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From: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>,
	Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>,
	linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
	linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org, linux-s390@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-um@lists.infradead.org, x86@kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH] seccomp: remove unused arg from secure_computing()
Date: Fri, 20 Sep 2019 15:19:09 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190920131907.6886-1-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com> (raw)

While touching seccomp code I realized that the struct seccomp_data
argument to secure_computing() seems to be unused by all current
callers. So let's remove it unless there is some subtlety I missed.
Note, I only tested this on x86.

Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Cc: linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-s390@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-um@lists.infradead.org
Cc: x86@kernel.org
---
 arch/arm/kernel/ptrace.c              | 2 +-
 arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c            | 2 +-
 arch/parisc/kernel/ptrace.c           | 2 +-
 arch/s390/kernel/ptrace.c             | 4 ++--
 arch/um/kernel/skas/syscall.c         | 2 +-
 arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c | 2 +-
 include/linux/seccomp.h               | 6 +++---
 7 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/arm/kernel/ptrace.c
index 324352787aea..b606cded90cd 100644
--- a/arch/arm/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/arch/arm/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -923,7 +923,7 @@ asmlinkage int syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs, int scno)
 
 	/* Do seccomp after ptrace; syscall may have changed. */
 #ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER
-	if (secure_computing(NULL) == -1)
+	if (secure_computing() == -1)
 		return -1;
 #else
 	/* XXX: remove this once OABI gets fixed */
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c
index 3cf3b135027e..010a835302d3 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -1816,7 +1816,7 @@ int syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)
 	}
 
 	/* Do the secure computing after ptrace; failures should be fast. */
-	if (secure_computing(NULL) == -1)
+	if (secure_computing() == -1)
 		return -1;
 
 	if (test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT))
diff --git a/arch/parisc/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/parisc/kernel/ptrace.c
index 9f6ff7bc06f9..f8c07dcbfb49 100644
--- a/arch/parisc/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/arch/parisc/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -342,7 +342,7 @@ long do_syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)
 	}
 
 	/* Do the secure computing check after ptrace. */
-	if (secure_computing(NULL) == -1)
+	if (secure_computing() == -1)
 		return -1;
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINTS
diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/s390/kernel/ptrace.c
index ad71132374f0..ed80bdfbf5fe 100644
--- a/arch/s390/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/arch/s390/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -439,7 +439,7 @@ static int poke_user(struct task_struct *child, addr_t addr, addr_t data)
 long arch_ptrace(struct task_struct *child, long request,
 		 unsigned long addr, unsigned long data)
 {
-	ptrace_area parea; 
+	ptrace_area parea;
 	int copied, ret;
 
 	switch (request) {
@@ -856,7 +856,7 @@ asmlinkage long do_syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)
 	}
 
 	/* Do the secure computing check after ptrace. */
-	if (secure_computing(NULL)) {
+	if (secure_computing()) {
 		/* seccomp failures shouldn't expose any additional code. */
 		return -1;
 	}
diff --git a/arch/um/kernel/skas/syscall.c b/arch/um/kernel/skas/syscall.c
index 44bb10785075..fc37259d5971 100644
--- a/arch/um/kernel/skas/syscall.c
+++ b/arch/um/kernel/skas/syscall.c
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ void handle_syscall(struct uml_pt_regs *r)
 		goto out;
 
 	/* Do the seccomp check after ptrace; failures should be fast. */
-	if (secure_computing(NULL) == -1)
+	if (secure_computing() == -1)
 		goto out;
 
 	syscall = UPT_SYSCALL_NR(r);
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c b/arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c
index e7c596dea947..b10cbf71a8cc 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/vsyscall/vsyscall_64.c
@@ -222,7 +222,7 @@ bool emulate_vsyscall(unsigned long error_code,
 	 */
 	regs->orig_ax = syscall_nr;
 	regs->ax = -ENOSYS;
-	tmp = secure_computing(NULL);
+	tmp = secure_computing();
 	if ((!tmp && regs->orig_ax != syscall_nr) || regs->ip != address) {
 		warn_bad_vsyscall(KERN_DEBUG, regs,
 				  "seccomp tried to change syscall nr or ip");
diff --git a/include/linux/seccomp.h b/include/linux/seccomp.h
index 84868d37b35d..03583b6d1416 100644
--- a/include/linux/seccomp.h
+++ b/include/linux/seccomp.h
@@ -33,10 +33,10 @@ struct seccomp {
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER
 extern int __secure_computing(const struct seccomp_data *sd);
-static inline int secure_computing(const struct seccomp_data *sd)
+static inline int secure_computing(void)
 {
 	if (unlikely(test_thread_flag(TIF_SECCOMP)))
-		return  __secure_computing(sd);
+		return  __secure_computing(NULL);
 	return 0;
 }
 #else
@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ struct seccomp { };
 struct seccomp_filter { };
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER
-static inline int secure_computing(struct seccomp_data *sd) { return 0; }
+static inline int secure_computing(void) { return 0; }
 #else
 static inline void secure_computing_strict(int this_syscall) { return; }
 #endif
-- 
2.23.0


             reply	other threads:[~2019-09-20 13:20 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 12+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-09-20 13:19 Christian Brauner [this message]
2019-09-23  9:49 ` [PATCH] seccomp: remove unused arg from secure_computing() Borislav Petkov
2019-09-23 18:41   ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-09-23 19:34     ` Borislav Petkov
2019-09-23 23:51       ` Kees Cook
2019-09-24  6:19       ` Christian Brauner
2019-09-24  6:30     ` Christian Brauner
2019-09-24  6:44 ` [PATCH v1] seccomp: simplify secure_computing() Christian Brauner
2019-09-24  9:51   ` Borislav Petkov
2019-09-24 17:11   ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-10-10 21:53   ` Kees Cook
2019-10-11  9:45     ` Christian Brauner

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