[tip: x86/fsgsbase] x86/speculation/swapgs: Check FSGSBASE in enabling SWAPGS mitigation - tip-bot2 for Tony Luck

From: "tip-bot2 for Tony Luck" <tip-bot2@linutronix.de>
To: linux-tip-commits@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>,
	"Chang S. Bae" <chang.seok.bae@intel.com>,
	Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>, x86 <x86@kernel.org>,
	LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: [tip: x86/fsgsbase] x86/speculation/swapgs: Check FSGSBASE in enabling SWAPGS mitigation
Date: Thu, 18 Jun 2020 13:50:57 -0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <159248825731.16989.10228192989851794615.tip-bot2@tip-bot2> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200528201402.1708239-9-sashal@kernel.org>

The following commit has been merged into the x86/fsgsbase branch of tip:

Commit-ID:     978e1342c3c4d7b20808fd5875d9ac0d57db22ee
Gitweb:        https://git.kernel.org/tip/978e1342c3c4d7b20808fd5875d9ac0d57db22ee
Author:        Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
AuthorDate:    Thu, 28 May 2020 16:13:54 -04:00
Committer:     Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
CommitterDate: Thu, 18 Jun 2020 15:47:02 +02:00

x86/speculation/swapgs: Check FSGSBASE in enabling SWAPGS mitigation

Before enabling FSGSBASE the kernel could safely assume that the content
of GS base was a user address. Thus any speculative access as the result
of a mispredicted branch controlling the execution of SWAPGS would be to
a user address. So systems with speculation-proof SMAP did not need to
add additional LFENCE instructions to mitigate.

With FSGSBASE enabled a hostile user can set GS base to a kernel address.
So they can make the kernel speculatively access data they wish to leak
via a side channel. This means that SMAP provides no protection.

Add FSGSBASE as an additional condition to enable the fence-based SWAPGS
mitigation.

Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Chang S. Bae <chang.seok.bae@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200528201402.1708239-9-sashal@kernel.org


---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 6 ++----
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 0b71970..5ea5fbd 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -543,14 +543,12 @@ static void __init spectre_v1_select_mitigation(void)
 		 * If FSGSBASE is enabled, the user can put a kernel address in
 		 * GS, in which case SMAP provides no protection.
 		 *
-		 * [ NOTE: Don't check for X86_FEATURE_FSGSBASE until the
-		 *	   FSGSBASE enablement patches have been merged. ]
-		 *
 		 * If FSGSBASE is disabled, the user can only put a user space
 		 * address in GS.  That makes an attack harder, but still
 		 * possible if there's no SMAP protection.
 		 */
-		if (!smap_works_speculatively()) {
+		if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_FSGSBASE) ||
+		    !smap_works_speculatively()) {
 			/*
 			 * Mitigation can be provided from SWAPGS itself or
 			 * PTI as the CR3 write in the Meltdown mitigation
