From: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: x86@kernel.org, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
"H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>, Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>,
Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>,
Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>,
Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>,
Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>,
Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org,
Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>,
Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>,
linux-s390@vger.kernel.org,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>,
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Subject: [PATCH RFC 3/5] powerpc/speculation: Add support for 'cpu_spec_mitigations=' cmdline options
Date: Thu, 4 Apr 2019 11:44:13 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <91b92d8182d2f114d92c95689fcd4bb1a8dda1b0.1554396090.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <cover.1554396090.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Configure powerpc CPU runtime speculation bug mitigations in accordance
with the 'cpu_spec_mitigations=' cmdline options. This affects
Meltdown, Spectre v1, Spectre v2, and Speculative Store Bypass.
The default behavior is unchanged.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
---
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 9 +++++----
arch/powerpc/kernel/security.c | 6 +++---
arch/powerpc/kernel/setup_64.c | 2 +-
3 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
index 29dc03971630..0e8eae1e8a25 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -2552,10 +2552,11 @@
off
Disable all speculative CPU mitigations.
- Equivalent to: nopti [x86]
+ Equivalent to: nopti [x86, powerpc]
+ nospectre_v1 [powerpc]
nospectre_v2 [x86]
spectre_v2_user=off [x86]
- spec_store_bypass_disable=off [x86]
+ spec_store_bypass_disable=off [x86, powerpc]
l1tf=off [x86]
auto (default)
@@ -2568,7 +2569,7 @@
Equivalent to: pti=auto [x86]
spectre_v2=auto [x86]
spectre_v2_user=auto [x86]
- spec_store_bypass_disable=auto [x86]
+ spec_store_bypass_disable=auto [x86, powerpc]
l1tf=flush [x86]
auto,nosmt
@@ -2579,7 +2580,7 @@
Equivalent to: pti=auto [x86]
spectre_v2=auto [x86]
spectre_v2_user=auto [x86]
- spec_store_bypass_disable=auto [x86]
+ spec_store_bypass_disable=auto [x86, powerpc]
l1tf=flush,nosmt [x86]
mminit_loglevel=
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/security.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/security.c
index b33bafb8fcea..5aed4ad729ba 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/security.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/security.c
@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ void setup_barrier_nospec(void)
enable = security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_FAVOUR_SECURITY) &&
security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_BNDS_CHK_SPEC_BAR);
- if (!no_nospec)
+ if (!no_nospec && cpu_spec_mitigations != CPU_SPEC_MITIGATIONS_OFF)
enable_barrier_nospec(enable);
}
@@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ static int __init handle_nospectre_v2(char *p)
early_param("nospectre_v2", handle_nospectre_v2);
void setup_spectre_v2(void)
{
- if (no_spectrev2)
+ if (no_spectrev2 || cpu_spec_mitigations == CPU_SPEC_MITIGATIONS_OFF)
do_btb_flush_fixups();
else
btb_flush_enabled = true;
@@ -300,7 +300,7 @@ void setup_stf_barrier(void)
stf_enabled_flush_types = type;
- if (!no_stf_barrier)
+ if (!no_stf_barrier && cpu_spec_mitigations != CPU_SPEC_MITIGATIONS_OFF)
stf_barrier_enable(enable);
}
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/setup_64.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/setup_64.c
index ba404dd9ce1d..d9d796a66a79 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/setup_64.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/setup_64.c
@@ -932,7 +932,7 @@ void setup_rfi_flush(enum l1d_flush_type types, bool enable)
enabled_flush_types = types;
- if (!no_rfi_flush)
+ if (!no_rfi_flush || cpu_spec_mitigations != CPU_SPEC_MITIGATIONS_OFF)
rfi_flush_enable(enable);
}
--
2.17.2
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-04-04 16:45 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 33+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-04-04 16:44 [PATCH RFC 0/5] cpu/speculation: Add 'cpu_spec_mitigations=' cmdline options Josh Poimboeuf
2019-04-04 16:44 ` [PATCH RFC 1/5] " Josh Poimboeuf
2019-04-04 16:49 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-04-05 13:12 ` Borislav Petkov
2019-04-05 14:20 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-04-05 15:20 ` Borislav Petkov
2019-04-05 16:01 ` Borislav Petkov
2019-04-05 16:18 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-04-10 5:48 ` Michael Ellerman
2019-04-10 8:30 ` Borislav Petkov
2019-04-10 12:10 ` Thomas Gleixner
2019-04-11 13:15 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-04-12 2:41 ` Michael Ellerman
2019-04-12 2:29 ` Michael Ellerman
2019-04-04 16:44 ` [PATCH RFC 2/5] x86/speculation: Add support for " Josh Poimboeuf
2019-04-05 13:57 ` Borislav Petkov
2019-04-05 14:31 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-04-05 15:26 ` Borislav Petkov
2019-04-05 16:05 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-04-05 15:18 ` Randy Dunlap
2019-04-05 15:30 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-04-04 16:44 ` Josh Poimboeuf [this message]
2019-04-04 19:49 ` [PATCH RFC 3/5] powerpc/speculation: " Jiri Kosina
2019-04-04 20:01 ` Timothy Pearson
2019-04-10 6:06 ` Michael Ellerman
2019-04-11 4:02 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-04-04 16:44 ` [PATCH RFC 4/5] s390/speculation: " Josh Poimboeuf
2019-04-04 16:44 ` [PATCH RFC 5/5] arm64/speculation: " Josh Poimboeuf
2019-04-05 14:39 ` Steven Price
2019-04-05 14:43 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-04-05 14:44 ` Will Deacon
2019-04-05 16:03 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-04-04 16:50 ` [PATCH RFC 0/5] cpu/speculation: Add " Waiman Long
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