From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, platform-driver-x86@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>,
Darren Hart <dvhart@infradead.org>,
Andy Shevchenko <andy@infradead.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Subject: [PATCH v3 2/2] x86/efi: Add RNG seed EFI table to unencrypted mapping check
Date: Tue, 25 Feb 2020 14:34:02 -0600 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <b64385fc13e5d7ad4b459216524f138e7879234f.1582662842.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <cover.1582662842.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
When booting with SME active, EFI tables must be mapped unencrypted since
they were built by UEFI in unencrypted memory. Update the list of tables
to be checked during early_memremap() processing to account for the EFI
RNG seed table.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
---
arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c | 1 +
drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c | 18 ++++++++++--------
include/linux/efi.h | 2 ++
3 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c
index 0a8117865430..aca9bdd87bca 100644
--- a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c
+++ b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c
@@ -90,6 +90,7 @@ static const unsigned long * const efi_tables[] = {
#endif
&efi.tpm_log,
&efi.tpm_final_log,
+ &efi_rng_seed,
};
u64 efi_setup; /* efi setup_data physical address */
diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c b/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c
index 69a585106d30..1e79f77d4e6c 100644
--- a/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c
+++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c
@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ struct efi __read_mostly efi = {
};
EXPORT_SYMBOL(efi);
-static unsigned long __ro_after_init rng_seed = EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR;
+unsigned long __ro_after_init efi_rng_seed = EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR;
static unsigned long __initdata mem_reserve = EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR;
static unsigned long __initdata rt_prop = EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR;
@@ -451,7 +451,7 @@ static const efi_config_table_type_t common_tables[] __initconst = {
{SMBIOS3_TABLE_GUID, "SMBIOS 3.0", &efi.smbios3},
{EFI_SYSTEM_RESOURCE_TABLE_GUID, "ESRT", &efi.esrt},
{EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_TABLE_GUID, "MEMATTR", &efi_mem_attr_table},
- {LINUX_EFI_RANDOM_SEED_TABLE_GUID, "RNG", &rng_seed},
+ {LINUX_EFI_RANDOM_SEED_TABLE_GUID, "RNG", &efi_rng_seed},
{LINUX_EFI_TPM_EVENT_LOG_GUID, "TPMEventLog", &efi.tpm_log},
{LINUX_EFI_TPM_FINAL_LOG_GUID, "TPMFinalLog", &efi.tpm_final_log},
{LINUX_EFI_MEMRESERVE_TABLE_GUID, "MEMRESERVE", &mem_reserve},
@@ -519,11 +519,11 @@ int __init efi_config_parse_tables(const efi_config_table_t *config_tables,
pr_cont("\n");
set_bit(EFI_CONFIG_TABLES, &efi.flags);
- if (rng_seed != EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR) {
+ if (efi_rng_seed != EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR) {
struct linux_efi_random_seed *seed;
u32 size = 0;
- seed = early_memremap(rng_seed, sizeof(*seed));
+ seed = early_memremap(efi_rng_seed, sizeof(*seed));
if (seed != NULL) {
size = seed->size;
early_memunmap(seed, sizeof(*seed));
@@ -531,7 +531,8 @@ int __init efi_config_parse_tables(const efi_config_table_t *config_tables,
pr_err("Could not map UEFI random seed!\n");
}
if (size > 0) {
- seed = early_memremap(rng_seed, sizeof(*seed) + size);
+ seed = early_memremap(efi_rng_seed,
+ sizeof(*seed) + size);
if (seed != NULL) {
pr_notice("seeding entropy pool\n");
add_bootloader_randomness(seed->bits, seed->size);
@@ -923,7 +924,7 @@ static int update_efi_random_seed(struct notifier_block *nb,
if (!kexec_in_progress)
return NOTIFY_DONE;
- seed = memremap(rng_seed, sizeof(*seed), MEMREMAP_WB);
+ seed = memremap(efi_rng_seed, sizeof(*seed), MEMREMAP_WB);
if (seed != NULL) {
size = min(seed->size, EFI_RANDOM_SEED_SIZE);
memunmap(seed);
@@ -931,7 +932,8 @@ static int update_efi_random_seed(struct notifier_block *nb,
pr_err("Could not map UEFI random seed!\n");
}
if (size > 0) {
- seed = memremap(rng_seed, sizeof(*seed) + size, MEMREMAP_WB);
+ seed = memremap(efi_rng_seed, sizeof(*seed) + size,
+ MEMREMAP_WB);
if (seed != NULL) {
seed->size = size;
get_random_bytes(seed->bits, seed->size);
@@ -949,7 +951,7 @@ static struct notifier_block efi_random_seed_nb = {
static int __init register_update_efi_random_seed(void)
{
- if (rng_seed == EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR)
+ if (efi_rng_seed == EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR)
return 0;
return register_reboot_notifier(&efi_random_seed_nb);
}
diff --git a/include/linux/efi.h b/include/linux/efi.h
index 2ab33d5d6ca5..e8a08a499131 100644
--- a/include/linux/efi.h
+++ b/include/linux/efi.h
@@ -526,6 +526,8 @@ typedef struct {
efi_time_t time_of_revocation;
} efi_cert_x509_sha256_t;
+extern unsigned long __ro_after_init efi_rng_seed; /* RNG Seed table */
+
/*
* All runtime access to EFI goes through this structure:
*/
--
2.17.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-02-25 20:34 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-02-25 20:34 [PATCH v3 0/2] SME EFI table updates/fixes Tom Lendacky
2020-02-25 20:34 ` [PATCH v3 1/2] x86/efi: Add TPM related EFI tables to unencrypted mapping checks Tom Lendacky
2020-02-25 20:34 ` Tom Lendacky [this message]
2020-02-25 20:38 ` [PATCH v3 0/2] SME EFI table updates/fixes Ard Biesheuvel
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