From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, John Wood <john.wood@gmx.com>,
Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Juri Lelli <juri.lelli@redhat.com>,
Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>,
Dietmar Eggemann <dietmar.eggemann@arm.com>,
Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>,
Ben Segall <bsegall@google.com>, Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>,
Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>,
Iurii Zaikin <yzaikin@google.com>,
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [RFC PATCH 1/6] security/fbfam: Add a Kconfig to enable the fbfam feature
Date: Thu, 10 Sep 2020 13:21:02 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200910202107.3799376-2-keescook@chromium.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200910202107.3799376-1-keescook@chromium.org>
From: John Wood <john.wood@gmx.com>
Add a menu entry under "Security options" to enable the "Fork brute
force attack mitigation" feature.
Signed-off-by: John Wood <john.wood@gmx.com>
---
security/Kconfig | 1 +
security/fbfam/Kconfig | 10 ++++++++++
2 files changed, 11 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 security/fbfam/Kconfig
diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
index 7561f6f99f1d..00a90e25b8d5 100644
--- a/security/Kconfig
+++ b/security/Kconfig
@@ -290,6 +290,7 @@ config LSM
If unsure, leave this as the default.
source "security/Kconfig.hardening"
+source "security/fbfam/Kconfig"
endmenu
diff --git a/security/fbfam/Kconfig b/security/fbfam/Kconfig
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..bbe7f6aad369
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/fbfam/Kconfig
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+config FBFAM
+ bool "Fork brute force attack mitigation"
+ default n
+ help
+ This is a user defense that detects any fork brute force attack
+ based on the application's crashing rate. When this measure is
+ triggered the fork system call is blocked.
+
+ If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
--
2.25.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-09-10 20:50 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 47+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-09-10 20:21 [RESEND][RFC PATCH 0/6] Fork brute force attack mitigation (fbfam) Kees Cook
2020-09-10 20:21 ` Kees Cook [this message]
2020-09-10 21:21 ` [RFC PATCH 1/6] security/fbfam: Add a Kconfig to enable the fbfam feature Jann Horn
2020-09-17 17:32 ` John Wood
2020-09-10 23:18 ` Kees Cook
2020-09-17 18:40 ` John Wood
2020-09-17 22:05 ` Kees Cook
2020-09-18 14:50 ` John Wood
2020-09-10 20:21 ` [RFC PATCH 2/6] security/fbfam: Add the api to manage statistics Kees Cook
2020-09-10 23:23 ` Kees Cook
2020-09-10 20:21 ` [RFC PATCH 3/6] security/fbfam: Use " Kees Cook
2020-09-10 20:27 ` Jann Horn
2020-09-10 23:33 ` Kees Cook
2020-09-29 23:47 ` Steven Rostedt
2020-09-29 23:49 ` Steven Rostedt
2020-10-03 9:52 ` John Wood
2020-09-10 20:21 ` [RFC PATCH 4/6] security/fbfam: Add a new sysctl to control the crashing rate threshold Kees Cook
2020-09-10 23:14 ` Kees Cook
2020-09-13 14:33 ` John Wood
2020-09-10 20:21 ` [RFC PATCH 5/6] security/fbfam: Detect a fork brute force attack Kees Cook
2020-09-10 21:10 ` Jann Horn
2020-09-13 17:54 ` John Wood
2020-09-14 19:42 ` Jann Horn
2020-09-15 18:44 ` John Wood
2020-09-10 23:49 ` Kees Cook
2020-09-11 0:01 ` Jann Horn
2020-09-13 16:56 ` John Wood
2020-09-14 19:39 ` Jann Horn
2020-09-15 17:36 ` John Wood
2020-09-10 20:21 ` [RFC PATCH 6/6] security/fbfam: Mitigate " Kees Cook
2020-09-10 20:55 ` Jann Horn
2020-09-10 23:56 ` Kees Cook
2020-09-11 0:20 ` Jann Horn
2020-09-18 16:02 ` John Wood
2020-09-18 21:35 ` Kees Cook
2020-09-19 8:01 ` John Wood
2020-09-10 20:39 ` [RESEND][RFC PATCH 0/6] Fork brute force attack mitigation (fbfam) Jann Horn
2020-09-10 23:58 ` Kees Cook
2020-09-11 14:48 ` John Wood
2020-09-12 7:55 ` Kees Cook
2020-09-12 12:24 ` John Wood
2020-09-12 0:03 ` James Morris
2020-09-12 7:56 ` Kees Cook
2020-09-12 9:36 ` John Wood
2020-09-12 14:47 ` Mel Gorman
2020-09-12 20:48 ` Ondrej Mosnacek
2020-09-13 7:24 ` John Wood
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