From: "Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
To: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>, Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@ziepe.ca>
Cc: linux-rdma@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
"Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
Subject: [PATCH] RDMA/ucma: Fix Spectre v1 vulnerability
Date: Tue, 16 Oct 2018 16:59:01 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20181016145901.GA8811@embeddedor.com> (raw)
hdr.cmd can be indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to
a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.
This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:
drivers/infiniband/core/ucma.c:1686 ucma_write() warn: potential
spectre issue 'ucma_cmd_table' [r] (local cap)
Fix this by sanitizing hdr.cmd before using it to index
ucm_cmd_table.
Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
completed with a dependent load/store [1].
[1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
---
drivers/infiniband/core/ucma.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/core/ucma.c b/drivers/infiniband/core/ucma.c
index 21863dd..01d68ed 100644
--- a/drivers/infiniband/core/ucma.c
+++ b/drivers/infiniband/core/ucma.c
@@ -44,6 +44,8 @@
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/nsproxy.h>
+#include <linux/nospec.h>
+
#include <rdma/rdma_user_cm.h>
#include <rdma/ib_marshall.h>
#include <rdma/rdma_cm.h>
@@ -1676,6 +1678,7 @@ static ssize_t ucma_write(struct file *filp, const char __user *buf,
if (hdr.cmd >= ARRAY_SIZE(ucma_cmd_table))
return -EINVAL;
+ hdr.cmd = array_index_nospec(hdr.cmd, ARRAY_SIZE(ucma_cmd_table));
if (hdr.in + sizeof(hdr) > len)
return -EINVAL;
--
2.7.4
next reply other threads:[~2018-10-16 14:59 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-10-16 14:59 Gustavo A. R. Silva [this message]
2018-10-16 16:49 ` [PATCH] RDMA/ucma: Fix Spectre v1 vulnerability Doug Ledford
2018-10-18 8:13 ` Gustavo A. R. Silva
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