From: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
To: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>, Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
elena.reshetova@intel.com,
Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>,
Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>,
Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH v1 1/3] capabilities: introduce CAP_SYS_PERFMON to kernel and user space
Date: Thu, 5 Dec 2019 19:19:51 +0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <4ebe4d05-85c3-20dc-89a4-ed8f052d586e@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <283f09a5-33bd-eac3-bdfd-83d775045bf9@linux.intel.com>
Introduce CAP_SYS_PERFMON capability dedicated to secure performance
monitoring activity so that CAP_SYS_PERFMON would assist CAP_SYS_ADMIN
capability in its governing role for perf_events based performance
monitoring of a system.
CAP_SYS_PERFMON aims to harden system security and integrity during
performance monitoring by decreasing attack surface that is available
to CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes.
CAP_SYS_PERFMON aims to take over CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials related to
performance monitoring functionality of perf_events and balance amount of
CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials in accordance with the recommendations provided in
the man page for CAP_SYS_ADMIN [3]: "Note: this capability is overloaded;
see Notes to kernel developers, below."
Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
---
include/uapi/linux/capability.h | 10 +++++++++-
security/selinux/include/classmap.h | 4 ++--
2 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/capability.h b/include/uapi/linux/capability.h
index 240fdb9a60f6..c9514f034be1 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/capability.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/capability.h
@@ -366,8 +366,16 @@ struct vfs_ns_cap_data {
#define CAP_AUDIT_READ 37
+/*
+ * Allow usage of perf_event_open() syscall (perf_events subsystem):
+ * http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/perf_event_open.2.html
+ * beyond the scope permitted by perf_event_paranoid kernel setting.
+ * See Documentation/admin-guide/perf-security.rst for more information.
+ */
+
+#define CAP_SYS_PERFMON 38
-#define CAP_LAST_CAP CAP_AUDIT_READ
+#define CAP_LAST_CAP CAP_SYS_PERFMON
#define cap_valid(x) ((x) >= 0 && (x) <= CAP_LAST_CAP)
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
index 7db24855e12d..bae602c623b0 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
@@ -27,9 +27,9 @@
"audit_control", "setfcap"
#define COMMON_CAP2_PERMS "mac_override", "mac_admin", "syslog", \
- "wake_alarm", "block_suspend", "audit_read"
+ "wake_alarm", "block_suspend", "audit_read", "sys_perfmon"
-#if CAP_LAST_CAP > CAP_AUDIT_READ
+#if CAP_LAST_CAP > CAP_SYS_PERFMON
#error New capability defined, please update COMMON_CAP2_PERMS.
#endif
--
2.20.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-12-05 16:20 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 18+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-12-05 16:15 [PATCH v1 0/3] Introduce CAP_SYS_PERFMON capability for secure Perf users groups Alexey Budankov
2019-12-05 16:19 ` Alexey Budankov [this message]
2019-12-05 16:21 ` [PATCH v1 2/3] perf/core: apply CAP_SYS_PERFMON to CPUs and kernel monitoring Alexey Budankov
2019-12-05 16:22 ` [PATCH v1 3/3] perf tool: extend Perf tool with CAP_SYS_PERFMON support Alexey Budankov
2019-12-05 16:49 ` [PATCH v1 0/3] Introduce CAP_SYS_PERFMON capability for secure Perf users groups Casey Schaufler
2019-12-05 17:05 ` Alexey Budankov
2019-12-05 17:33 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-12-05 18:11 ` Andi Kleen
2019-12-05 18:37 ` Alexey Budankov
2019-12-11 10:52 ` Alexey Budankov
2019-12-11 15:24 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-12-11 17:00 ` Alexey Budankov
2019-12-11 18:09 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-12-11 20:36 ` Andi Kleen
2019-12-11 21:25 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-12-12 14:24 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-12-15 11:53 ` Alexey Budankov
2019-12-11 19:04 ` Stephane Eranian
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