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Wed, 3 Feb 2021 20:24:03 +0000 (GMT) Subject: Re: Security Working Group meeting - Wednesday February 3 - results From: Joseph Reynolds To: openbmc References: Message-ID: Date: Wed, 3 Feb 2021 14:24:02 -0600 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.15; rv:78.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/78.5.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Content-Language: en-US X-TM-AS-GCONF: 00 X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=fsecure engine=2.50.10434:6.0.369, 18.0.737 definitions=2021-02-03_08:2021-02-03, 2021-02-03 signatures=0 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=outbound_notspam policy=outbound score=0 mlxscore=0 malwarescore=0 priorityscore=1501 bulkscore=0 spamscore=0 mlxlogscore=853 clxscore=1015 lowpriorityscore=0 phishscore=0 impostorscore=0 adultscore=0 suspectscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.12.0-2009150000 definitions=main-2102030118 X-BeenThere: openbmc@lists.ozlabs.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: Development list for OpenBMC List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Errors-To: openbmc-bounces+openbmc=archiver.kernel.org@lists.ozlabs.org Sender: "openbmc" On 2/2/21 10:51 AM, Joseph Reynolds wrote: > This is a reminder of the OpenBMC Security Working Group meeting > scheduled for this Wednesday February 3 at 10:00am PDT. > > We'll discuss the following items on the agenda > , > and anything else that comes up: > > 1. Continue to discuss APIs to disable HTTPS > https://gerrit.openbmc-project.xyz/c/openbmc/bmcweb/+/39006 > Is there a use case to allow users to disable the interface they are currently using?  For example, a Redfish user might disable IPMI and SSH, but why would they disable HTTPS? Agreed: Redfish should not be allowed to disable HTTPS.  IPMI should not be allowed to disable IPMI in a way that it could not be used to re-enable itself. We also mentioned MCTP channels. What {does|should} happen to login sessions {ipmi|https} when an interface is disabled?  They get logged off.  The ports get “cut” and the services get disabled. We discussed a race condition such that HTTPS disables IPMI at the same time IPMI disabled HTTPS.  Both might become disabled, resulting in no usable interfaces.  The consensus was this problem is not worth solving at this time. > > 2. Review Linux-PAM changes > https://gerrit.openbmc-project.xyz/c/openbmc/openbmc/+/40102 > and > https://gerrit.openbmc-project.xyz/c/openbmc/phosphor-user-manager/+/39853 > > Joseph described the effort to replace deprecated and removed PAM modules.  These modules were used by OpenBMC and their configuration arguments were modified by Redfish APIs (details are in the reviews). > > 3. Discuss plans for IBM Enterprise system “service” login support. > 3a. Implement restricted roles and restricted privileges per Redfish > spec DSP0266 1.12.0 aka 2020.4 > https://www.dmtf.org/sites/default/files/standards/documents/DSP0266_1.12.0.pdf > > > 3b. Story here: https://github.com/ibm-openbmc/dev/issues/1756 > > 3c. Need a special REST API to require variable privileges: > https://github.com/ibm-openbmc/dev/issues/2875 > Joseph introduced the Redfish spec changes (DSP0266 referenced above). We talked about aspects of the Access Control File (ACF) design The ACF design is similar to mutual TLS (mTLS) which is already implemented in OpenBMC.  Can we build on top of the mTLS design? What are the similarities between IBM’s & Intel’s approach? > > 4. Need help for > https://gerrit.openbmc-project.xyz/c/openbmc/bmcweb/+/39756 > ? Need reviews. > > 5. (Discord > OpenBMC > #yocto 2021-02-02) Security concerns using a > sstate cache. [Copied from Joseph’s Discord post]: I think yocto security agrees that you should trust a shared sstate cache that someone else built only if you trust that other party. (Reference email:https://lists.yoctoproject.org/g/yocto-security/message/264 ). For someone to use the OpenBMC project-level sstate cache, they would have to trust whoever has write access to that cache (such as: the host system, the host system admin, and the CI build process -- in other words, the geissonator). With this outlook, it seems okay to me to have a shared sstate cache. DISCUSSION: General agreement that this is okay, with the understanding that individual companies may decline to use this cache. Bonus topic 6: 6 There is interest in using yocto reproducible builds - https://wiki.yoctoproject.org/wiki/Reproducible_Builds > > > Access, agenda and notes are in the wiki: > https://github.com/openbmc/openbmc/wiki/Security-working-group >