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From: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com>,
	Jonathan Adams <jwadams@google.com>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, Paul Turner <pjt@google.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	x86@kernel.org, Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
Subject: [RFC PATCH 6/7] security: enable system call isolation in kernel config
Date: Fri, 26 Apr 2019 00:45:53 +0300	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1556228754-12996-7-git-send-email-rppt@linux.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1556228754-12996-1-git-send-email-rppt@linux.ibm.com>

Add SYSCALL_ISOLATION Kconfig option to enable build of SCI infrastructure.

Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
---
 security/Kconfig | 10 ++++++++++
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)

diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
index e4fe2f3..0c6929a 100644
--- a/security/Kconfig
+++ b/security/Kconfig
@@ -65,6 +65,16 @@ config PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
 
 	  See Documentation/x86/pti.txt for more details.
 
+config SYSCALL_ISOLATION
+	bool "System call isolation"
+	default n
+	depends on PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION && !X86_PAE
+	help
+	  This is an experimental feature to allow executing system
+	  calls in an isolated address space.
+
+	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
+
 config SECURITY_INFINIBAND
 	bool "Infiniband Security Hooks"
 	depends on SECURITY && INFINIBAND
-- 
2.7.4


  parent reply	other threads:[~2019-04-25 21:46 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 41+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-04-25 21:45 [RFC PATCH 0/7] x86: introduce system calls addess space isolation Mike Rapoport
2019-04-25 21:45 ` [RFC PATCH 1/7] x86/cpufeatures: add X86_FEATURE_SCI Mike Rapoport
2019-04-25 21:45 ` [RFC PATCH 2/7] x86/sci: add core implementation for system call isolation Mike Rapoport
2019-04-26  7:49   ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-04-28  5:45     ` Mike Rapoport
2019-04-26  8:31   ` Ingo Molnar
2019-04-26  9:58     ` Ingo Molnar
2019-04-26 21:26       ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-04-27  8:47         ` Ingo Molnar
2019-04-27 10:46           ` Ingo Molnar
2019-04-29 18:26             ` James Morris
2019-04-29 18:43               ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-04-29 18:46             ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-04-30  5:03               ` Ingo Molnar
2019-04-30  9:38                 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-04-30 11:05                   ` Ingo Molnar
2019-05-02 11:35             ` Robert O'Callahan
2019-05-02 15:20               ` Ingo Molnar
2019-05-02 21:07                 ` Robert O'Callahan
2019-04-26 14:44     ` James Bottomley
2019-04-26 14:46   ` Dave Hansen
2019-04-26 14:57     ` James Bottomley
2019-04-26 15:07       ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-04-26 15:19         ` James Bottomley
2019-04-26 17:40           ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-04-26 18:49             ` James Bottomley
2019-04-26 19:22               ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-04-25 21:45 ` [RFC PATCH 3/7] x86/entry/64: add infrastructure for switching to isolated syscall context Mike Rapoport
2019-04-25 21:45 ` [RFC PATCH 4/7] x86/sci: hook up isolated system call entry and exit Mike Rapoport
2019-04-25 21:45 ` [RFC PATCH 5/7] x86/mm/fault: hook up SCI verification Mike Rapoport
2019-04-26  7:42   ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-04-28  5:47     ` Mike Rapoport
2019-04-30 16:44       ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-05-01  5:39         ` Mike Rapoport
2019-04-25 21:45 ` Mike Rapoport [this message]
2019-04-25 21:45 ` [RFC PATCH 7/7] sci: add example system calls to exercse SCI Mike Rapoport
2019-04-26  0:30 ` [RFC PATCH 0/7] x86: introduce system calls addess space isolation Andy Lutomirski
2019-04-26  8:07   ` Jiri Kosina
2019-04-28  6:01   ` Mike Rapoport
2019-04-26 14:41 ` Dave Hansen
2019-04-28  6:08   ` Mike Rapoport

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