From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
To: x86@kernel.org, linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>,
Jethro Beekman <jethro@fortanix.com>,
Haitao Huang <haitao.huang@linux.intel.com>,
Chunyang Hui <sanqian.hcy@antfin.com>,
Jordan Hand <jorhand@linux.microsoft.com>,
Nathaniel McCallum <npmccallum@redhat.com>,
Seth Moore <sethmo@google.com>,
Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>,
Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>,
Suresh Siddha <suresh.b.siddha@intel.com>,
akpm@linux-foundation.org, andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com,
asapek@google.com, bp@alien8.de, cedric.xing@intel.com,
chenalexchen@google.com, conradparker@google.com,
cyhanish@google.com, dave.hansen@intel.com,
haitao.huang@intel.com, josh@joshtriplett.org,
kai.huang@intel.com, kai.svahn@intel.com, kmoy@google.com,
ludloff@google.com, luto@kernel.org, nhorman@redhat.com,
puiterwijk@redhat.com, rientjes@google.com, tglx@linutronix.de,
yaozhangx@google.com
Subject: [PATCH v38 13/24] x86/sgx: Add SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES
Date: Tue, 15 Sep 2020 14:28:31 +0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200915112842.897265-14-jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200915112842.897265-1-jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Add an ioctl, which performs ENCLS[EADD] that adds new visible page to an
enclave, and optionally ENCLS[EEXTEND] operations that hash the page to the
enclave measurement. By visible we mean a page that can be mapped to the
address range of an enclave.
Acked-by: Jethro Beekman <jethro@fortanix.com>
Tested-by: Jethro Beekman <jethro@fortanix.com>
Tested-by: Haitao Huang <haitao.huang@linux.intel.com>
Tested-by: Chunyang Hui <sanqian.hcy@antfin.com>
Tested-by: Jordan Hand <jorhand@linux.microsoft.com>
Tested-by: Nathaniel McCallum <npmccallum@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Seth Moore <sethmo@google.com>
Tested-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>
Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Co-developed-by: Suresh Siddha <suresh.b.siddha@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Suresh Siddha <suresh.b.siddha@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
---
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h | 28 +++
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c | 294 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h | 1 +
3 files changed, 323 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h
index c75b375f3770..c42a2ad3ca0b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h
@@ -8,10 +8,21 @@
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <linux/ioctl.h>
+/**
+ * enum sgx_epage_flags - page control flags
+ * %SGX_PAGE_MEASURE: Measure the page contents with a sequence of
+ * ENCLS[EEXTEND] operations.
+ */
+enum sgx_page_flags {
+ SGX_PAGE_MEASURE = 0x01,
+};
+
#define SGX_MAGIC 0xA4
#define SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_CREATE \
_IOW(SGX_MAGIC, 0x00, struct sgx_enclave_create)
+#define SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES \
+ _IOWR(SGX_MAGIC, 0x01, struct sgx_enclave_add_pages)
/**
* struct sgx_enclave_create - parameter structure for the
@@ -22,4 +33,21 @@ struct sgx_enclave_create {
__u64 src;
};
+/**
+ * struct sgx_enclave_add_pages - parameter structure for the
+ * %SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGE ioctl
+ * @src: start address for the page data
+ * @offset: starting page offset
+ * @length: length of the data (multiple of the page size)
+ * @secinfo: address for the SECINFO data
+ * @flags: page control flags
+ */
+struct sgx_enclave_add_pages {
+ __u64 src;
+ __u64 offset;
+ __u64 length;
+ __u64 secinfo;
+ __u64 flags;
+};
+
#endif /* _UAPI_ASM_X86_SGX_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c
index 352a3c461812..202680a06c17 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c
@@ -191,6 +191,297 @@ static long sgx_ioc_enclave_create(struct sgx_encl *encl, void __user *arg)
return ret;
}
+static struct sgx_encl_page *sgx_encl_page_alloc(struct sgx_encl *encl,
+ unsigned long offset,
+ u64 secinfo_flags)
+{
+ struct sgx_encl_page *encl_page;
+ unsigned long prot;
+
+ encl_page = kzalloc(sizeof(*encl_page), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!encl_page)
+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+
+ encl_page->desc = encl->base + offset;
+ encl_page->encl = encl;
+
+ prot = _calc_vm_trans(secinfo_flags, SGX_SECINFO_R, PROT_READ) |
+ _calc_vm_trans(secinfo_flags, SGX_SECINFO_W, PROT_WRITE) |
+ _calc_vm_trans(secinfo_flags, SGX_SECINFO_X, PROT_EXEC);
+
+ /*
+ * TCS pages must always RW set for CPU access while the SECINFO
+ * permissions are *always* zero - the CPU ignores the user provided
+ * values and silently overwrites them with zero permissions.
+ */
+ if ((secinfo_flags & SGX_SECINFO_PAGE_TYPE_MASK) == SGX_SECINFO_TCS)
+ prot |= PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE;
+
+ /* Calculate maximum of the VM flags for the page. */
+ encl_page->vm_max_prot_bits = calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, 0);
+
+ return encl_page;
+}
+
+static int sgx_validate_secinfo(struct sgx_secinfo *secinfo)
+{
+ u64 perm = secinfo->flags & SGX_SECINFO_PERMISSION_MASK;
+ u64 pt = secinfo->flags & SGX_SECINFO_PAGE_TYPE_MASK;
+
+ if (pt != SGX_SECINFO_REG && pt != SGX_SECINFO_TCS)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if ((perm & SGX_SECINFO_W) && !(perm & SGX_SECINFO_R))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /*
+ * CPU will silently overwrite the permissions as zero, which means
+ * that we need to validate it ourselves.
+ */
+ if (pt == SGX_SECINFO_TCS && perm)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (secinfo->flags & SGX_SECINFO_RESERVED_MASK)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (memchr_inv(secinfo->reserved, 0, sizeof(secinfo->reserved)))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int __sgx_encl_add_page(struct sgx_encl *encl,
+ struct sgx_encl_page *encl_page,
+ struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page,
+ struct sgx_secinfo *secinfo, unsigned long src)
+{
+ struct sgx_pageinfo pginfo;
+ struct vm_area_struct *vma;
+ struct page *src_page;
+ int ret;
+
+ /* Query vma's VM_MAYEXEC as an indirect path_noexec() check. */
+ if (encl_page->vm_max_prot_bits & VM_EXEC) {
+ vma = find_vma(current->mm, src);
+ if (!vma)
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_MAYEXEC))
+ return -EACCES;
+ }
+
+ ret = get_user_pages(src, 1, 0, &src_page, NULL);
+ if (ret < 1)
+ return ret;
+
+ pginfo.secs = (unsigned long)sgx_get_epc_addr(encl->secs.epc_page);
+ pginfo.addr = SGX_ENCL_PAGE_ADDR(encl_page);
+ pginfo.metadata = (unsigned long)secinfo;
+ pginfo.contents = (unsigned long)kmap_atomic(src_page);
+
+ ret = __eadd(&pginfo, sgx_get_epc_addr(epc_page));
+
+ kunmap_atomic((void *)pginfo.contents);
+ put_page(src_page);
+
+ return ret ? -EIO : 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * If the caller requires measurement of the page as a proof for the content,
+ * use EEXTEND to add a measurement for 256 bytes of the page. Repeat this
+ * operation until the entire page is measured."
+ */
+static int __sgx_encl_extend(struct sgx_encl *encl,
+ struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page)
+{
+ int ret;
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) {
+ ret = __eextend(sgx_get_epc_addr(encl->secs.epc_page),
+ sgx_get_epc_addr(epc_page) + (i * 0x100));
+ if (ret) {
+ if (encls_failed(ret))
+ ENCLS_WARN(ret, "EEXTEND");
+ return -EIO;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int sgx_encl_add_page(struct sgx_encl *encl, unsigned long src,
+ unsigned long offset, struct sgx_secinfo *secinfo,
+ unsigned long flags)
+{
+ struct sgx_encl_page *encl_page;
+ struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page;
+ int ret;
+
+ encl_page = sgx_encl_page_alloc(encl, offset, secinfo->flags);
+ if (IS_ERR(encl_page))
+ return PTR_ERR(encl_page);
+
+ epc_page = __sgx_alloc_epc_page();
+ if (IS_ERR(epc_page)) {
+ kfree(encl_page);
+ return PTR_ERR(epc_page);
+ }
+
+ mmap_read_lock(current->mm);
+ mutex_lock(&encl->lock);
+
+ /*
+ * Insert prior to EADD in case of OOM. EADD modifies MRENCLAVE, i.e.
+ * can't be gracefully unwound, while failure on EADD/EXTEND is limited
+ * to userspace errors (or kernel/hardware bugs).
+ */
+ ret = xa_insert(&encl->page_array, PFN_DOWN(encl_page->desc),
+ encl_page, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (ret)
+ goto err_out_unlock;
+
+ ret = __sgx_encl_add_page(encl, encl_page, epc_page, secinfo,
+ src);
+ if (ret)
+ goto err_out;
+
+ /*
+ * Complete the "add" before doing the "extend" so that the "add"
+ * isn't in a half-baked state in the extremely unlikely scenario
+ * the enclave will be destroyed in response to EEXTEND failure.
+ */
+ encl_page->encl = encl;
+ encl_page->epc_page = epc_page;
+ encl->secs_child_cnt++;
+
+ if (flags & SGX_PAGE_MEASURE) {
+ ret = __sgx_encl_extend(encl, epc_page);
+ if (ret)
+ goto err_out;
+ }
+
+ mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
+ mmap_read_unlock(current->mm);
+ return ret;
+
+err_out:
+ xa_erase(&encl->page_array, PFN_DOWN(encl_page->desc));
+
+err_out_unlock:
+ mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
+ mmap_read_unlock(current->mm);
+
+ sgx_free_epc_page(epc_page);
+ kfree(encl_page);
+
+ /*
+ * Destroy enclave on ENCLS failure as this means that EPC has been
+ * invalidated.
+ */
+ if (ret == -EIO) {
+ mutex_lock(&encl->lock);
+ sgx_encl_destroy(encl);
+ mutex_unlock(&encl->lock);
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * sgx_ioc_enclave_add_pages() - The handler for %SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES
+ * @encl: an enclave pointer
+ * @arg: a user pointer to a struct sgx_enclave_add_pages instance
+ *
+ * Add one or more pages to an uninitialized enclave, and optionally extend the
+ * measurement with the contents of the page. The SECINFO and measurement mask
+ * are applied to all pages.
+ *
+ * A SECINFO for a TCS is required to always contain zero permissions because
+ * CPU silently zeros them. Allowing anything else would cause a mismatch in
+ * the measurement.
+ *
+ * mmap()'s protection bits are capped by the page permissions. For each page
+ * address, the maximum protection bits are computed with the following
+ * heuristics:
+ *
+ * 1. A regular page: PROT_R, PROT_W and PROT_X match the SECINFO permissions.
+ * 2. A TCS page: PROT_R | PROT_W.
+ *
+ * mmap() is not allowed to surpass the minimum of the maximum protection bits
+ * within the given address range.
+ *
+ * If ENCLS opcode fails, that effectively means that EPC has been invalidated.
+ * When this happens the enclave is destroyed and -EIO is returned to the
+ * caller.
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * length of the data processed on success,
+ * -EACCES if an executable source page is located in a noexec partition,
+ * -EIO if either ENCLS[EADD] or ENCLS[EEXTEND] fails
+ * -errno otherwise
+ */
+static long sgx_ioc_enclave_add_pages(struct sgx_encl *encl, void __user *arg)
+{
+ struct sgx_enclave_add_pages addp;
+ struct sgx_secinfo secinfo;
+ unsigned long c;
+ int ret;
+
+ if ((atomic_read(&encl->flags) & SGX_ENCL_INITIALIZED) ||
+ !(atomic_read(&encl->flags) & SGX_ENCL_CREATED))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (copy_from_user(&addp, arg, sizeof(addp)))
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ if (!IS_ALIGNED(addp.offset, PAGE_SIZE) ||
+ !IS_ALIGNED(addp.src, PAGE_SIZE))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (!(access_ok(addp.src, PAGE_SIZE)))
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ if (addp.length & (PAGE_SIZE - 1))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (addp.offset + addp.length - PAGE_SIZE >= encl->size)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (copy_from_user(&secinfo, (void __user *)addp.secinfo,
+ sizeof(secinfo)))
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ if (sgx_validate_secinfo(&secinfo))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ for (c = 0 ; c < addp.length; c += PAGE_SIZE) {
+ if (signal_pending(current)) {
+ if (!c)
+ ret = -EINTR;
+
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (c == SGX_MAX_ADD_PAGES_LENGTH)
+ break;
+
+ if (need_resched())
+ cond_resched();
+
+ ret = sgx_encl_add_page(encl, addp.src + c, addp.offset + c,
+ &secinfo, addp.flags);
+ if (ret)
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ return c;
+}
+
long sgx_ioctl(struct file *filep, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
{
struct sgx_encl *encl = filep->private_data;
@@ -209,6 +500,9 @@ long sgx_ioctl(struct file *filep, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
case SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_CREATE:
ret = sgx_ioc_enclave_create(encl, (void __user *)arg);
break;
+ case SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES:
+ ret = sgx_ioc_enclave_add_pages(encl, (void __user *)arg);
+ break;
default:
ret = -ENOIOCTLCMD;
break;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h
index fce756c3434b..8d126070db1e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ struct sgx_epc_section {
#define SGX_EPC_SECTION_MASK GENMASK(7, 0)
#define SGX_MAX_EPC_SECTIONS (SGX_EPC_SECTION_MASK + 1)
+#define SGX_MAX_ADD_PAGES_LENGTH 0x100000
extern struct sgx_epc_section sgx_epc_sections[SGX_MAX_EPC_SECTIONS];
--
2.25.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-09-16 0:54 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 195+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-09-15 11:28 [PATCH v38 00/24] Intel SGX foundations Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-15 11:28 ` [PATCH v38 01/24] x86/cpufeatures: x86/msr: Add Intel SGX hardware bits Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-15 11:28 ` [PATCH v38 02/24] x86/cpufeatures: x86/msr: Add Intel SGX Launch Control " Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-15 11:28 ` [PATCH v38 03/24] x86/mm: x86/sgx: Signal SIGSEGV with PF_SGX Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-16 11:44 ` Borislav Petkov
2020-09-16 20:30 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-16 20:32 ` Borislav Petkov
2020-09-15 11:28 ` [PATCH v38 04/24] x86/sgx: Add SGX microarchitectural data structures Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-15 11:28 ` [PATCH v38 05/24] x86/sgx: Add wrappers for ENCLS leaf functions Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-15 11:28 ` [PATCH v38 06/24] x86/cpu/intel: Detect SGX support Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-15 11:28 ` [PATCH v38 07/24] x86/cpu/intel: Add nosgx kernel parameter Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-15 11:28 ` [PATCH v38 08/24] x86/sgx: Initialize metadata for Enclave Page Cache (EPC) sections Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-15 11:28 ` [PATCH v38 09/24] x86/sgx: Add __sgx_alloc_epc_page() and sgx_free_epc_page() Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-15 11:28 ` [PATCH v38 10/24] mm: Add vm_ops->mprotect() Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-18 12:44 ` Borislav Petkov
2020-09-18 15:09 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-09-18 23:24 ` [PATCH v38 10/24] mm: Add vm_ops->mprotect()' Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-18 23:53 ` [PATCH v38 10/24] mm: Add vm_ops->mprotect() Sean Christopherson
2020-09-19 0:15 ` Andy Lutomirski
[not found] ` <20200922125801.GA133710@linux.intel.com>
2020-09-22 15:11 ` Dave Hansen
2020-09-23 13:30 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-23 13:43 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-23 14:33 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-24 14:50 ` Dave Hansen
2020-09-24 16:27 ` Sean Christopherson
[not found] ` <20200921124946.GF6038@linux.intel.com>
2020-09-21 12:51 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-21 13:14 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
[not found] ` <20200921165758.GA24156@linux.intel.com>
2020-09-21 21:07 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-21 21:18 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-09-22 5:29 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-22 5:35 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-22 16:43 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-09-23 13:50 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-24 19:11 ` Haitao Huang
2020-09-24 19:28 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-09-24 19:39 ` Dave Hansen
2020-09-24 20:01 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-09-24 20:10 ` Dave Hansen
2020-09-24 20:25 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-09-24 20:54 ` Dave Hansen
2020-09-24 23:05 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-09-24 23:09 ` Dave Hansen
2020-09-25 0:00 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-09-25 17:18 ` Dave Hansen
2020-09-25 19:43 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-09-25 19:53 ` Dave Hansen
2020-09-26 4:15 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-09-28 0:53 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-28 14:04 ` Dave Hansen
2020-09-28 16:19 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-28 16:48 ` Dave Hansen
2020-09-28 19:32 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-28 19:45 ` Dave Hansen
2020-09-28 20:19 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-29 1:37 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-09-29 4:05 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-29 14:24 ` Dave Hansen
2020-09-30 0:20 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-30 14:35 ` Dave Hansen
2020-09-28 20:18 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-18 8:49 ` Dr. Greg
2020-10-19 21:31 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-10-20 10:01 ` Dr. Greg
2020-10-20 16:40 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-10-24 14:37 ` Dr. Greg
2020-10-24 15:33 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-10-26 10:51 ` Dr. Greg
2020-10-26 22:59 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-10-27 0:40 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-09-24 22:07 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-24 21:58 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-24 21:55 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-15 11:28 ` [PATCH v38 11/24] x86/sgx: Add SGX enclave driver Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-21 9:30 ` Borislav Petkov
2020-09-21 12:09 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-01 17:36 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-10-01 18:49 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-15 11:28 ` [PATCH v38 12/24] x86/sgx: Add SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_CREATE Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-21 10:03 ` Borislav Petkov
2020-09-21 12:28 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-21 13:51 ` Borislav Petkov
2020-09-21 19:29 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-10-03 0:23 ` Haitao Huang
2020-10-03 3:24 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-15 11:28 ` Jarkko Sakkinen [this message]
2020-09-15 11:28 ` [PATCH v38 14/24] x86/sgx: Add SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_INIT Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-21 17:35 ` Borislav Petkov
2020-09-21 18:10 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-09-21 18:27 ` Borislav Petkov
[not found] ` <20200921191658.GA24823@linux.intel.com>
2020-09-22 8:29 ` Borislav Petkov
2020-09-22 11:50 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-22 12:56 ` Jethro Beekman
2020-09-22 14:29 ` Borislav Petkov
2020-09-23 14:47 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-23 15:55 ` Borislav Petkov
2020-09-24 12:23 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-22 16:29 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-09-21 19:22 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-15 11:28 ` [PATCH v38 15/24] x86/sgx: Enable provisioning for remote attestation Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-21 18:07 ` Borislav Petkov
2020-09-21 19:27 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-21 19:41 ` Borislav Petkov
2020-09-21 21:26 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-22 8:30 ` Borislav Petkov
2020-09-15 11:28 ` [PATCH v38 16/24] x86/sgx: Add a page reclaimer Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-22 10:45 ` Borislav Petkov
2020-09-22 14:03 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-22 14:24 ` Borislav Petkov
2020-09-23 14:52 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-29 1:14 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-09-29 3:50 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-29 8:35 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-09-22 16:24 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-09-22 18:02 ` Borislav Petkov
2020-09-23 15:25 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-15 11:28 ` [PATCH v38 17/24] x86/sgx: ptrace() support for the SGX driver Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-22 15:44 ` Borislav Petkov
2020-09-23 13:20 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-23 16:17 ` Borislav Petkov
2020-09-24 11:51 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-24 15:57 ` Borislav Petkov
2020-09-24 20:38 ` [PATCH v38 17/24] x86/sgx: ptrace() support for the SGX driver' Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-24 20:40 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-25 7:53 ` Borislav Petkov
2020-09-25 11:00 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-25 7:51 ` Borislav Petkov
2020-09-25 11:21 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-15 11:28 ` [PATCH v38 18/24] x86/vdso: Add support for exception fixup in vDSO functions Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-23 22:07 ` Borislav Petkov
2020-09-24 12:09 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-24 16:00 ` Borislav Petkov
2020-09-24 21:07 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-15 11:28 ` [PATCH v38 19/24] x86/fault: Add helper function to sanitize error code Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-15 11:28 ` [PATCH v38 20/24] x86/traps: Attempt to fixup exceptions in vDSO before signaling Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-24 16:31 ` Borislav Petkov
2020-09-24 23:11 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-15 11:28 ` [PATCH v38 21/24] x86/vdso: Implement a vDSO for Intel SGX enclave call Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-24 18:04 ` Borislav Petkov
2020-09-25 1:00 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-25 8:28 ` Borislav Petkov
2020-09-27 23:37 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-28 8:30 ` Borislav Petkov
2020-09-28 15:02 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-25 8:39 ` Jethro Beekman
2020-09-25 11:17 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-25 11:43 ` Jethro Beekman
[not found] ` <20200925003808.GB20333@linux.intel.com>
2020-09-25 1:04 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-25 8:14 ` Borislav Petkov
2020-09-25 10:59 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-28 14:36 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-25 18:23 ` Andrew Cooper
2020-09-28 0:58 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-28 16:44 ` Andrew Cooper
2020-09-28 18:07 ` H.J. Lu
2020-09-28 18:12 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-09-28 18:17 ` Dave Hansen
2020-09-28 22:07 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-28 21:56 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-28 22:06 ` H.J. Lu
2020-09-28 22:18 ` Dave Hansen
2020-09-28 22:41 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-09-28 23:38 ` Andrew Cooper
2020-09-29 14:10 ` Dave Hansen
2020-09-29 15:01 ` Andrew Cooper
2020-09-28 21:41 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-28 20:42 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-28 23:52 ` Andrew Cooper
2020-09-30 0:52 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-28 15:43 ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2020-09-28 15:54 ` H.J. Lu
2020-09-28 16:40 ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2020-09-28 21:36 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-28 20:56 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-15 11:28 ` [PATCH v38 22/24] selftests/x86: Add a selftest for SGX Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-15 11:28 ` [PATCH v38 23/24] docs: x86/sgx: Document SGX micro architecture and kernel internals Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-23 13:50 ` Borislav Petkov
2020-09-24 11:28 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-24 15:54 ` Borislav Petkov
2020-09-15 11:28 ` [PATCH v38 24/24] x86/sgx: Update MAINTAINERS Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-25 22:37 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-09-28 0:44 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
-- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2020-09-15 11:04 [PATCH v38 00/24] Intel SGX foundations Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-15 11:05 ` [PATCH v38 13/24] x86/sgx: Add SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES Jarkko Sakkinen
[not found] ` <op.0q2prldowjvjmi@mqcpg7oapc828.gar.corp.intel.com>
2020-09-17 16:02 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-17 18:35 ` Haitao Huang
2020-09-18 2:09 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-09-18 12:20 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-18 12:39 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
[not found] ` <20200919000918.GB21189@sjchrist-ice>
2020-09-21 11:41 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-21 16:46 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-09-21 18:49 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-21 19:44 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-21 19:57 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-09-21 21:24 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-21 19:58 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-17 16:03 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
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