From: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
To: elver@google.com
Cc: peterz@infradead.org, bp@alien8.de, tglx@linutronix.de,
mingo@kernel.org, clang-built-linux@googlegroups.com,
paulmck@kernel.org, dvyukov@google.com, glider@google.com,
andreyknvl@google.com, kasan-dev@googlegroups.com,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
akpm@linux-foundation.org
Subject: [PATCH -tip v3 1/2] kcov: Make runtime functions noinstr-compatible
Date: Fri, 5 Jun 2020 10:28:38 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200605082839.226418-1-elver@google.com> (raw)
While we lack a compiler attribute to add to noinstr that would disable
KCOV, make the KCOV runtime functions return if the caller is in a
noinstr section, and mark them noinstr.
Declare write_comp_data() as __always_inline to ensure it is inlined,
which also reduces stack usage and removes one extra call from the
fast-path.
In future, our compilers may provide an attribute to implement
__no_sanitize_coverage, which can then be added to noinstr, and the
checks added in this patch can be guarded by an #ifdef checking if the
compiler has such an attribute or not.
Signed-off-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
---
Applies to -tip only currently, because of the use of instrumentation.h
markers.
v3:
* Remove objtool hack, and instead properly mark __sanitizer_cov
functions as noinstr.
* Add comment about .entry.text.
v2: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200604145635.21565-1-elver@google.com
* Rewrite based on Peter's and Andrey's feedback -- v1 worked because we
got lucky. Let's not rely on luck, as it will be difficult to ensure the
same conditions remain true in future.
v1: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200604095057.259452-1-elver@google.com
Note: There are a set of KCOV patches from Andrey in -next:
https://lkml.kernel.org/r/cover.1585233617.git.andreyknvl@google.com --
Git cleanly merges this patch with those patches, and no merge conflict
is expected.
---
kernel/kcov.c | 59 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------
1 file changed, 45 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/kcov.c b/kernel/kcov.c
index 8accc9722a81..84cdc30d478e 100644
--- a/kernel/kcov.c
+++ b/kernel/kcov.c
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
#include <linux/compiler.h>
#include <linux/errno.h>
#include <linux/export.h>
+#include <linux/instrumentation.h>
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <linux/file.h>
#include <linux/fs.h>
@@ -24,6 +25,7 @@
#include <linux/refcount.h>
#include <linux/log2.h>
#include <asm/setup.h>
+#include <asm/sections.h>
#define kcov_debug(fmt, ...) pr_debug("%s: " fmt, __func__, ##__VA_ARGS__)
@@ -172,20 +174,38 @@ static notrace unsigned long canonicalize_ip(unsigned long ip)
return ip;
}
+/* Return true if @ip is within a noinstr section. */
+static __always_inline bool within_noinstr_section(unsigned long ip)
+{
+ /*
+ * Note: .entry.text is also considered noinstr, but for now, since all
+ * .entry.text code lives in .S files, these are never instrumented.
+ */
+ return (unsigned long)__noinstr_text_start <= ip &&
+ ip < (unsigned long)__noinstr_text_end;
+}
+
/*
* Entry point from instrumented code.
* This is called once per basic-block/edge.
*/
-void notrace __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc(void)
+void noinstr __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc(void)
{
struct task_struct *t;
unsigned long *area;
- unsigned long ip = canonicalize_ip(_RET_IP_);
+ unsigned long ip;
unsigned long pos;
+ if (unlikely(within_noinstr_section(_RET_IP_)))
+ return;
+
+ instrumentation_begin();
+
t = current;
if (!check_kcov_mode(KCOV_MODE_TRACE_PC, t))
- return;
+ goto out;
+
+ ip = canonicalize_ip(_RET_IP_);
area = t->kcov_area;
/* The first 64-bit word is the number of subsequent PCs. */
@@ -194,19 +214,27 @@ void notrace __sanitizer_cov_trace_pc(void)
area[pos] = ip;
WRITE_ONCE(area[0], pos);
}
+
+out:
+ instrumentation_end();
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__sanitizer_cov_trace_pc);
#ifdef CONFIG_KCOV_ENABLE_COMPARISONS
-static void notrace write_comp_data(u64 type, u64 arg1, u64 arg2, u64 ip)
+static __always_inline void write_comp_data(u64 type, u64 arg1, u64 arg2, u64 ip)
{
struct task_struct *t;
u64 *area;
u64 count, start_index, end_pos, max_pos;
+ if (unlikely(within_noinstr_section(ip)))
+ return;
+
+ instrumentation_begin();
+
t = current;
if (!check_kcov_mode(KCOV_MODE_TRACE_CMP, t))
- return;
+ goto out;
ip = canonicalize_ip(ip);
@@ -229,61 +257,64 @@ static void notrace write_comp_data(u64 type, u64 arg1, u64 arg2, u64 ip)
area[start_index + 3] = ip;
WRITE_ONCE(area[0], count + 1);
}
+
+out:
+ instrumentation_end();
}
-void notrace __sanitizer_cov_trace_cmp1(u8 arg1, u8 arg2)
+void noinstr __sanitizer_cov_trace_cmp1(u8 arg1, u8 arg2)
{
write_comp_data(KCOV_CMP_SIZE(0), arg1, arg2, _RET_IP_);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__sanitizer_cov_trace_cmp1);
-void notrace __sanitizer_cov_trace_cmp2(u16 arg1, u16 arg2)
+void noinstr __sanitizer_cov_trace_cmp2(u16 arg1, u16 arg2)
{
write_comp_data(KCOV_CMP_SIZE(1), arg1, arg2, _RET_IP_);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__sanitizer_cov_trace_cmp2);
-void notrace __sanitizer_cov_trace_cmp4(u32 arg1, u32 arg2)
+void noinstr __sanitizer_cov_trace_cmp4(u32 arg1, u32 arg2)
{
write_comp_data(KCOV_CMP_SIZE(2), arg1, arg2, _RET_IP_);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__sanitizer_cov_trace_cmp4);
-void notrace __sanitizer_cov_trace_cmp8(u64 arg1, u64 arg2)
+void noinstr __sanitizer_cov_trace_cmp8(u64 arg1, u64 arg2)
{
write_comp_data(KCOV_CMP_SIZE(3), arg1, arg2, _RET_IP_);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__sanitizer_cov_trace_cmp8);
-void notrace __sanitizer_cov_trace_const_cmp1(u8 arg1, u8 arg2)
+void noinstr __sanitizer_cov_trace_const_cmp1(u8 arg1, u8 arg2)
{
write_comp_data(KCOV_CMP_SIZE(0) | KCOV_CMP_CONST, arg1, arg2,
_RET_IP_);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__sanitizer_cov_trace_const_cmp1);
-void notrace __sanitizer_cov_trace_const_cmp2(u16 arg1, u16 arg2)
+void noinstr __sanitizer_cov_trace_const_cmp2(u16 arg1, u16 arg2)
{
write_comp_data(KCOV_CMP_SIZE(1) | KCOV_CMP_CONST, arg1, arg2,
_RET_IP_);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__sanitizer_cov_trace_const_cmp2);
-void notrace __sanitizer_cov_trace_const_cmp4(u32 arg1, u32 arg2)
+void noinstr __sanitizer_cov_trace_const_cmp4(u32 arg1, u32 arg2)
{
write_comp_data(KCOV_CMP_SIZE(2) | KCOV_CMP_CONST, arg1, arg2,
_RET_IP_);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__sanitizer_cov_trace_const_cmp4);
-void notrace __sanitizer_cov_trace_const_cmp8(u64 arg1, u64 arg2)
+void noinstr __sanitizer_cov_trace_const_cmp8(u64 arg1, u64 arg2)
{
write_comp_data(KCOV_CMP_SIZE(3) | KCOV_CMP_CONST, arg1, arg2,
_RET_IP_);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__sanitizer_cov_trace_const_cmp8);
-void notrace __sanitizer_cov_trace_switch(u64 val, u64 *cases)
+void noinstr __sanitizer_cov_trace_switch(u64 val, u64 *cases)
{
u64 i;
u64 count = cases[0];
--
2.27.0.278.ge193c7cf3a9-goog
next reply other threads:[~2020-06-05 8:28 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 30+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-06-05 8:28 Marco Elver [this message]
2020-06-05 8:28 ` [PATCH -tip v3 2/2] kcov: Unconditionally add -fno-stack-protector to compiler options Marco Elver
2020-06-05 16:50 ` Nick Desaulniers
2020-06-05 10:57 ` [PATCH -tip v3 1/2] kcov: Make runtime functions noinstr-compatible Dmitry Vyukov
2020-06-05 12:03 ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-06-05 13:25 ` Andrey Konovalov
2020-06-07 9:37 ` Dmitry Vyukov
2020-06-08 7:48 ` Marco Elver
2020-06-08 7:57 ` Dmitry Vyukov
2020-06-08 11:01 ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-06-11 21:55 ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-06-11 21:58 ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-06-12 11:34 ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-06-12 4:04 ` Dmitry Vyukov
2020-06-12 11:49 ` Marco Elver
2020-06-13 17:24 ` Dmitry Vyukov
2020-06-15 7:53 ` Marco Elver
2020-06-15 14:29 ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-06-15 14:35 ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-06-15 14:53 ` Marco Elver
2020-06-15 15:03 ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-06-15 15:20 ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-06-17 14:32 ` Marco Elver
2020-06-17 14:49 ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-06-17 15:19 ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-06-17 15:19 ` Marco Elver
2020-06-17 15:55 ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-06-17 16:36 ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-06-17 18:06 ` Marco Elver
2020-06-15 14:54 ` Peter Zijlstra
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