMC (I think for my question it doesn't matter where the hardware root of trust is - it could be on the BMC or an external chip) or signed images deprive users of rights associated with code in OpenBMC that is GPL licensed? Meaning, GPL allows users to modify and distribute the GPL components. I'm not a legal expert, but I understand from the legal team in my company that these rights are not limited to making modifications to the GPL code and that they also imply being able to deploy/boot such modified code; and the problem is secure boot/signed images would prevent the same. It also looks like this isn't specific to GPLv3, but GPL in general (for eg GPLv2 clause 6). How are others dealing with this: - By having an ability to disable secure boot (I see this as optional in https://gerrit.openbmc-project.xyz/#/c/openbmc/docs/+/26169/)? What if this is not an option on a system? - Other options? - Do you (or your legal team) view this is only a GPLv3 problem, or not a problem at all? Thanks, Deepak --000000000000beaa0c05b337130d Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Hi,

Does secure boot on the = BMC (I think for my question it doesn't matter where the hardware root = of trust is - it could be on the BMC or an external chip) or signed images = deprive users of rights associated with code in OpenBMC that is GPL license= d? Meaning, GPL allows users to modify and distribute the GPL components. I= 'm not a legal expert, but I understand from the legal team in my compa= ny that these rights are not limited to making modifications to the GPL cod= e and that they also imply being able to deploy/boot such modified code; an= d the problem is secure boot/signed images would prevent the same. It also = looks like this isn't specific to GPLv3, but GPL in general (for eg GPL= v2 clause 6).

How are others dealing with this:
- By having an ability to disable secure boot (I see this as option= al in https://gerrit.openbmc-project.xyz/#/c/openbmc/docs/+/26169/)? What= if this is not an option on a system?
- Other options?
=
- Do you (or your legal team) view this is only a GPLv3 problem, or no= t a problem at all?

Thanks,
Deepak
--000000000000beaa0c05b337130d--