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From: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
To: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>,
	Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>,
	David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>,
	Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
	Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>,
	Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>,
	Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>,
	Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>, Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>,
	Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	Dave Stewart <david.c.stewart@intel.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
	stable@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [Patch v6 16/16] x86/smt: Allow disabling of SMT when last SMT is offlined
Date: Tue, 20 Nov 2018 16:00:08 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <e48e75a70ec4a821caa0cf2393a0554d619afdd0.1542757030.git.tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <cover.1542757030.git.tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
In-Reply-To: <cover.1542757030.git.tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>

Currently cpu_use_smt_and_hotplug is only set during boot time
to indicate if SMT is in use.

However, CPU topology may change and when the last SMT thread is offlined,
the SMT code path can be skipped.  The sched_smt_present key detects
this condition.

Export sched_smt_present and incorporate it into cpu_use_smt_and_hotplug
to disable SMT code when there are no paired siblings.

Signed-off-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>
---
 include/linux/cpu.h  | 12 ++++++++++++
 kernel/sched/sched.h |  2 --
 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/cpu.h b/include/linux/cpu.h
index 4fef90a..2fc649d 100644
--- a/include/linux/cpu.h
+++ b/include/linux/cpu.h
@@ -100,6 +100,10 @@ static inline void cpu_maps_update_done(void)
 #endif /* CONFIG_SMP */
 extern struct bus_type cpu_subsys;
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_SCHED_SMT
+extern struct static_key_false sched_smt_present;
+#endif
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_HOTPLUG_CPU
 extern void cpus_write_lock(void);
 extern void cpus_write_unlock(void);
@@ -172,7 +176,15 @@ static inline void cpuhp_report_idle_dead(void) { }
 
 #if defined(CONFIG_SMP) && defined(CONFIG_HOTPLUG_SMT)
 DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_TRUE(cpu_smt_enabled);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SCHED_SMT
+#define cpu_use_smt_and_hotplug				\
+	(static_branch_likely(&cpu_smt_enabled) &&	\
+	 static_branch_unlikely(&sched_smt_present))
+#else
 #define cpu_use_smt_and_hotplug	(static_branch_likely(&cpu_smt_enabled))
+#endif
+
 extern void cpu_smt_disable(bool force);
 extern void cpu_smt_check_topology_early(void);
 extern void cpu_smt_check_topology(void);
diff --git a/kernel/sched/sched.h b/kernel/sched/sched.h
index 618577f..e1e3f09 100644
--- a/kernel/sched/sched.h
+++ b/kernel/sched/sched.h
@@ -937,8 +937,6 @@ static inline int cpu_of(struct rq *rq)
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SCHED_SMT
 
-extern struct static_key_false sched_smt_present;
-
 extern void __update_idle_core(struct rq *rq);
 
 static inline void update_idle_core(struct rq *rq)
-- 
2.9.4


  parent reply	other threads:[~2018-11-21  0:33 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 26+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-11-20 23:59 [Patch v6 00/16] Provide task property based options to enable Spectre v2 userspace-userspace protection Tim Chen
2018-11-20 23:59 ` [Patch v6 01/16] x86/speculation: Reorganize cpu_show_common() Tim Chen
2018-11-20 23:59 ` [Patch v6 02/16] x86/speculation: Add X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_ENHANCED Tim Chen
2018-11-20 23:59 ` [Patch v6 03/16] x86/speculation: Disable STIBP when enhanced IBRS is in use Tim Chen
2018-11-20 23:59 ` [Patch v6 04/16] x86/speculation: Rename SSBD update functions Tim Chen
2018-11-20 23:59 ` [Patch v6 05/16] x86/speculation: Reorganize speculation control MSRs update Tim Chen
2018-11-20 23:59 ` [Patch v6 06/16] smt: Create cpu_smt_enabled static key for SMT specific code Tim Chen
2018-11-20 23:59 ` [Patch v6 07/16] x86/smt: Convert cpu_smt_control check to cpu_smt_enabled static key Tim Chen
2018-11-21  0:00 ` [Patch v6 08/16] x86/speculation: Turn on or off STIBP according to a task's TIF_STIBP Tim Chen
2018-11-21  0:00 ` [Patch v6 09/16] x86/speculation: Add Spectre v2 app to app protection modes Tim Chen
2018-11-21  0:00 ` [Patch v6 10/16] x86/speculation: Create PRCTL interface to restrict indirect branch speculation Tim Chen
2018-11-21  0:00 ` [Patch v6 11/16] x86/speculation: Enable IBPB for tasks with TIF_SPEC_BRANCH_SPECULATION Tim Chen
2018-11-21  0:00 ` [Patch v6 12/16] x86/speculation: Add 'seccomp' Spectre v2 app to app protection mode Tim Chen
2018-11-21  0:44   ` Jiri Kosina
2018-11-21  0:54     ` Tim Chen
2018-11-21  0:00 ` [Patch v6 13/16] security: Update speculation restriction of a process when modifying its dumpability Tim Chen
2018-11-21  0:00 ` [Patch v6 14/16] x86/speculation: Use STIBP to restrict speculation on non-dumpable task Tim Chen
2018-11-21  1:27   ` Linus Torvalds
2018-11-21  6:14     ` Jiri Kosina
2018-11-21 17:41     ` Tim Chen
2018-11-21 19:32       ` Linus Torvalds
2018-11-21 20:07     ` Dave Hansen
2018-11-21 20:26       ` Linus Torvalds
2018-11-21  0:00 ` [Patch v6 15/16] sched/smt: Make sched_smt_present track topology Tim Chen
2018-11-21  0:00 ` Tim Chen [this message]
2018-11-21  0:44 ` [Patch v6 00/16] Provide task property based options to enable Spectre v2 userspace-userspace protection Tim Chen

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