From: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@oracle.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org,
linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: ross.philipson@oracle.com, dpsmith@apertussolutions.com,
tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de,
hpa@zytor.com, luto@amacapital.net,
trenchboot-devel@googlegroups.com
Subject: [PATCH 06/13] x86: Add early general TPM interface support for Secure Launch
Date: Thu, 24 Sep 2020 10:58:34 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1600959521-24158-7-git-send-email-ross.philipson@oracle.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1600959521-24158-1-git-send-email-ross.philipson@oracle.com>
From: "Daniel P. Smith" <dpsmith@apertussolutions.com>
This commit exposes a minimal general interface for the compressed
kernel to request the required TPM operations to send measurements to
a TPM.
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Smith <dpsmith@apertussolutions.com>
Signed-off-by: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@oracle.com>
---
arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile | 2 +-
arch/x86/boot/compressed/tpm/tpm.c | 145 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 146 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
create mode 100644 arch/x86/boot/compressed/tpm/tpm.c
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile
index a4308d5..35947b9 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile
@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ vmlinux-objs-$(CONFIG_SECURE_LAUNCH_SHA256) += $(obj)/early_sha256.o
vmlinux-objs-$(CONFIG_SECURE_LAUNCH_SHA512) += $(obj)/early_sha512.o
vmlinux-objs-$(CONFIG_SECURE_LAUNCH) += $(obj)/tpm/tpmio.o $(obj)/tpm/tpm_buff.o \
$(obj)/tpm/tis.o $(obj)/tpm/crb.o $(obj)/tpm/tpm1_cmds.o \
- $(obj)/tpm/tpm2_cmds.o $(obj)/tpm/tpm2_auth.o
+ $(obj)/tpm/tpm2_cmds.o $(obj)/tpm/tpm2_auth.o $(obj)/tpm/tpm.o
# The compressed kernel is built with -fPIC/-fPIE so that a boot loader
# can place it anywhere in memory and it will still run. However, since
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/tpm/tpm.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/tpm/tpm.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0fe62d2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/tpm/tpm.c
@@ -0,0 +1,145 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2020 Apertus Solutions, LLC
+ *
+ * Author(s):
+ * Daniel P. Smith <dpsmith@apertussolutions.com>
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/const.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include "tpm.h"
+#include "tpmbuff.h"
+#include "tis.h"
+#include "crb.h"
+#include "tpm_common.h"
+#include "tpm1.h"
+#include "tpm2.h"
+#include "tpm2_constants.h"
+
+static struct tpm tpm;
+
+static void find_interface_and_family(struct tpm *t)
+{
+ struct tpm_interface_id intf_id;
+ struct tpm_intf_capability intf_cap;
+
+ /* Sort out whether if it is 1.2 */
+ intf_cap.val = tpm_read32(TPM_INTF_CAPABILITY_0);
+ if ((intf_cap.interface_version == TPM12_TIS_INTF_12) ||
+ (intf_cap.interface_version == TPM12_TIS_INTF_13)) {
+ t->family = TPM12;
+ t->intf = TPM_TIS;
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /* Assume that it is 2.0 and TIS */
+ t->family = TPM20;
+ t->intf = TPM_TIS;
+
+ /* Check if the interface is CRB */
+ intf_id.val = tpm_read32(TPM_INTERFACE_ID_0);
+ if (intf_id.interface_type == TPM_CRB_INTF_ACTIVE)
+ t->intf = TPM_CRB;
+}
+
+struct tpm *enable_tpm(void)
+{
+ struct tpm *t = &tpm;
+
+ find_interface_and_family(t);
+
+ switch (t->intf) {
+ case TPM_TIS:
+ if (!tis_init(t))
+ return NULL;
+ break;
+ case TPM_CRB:
+ if (!crb_init(t))
+ return NULL;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return t;
+}
+
+u8 tpm_request_locality(struct tpm *t, u8 l)
+{
+ u8 ret = TPM_NO_LOCALITY;
+
+ ret = t->ops.request_locality(l);
+
+ if (ret < TPM_MAX_LOCALITY)
+ t->buff = alloc_tpmbuff(t->intf, ret);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+void tpm_relinquish_locality(struct tpm *t)
+{
+ t->ops.relinquish_locality();
+
+ free_tpmbuff(t->buff, t->intf);
+}
+
+#define MAX_TPM_EXTEND_SIZE 70 /* TPM2 SHA512 is the largest */
+int tpm_extend_pcr(struct tpm *t, u32 pcr, u16 algo,
+ u8 *digest)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ if (t->buff == NULL)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (t->family == TPM12) {
+ struct tpm_digest d;
+
+ if (algo != TPM_ALG_SHA1)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ d.pcr = pcr;
+ memcpy((void *)d.digest.sha1.digest,
+ digest, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
+
+ ret = tpm1_pcr_extend(t, &d);
+ } else if (t->family == TPM20) {
+ struct tpml_digest_values *d;
+ u8 buf[MAX_TPM_EXTEND_SIZE];
+
+ d = (struct tpml_digest_values *) buf;
+ d->count = 1;
+ d->digests->alg = algo;
+ switch (algo) {
+ case TPM_ALG_SHA1:
+ memcpy(d->digests->digest, digest, SHA1_SIZE);
+ break;
+ case TPM_ALG_SHA256:
+ memcpy(d->digests->digest, digest, SHA256_SIZE);
+ break;
+ case TPM_ALG_SHA384:
+ memcpy(d->digests->digest, digest, SHA384_SIZE);
+ break;
+ case TPM_ALG_SHA512:
+ memcpy(d->digests->digest, digest, SHA512_SIZE);
+ break;
+ case TPM_ALG_SM3_256:
+ memcpy(d->digests->digest, digest, SM3256_SIZE);
+ break;
+ default:
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ ret = tpm2_extend_pcr(t, pcr, d);
+ } else
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+void free_tpm(struct tpm *t)
+{
+ tpm_relinquish_locality(t);
+}
--
1.8.3.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-09-24 14:58 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 40+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-09-24 14:58 [PATCH 00/13] x86: Trenchboot secure dynamic launch Linux kernel support Ross Philipson
2020-09-24 14:58 ` [PATCH 01/13] x86: Secure Launch Kconfig Ross Philipson
2020-09-25 2:08 ` Randy Dunlap
2020-09-25 14:59 ` Ross Philipson
2020-09-24 14:58 ` [PATCH 02/13] x86: Secure Launch main header file Ross Philipson
2020-09-24 14:58 ` [PATCH 03/13] x86: Add early SHA support for Secure Launch early measurements Ross Philipson
2020-09-29 17:26 ` Jason Andryuk
2020-09-24 14:58 ` [PATCH 04/13] x86: Add early TPM TIS/CRB interface support for Secure Launch Ross Philipson
2020-09-24 14:58 ` [PATCH 05/13] x86: Add early TPM1.2/TPM2.0 " Ross Philipson
2020-09-25 5:43 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-29 23:47 ` Daniel P. Smith
2020-09-30 3:19 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-30 3:24 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-01-20 0:33 ` Daniel P. Smith
2020-09-24 14:58 ` Ross Philipson [this message]
2020-09-24 14:58 ` [PATCH 07/13] x86: Secure Launch kernel early boot stub Ross Philipson
2020-09-24 17:38 ` Arvind Sankar
2020-09-25 14:56 ` Ross Philipson
2020-09-25 19:18 ` Arvind Sankar
2020-09-29 14:03 ` Ross Philipson
2020-09-29 14:53 ` Arvind Sankar
2020-10-15 18:26 ` Daniel Kiper
2020-10-16 20:51 ` Arvind Sankar
2020-10-19 14:38 ` Ross Philipson
2020-10-19 17:06 ` Arvind Sankar
2020-10-19 19:00 ` Ross Philipson
2020-10-19 14:51 ` Daniel Kiper
2020-10-19 17:18 ` Arvind Sankar
2020-10-21 15:28 ` Daniel Kiper
2020-10-21 16:18 ` Arvind Sankar
2020-10-21 20:36 ` Ross Philipson
2020-09-24 14:58 ` [PATCH 08/13] x86: Secure Launch kernel late " Ross Philipson
2020-09-24 14:58 ` [PATCH 09/13] x86: Secure Launch SMP bringup support Ross Philipson
2020-09-24 14:58 ` [PATCH 10/13] x86: Secure Launch adding event log securityfs Ross Philipson
2020-09-24 14:58 ` [PATCH 11/13] kexec: Secure Launch kexec SEXIT support Ross Philipson
2020-09-24 14:58 ` [PATCH 12/13] reboot: Secure Launch SEXIT support on reboot paths Ross Philipson
2020-09-24 14:58 ` [PATCH 13/13] tpm: Allow locality 2 to be set when initializing the TPM for Secure Launch Ross Philipson
2020-09-25 5:30 ` [PATCH 00/13] x86: Trenchboot secure dynamic launch Linux kernel support Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-25 21:32 ` Daniel P. Smith
2020-09-27 23:59 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
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