From: Randy MacLeod <randy.macleod@windriver.com>
To: soumya.sambu@windriver.com,
openembedded-core@lists.openembedded.org,
"steve@sakoman.com" <steve@sakoman.com>
Subject: Re: [oe-core][kirkstone][PATCH 1/1] perl: Fix CVE-2023-31486
Date: Tue, 6 Jun 2023 14:24:32 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <91f02897-1a53-3458-d493-7cbb44016951@windriver.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230605032300.2325425-1-soumya.sambu@windriver.com>
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On 2023-06-04 23:23, Soumya via lists.openembedded.org wrote:
> HTTP::Tiny 0.082, a Perl core module since 5.13.9 and available standalone on CPAN,
> has an insecure default TLS configuration where users must opt in to verify certificates.
>
> Signed-off-by: Soumya<soumya.sambu@windriver.com>
> ---
> .../perl/files/CVE-2023-31486.patch | 89 +++++++++++++++++++
> meta/recipes-devtools/perl/perl_5.34.1.bb | 1 +
> 2 files changed, 90 insertions(+)
> create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/perl/files/CVE-2023-31486.patch
>
> diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/perl/files/CVE-2023-31486.patch b/meta/recipes-devtools/perl/files/CVE-2023-31486.patch
> new file mode 100644
> index 0000000000..55c4bd1d47
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/perl/files/CVE-2023-31486.patch
> @@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
> +From 1490431e40e22052f75a0b3449f1f53cbd27ba92 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
> +From: Dominic Hargreaves<dom@earth.li>
> +Date: Thu, 21 May 2020 22:53:37 +0100
> +Subject: [PATCH] Enable SSL by default in HTTP::Tiny
> +
> +Gbp-Pq: Topic debian
> +Gbp-Pq: Name http-tiny-ssl.diff
> +
> +CVE: CVE-2023-31486
> +
> +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://salsa.debian.org/perl-team/interpreter/perl/-/commit/1490431e40e22052f75a0b3449f1f53cbd27ba92.patch]
The upstream for the YP Perl recipe is not Debian but rather:
https://layers.openembedded.org/layerindex/branch/master/recipes/?q=perl
-> https://www.perl.org/get.html
-> https://dev.perl.org/perl5/source.html
git clone https://github.com/Perl/perl5.git perl
Please find the equivalent patch if it's available there and re-submit.
If the patch isn't there, there is a (not very active) maint-5.34 branch so
we should send a PR there and change the Upstream-Status for the oe-core
commit as needed.
../Randy
> +
> +Signed-off-by: Soumya<soumya.sambu@windriver.com>
> +---
> + cpan/HTTP-Tiny/lib/HTTP/Tiny.pm | 20 +++++++++-----------
> + 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
> +
> +diff --git a/cpan/HTTP-Tiny/lib/HTTP/Tiny.pm b/cpan/HTTP-Tiny/lib/HTTP/Tiny.pm
> +index 5803e45..88ba514 100644
> +--- a/cpan/HTTP-Tiny/lib/HTTP/Tiny.pm
> ++++ b/cpan/HTTP-Tiny/lib/HTTP/Tiny.pm
> +@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ sub _croak { require Carp; Carp::croak(@_) }
> + #pod * C<timeout> — Request timeout in seconds (default is 60) If a socket open,
> + #pod read or write takes longer than the timeout, an exception is thrown.
> + #pod * C<verify_SSL> — A boolean that indicates whether to validate the SSL
> +-#pod certificate of an C<https> — connection (default is false)
> ++#pod certificate of an C<https> — connection (default is true)
> + #pod * C<SSL_options> — A hashref of C<SSL_*> — options to pass through to
> + #pod L<IO::Socket::SSL>
> + #pod
> +@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ sub new {
> + max_redirect => 5,
> + timeout => defined $args{timeout} ? $args{timeout} : 60,
> + keep_alive => 1,
> +- verify_SSL => $args{verify_SSL} || $args{verify_ssl} || 0, # no verification by default
> ++ verify_SSL => $args{verify_SSL} // $args{verify_ssl} // 1, # verification by default
> + no_proxy => $ENV{no_proxy},
> + };
> +
> +@@ -1038,7 +1038,7 @@ sub new {
> + timeout => 60,
> + max_line_size => 16384,
> + max_header_lines => 64,
> +- verify_SSL => 0,
> ++ verify_SSL => 1,
> + SSL_options => {},
> + %args
> + }, $class;
> +@@ -1765,7 +1765,7 @@ C<timeout> — Request timeout in seconds (default is 60) If a socket open, read
> +
> + =item *
> +
> +-C<verify_SSL> — A boolean that indicates whether to validate the SSL certificate of an C<https> — connection (default is false)
> ++C<verify_SSL> — A boolean that indicates whether to validate the SSL certificate of an C<https> — connection (default is true)
> +
> + =item *
> +
> +@@ -2035,7 +2035,7 @@ Verification of server identity
> +
> + =back
> +
> +-B<By default, HTTP::Tiny does not verify server identity>.
> ++B<By default, HTTP::Tiny in Debian verifies server identity.
> +
> + Server identity verification is controversial and potentially tricky because it
> + depends on a (usually paid) third-party Certificate Authority (CA) trust model
> +@@ -2043,16 +2043,14 @@ to validate a certificate as legitimate. This discriminates against servers
> + with self-signed certificates or certificates signed by free, community-driven
> + CA's such as L<CAcert.org|http://cacert.org>.
> +
> +-By default, HTTP::Tiny does not make any assumptions about your trust model,
> +-threat level or risk tolerance. It just aims to give you an encrypted channel
> +-when you need one.
> +-
> + Setting the C<verify_SSL> attribute to a true value will make HTTP::Tiny verify
> + that an SSL connection has a valid SSL certificate corresponding to the host
> + name of the connection and that the SSL certificate has been verified by a CA.
> + Assuming you trust the CA, this will protect against a L<man-in-the-middle
> +-attack|http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Man-in-the-middle_attack>. If you are
> +-concerned about security, you should enable this option.
> ++attack|http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Man-in-the-middle_attack>.
> ++
> ++If you are not concerned about security, and this default in Debian causes
> ++problems, you should disable this option.
> +
> + Certificate verification requires a file containing trusted CA certificates.
> +
> +--
> +2.40.0
> diff --git a/meta/recipes-devtools/perl/perl_5.34.1.bb b/meta/recipes-devtools/perl/perl_5.34.1.bb
> index 42bcb8b1bc..af4660091b 100644
> --- a/meta/recipes-devtools/perl/perl_5.34.1.bb
> +++ b/meta/recipes-devtools/perl/perl_5.34.1.bb
> @@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ SRC_URI ="https://www.cpan.org/src/5.0/perl-${PV}.tar.gz;name=perl \
> file://determinism.patch \
> file://0001-cpan-Sys-Syslog-Makefile.PL-Fix-_PATH_LOG-for-determ.patch
> \ file://0001-Fix-build-with-gcc-12.patch \ +
> file://CVE-2023-31486.patch \ "
> SRC_URI:append:class-native = " \
> file://perl-configpm-switch.patch \
>
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--
# Randy MacLeod
# Wind River Linux
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-06-06 18:24 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-06-05 3:23 [oe-core][kirkstone][PATCH 1/1] perl: Fix CVE-2023-31486 Soumya
2023-06-06 18:24 ` Randy MacLeod [this message]
2023-07-14 3:21 Soumya
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