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From: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
To: tglx@linutronix.de, luto@kernel.org, ak@linux.intel.com
Cc: corbet@lwn.net, mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de, x86@kernel.org,
	shuah@kernel.org, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org,
	tony.luck@intel.com, chang.seok.bae@intel.com,
	dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, peterz@infradead.org,
	linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com,
	Ravi Shankar <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>,
	"H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH v13 12/16] x86/cpu: Enable FSGSBASE on 64bit by default and add a chicken bit
Date: Thu, 28 May 2020 16:13:58 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200528201402.1708239-13-sashal@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200528201402.1708239-1-sashal@kernel.org>

From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>

Now that FSGSBASE is fully supported, remove unsafe_fsgsbase, enable
FSGSBASE by default, and add nofsgsbase to disable it.

Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Chang S. Bae <chang.seok.bae@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Ravi Shankar <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1557309753-24073-17-git-send-email-chang.seok.bae@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt         |  3 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c                  | 32 ++++++++-----------
 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
index af3aaade195b..1924845c879c 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -3033,8 +3033,7 @@
 	no5lvl		[X86-64] Disable 5-level paging mode. Forces
 			kernel to use 4-level paging instead.
 
-	unsafe_fsgsbase	[X86] Allow FSGSBASE instructions.  This will be
-			replaced with a nofsgsbase flag.
+	nofsgsbase	[X86] Disables FSGSBASE instructions.
 
 	no_console_suspend
 			[HW] Never suspend the console
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
index 4224760c74e2..0d480cbadc7d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -418,21 +418,21 @@ static void __init setup_cr_pinning(void)
 	static_key_enable(&cr_pinning.key);
 }
 
-/*
- * Temporary hack: FSGSBASE is unsafe until a few kernel code paths are
- * updated. This allows us to get the kernel ready incrementally.
- *
- * Once all the pieces are in place, these will go away and be replaced with
- * a nofsgsbase chicken flag.
- */
-static bool unsafe_fsgsbase;
-
-static __init int setup_unsafe_fsgsbase(char *arg)
+static __init int x86_nofsgsbase_setup(char *arg)
 {
-	unsafe_fsgsbase = true;
+	/* Require an exact match without trailing characters. */
+	if (strlen(arg))
+		return 0;
+
+	/* Do not emit a message if the feature is not present. */
+	if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_FSGSBASE))
+		return 1;
+
+	setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_FSGSBASE);
+	pr_info("FSGSBASE disabled via kernel command line\n");
 	return 1;
 }
-__setup("unsafe_fsgsbase", setup_unsafe_fsgsbase);
+__setup("nofsgsbase", x86_nofsgsbase_setup);
 
 /*
  * Protection Keys are not available in 32-bit mode.
@@ -1495,12 +1495,8 @@ static void identify_cpu(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 	setup_umip(c);
 
 	/* Enable FSGSBASE instructions if available. */
-	if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_FSGSBASE)) {
-		if (unsafe_fsgsbase)
-			cr4_set_bits(X86_CR4_FSGSBASE);
-		else
-			clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_FSGSBASE);
-	}
+	if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_FSGSBASE))
+		cr4_set_bits(X86_CR4_FSGSBASE);
 
 	/*
 	 * The vendor-specific functions might have changed features.
-- 
2.25.1


  parent reply	other threads:[~2020-05-28 20:15 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 28+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-05-28 20:13 [PATCH v13 00/16] Enable FSGSBASE instructions Sasha Levin
2020-05-28 20:13 ` [PATCH v13 01/16] x86/ptrace: Prevent ptrace from clearing the FS/GS selector Sasha Levin
2020-05-28 20:13 ` [PATCH v13 02/16] x86/cpu: Add 'unsafe_fsgsbase' to enable CR4.FSGSBASE Sasha Levin
2020-05-28 20:13 ` [PATCH v13 03/16] x86/fsgsbase/64: Add intrinsics for FSGSBASE instructions Sasha Levin
2020-05-28 20:13 ` [PATCH v13 04/16] x86/fsgsbase/64: Enable FSGSBASE instructions in helper functions Sasha Levin
2020-05-28 20:13 ` [PATCH v13 05/16] x86/process/64: Use FSBSBASE in switch_to() if available Sasha Levin
2020-05-28 20:13 ` [PATCH v13 06/16] x86/process/64: Make save_fsgs() public available Sasha Levin
2020-06-18 13:50   ` [tip: x86/fsgsbase] x86/process/64: Make save_fsgs_for_kvm() ready for FSGSBASE tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2020-05-28 20:13 ` [PATCH v13 07/16] x86/process/64: Use FSGSBASE instructions on thread copy and ptrace Sasha Levin
2020-05-28 20:13 ` [PATCH v13 08/16] x86/speculation/swapgs: Check FSGSBASE in enabling SWAPGS mitigation Sasha Levin
2020-06-18 13:50   ` [tip: x86/fsgsbase] " tip-bot2 for Tony Luck
2020-05-28 20:13 ` [PATCH v13 09/16] x86/entry/64: Switch CR3 before SWAPGS in paranoid entry Sasha Levin
2020-05-28 20:13 ` [PATCH v13 10/16] x86/entry/64: Introduce the FIND_PERCPU_BASE macro Sasha Levin
2020-05-28 20:13 ` [PATCH v13 11/16] x86/entry/64: Handle FSGSBASE enabled paranoid entry/exit Sasha Levin
2020-05-28 20:13 ` Sasha Levin [this message]
2020-05-28 20:13 ` [PATCH v13 13/16] x86/elf: Enumerate kernel FSGSBASE capability in AT_HWCAP2 Sasha Levin
2020-10-26 17:18   ` [PATCH] x86/elf: Fix use of internal macro BIT in uapi header Thiago Macieira
2020-05-28 20:14 ` [PATCH v13 14/16] Documentation/x86/64: Add documentation for GS/FS addressing mode Sasha Levin
2020-06-18 13:50   ` [tip: x86/fsgsbase] " tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2020-05-28 20:14 ` [PATCH v13 15/16] selftests/x86/fsgsbase: Test GS selector on ptracer-induced GS base write Sasha Levin
2020-05-29 14:40   ` Shuah Khan
2020-06-18 13:50   ` [tip: x86/fsgsbase] " tip-bot2 for Chang S. Bae
2020-05-28 20:14 ` [PATCH v13 16/16] selftests/x86/fsgsbase: Test ptracer-induced GS base write with FSGSBASE Sasha Levin
2020-05-29 14:42   ` Shuah Khan
2020-06-18 13:50   ` [tip: x86/fsgsbase] " tip-bot2 for Chang S. Bae
2020-06-18 14:18 ` [PATCH v13 00/16] Enable FSGSBASE instructions Thomas Gleixner
2020-06-18 18:08   ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-06-18 18:25     ` Thomas Gleixner

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