From: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>
To: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>,
Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>,
"Eric Paris" <eparis@redhat.com>,
"James Morris" <jmorris@namei.org>,
"Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
"Tyler Hicks" <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>,
"Will Drewry" <wad@chromium.org>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, stable@vger.kernel.org,
"Mickaël Salaün" <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
Subject: [PATCH v1 2/2] seccomp: Set PF_SUPERPRIV when checking capability
Date: Fri, 30 Oct 2020 13:38:49 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20201030123849.770769-3-mic@digikod.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20201030123849.770769-1-mic@digikod.net>
From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
Replace the use of security_capable(current_cred(), ...) with
ns_capable_noaudit() which set PF_SUPERPRIV.
Since commit 98f368e9e263 ("kernel: Add noaudit variant of
ns_capable()"), a new ns_capable_noaudit() helper is available. Let's
use it!
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: e2cfabdfd075 ("seccomp: add system call filtering using BPF")
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
---
kernel/seccomp.c | 5 ++---
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c
index 8ad7a293255a..53a7d1512dd7 100644
--- a/kernel/seccomp.c
+++ b/kernel/seccomp.c
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@
#include <linux/filter.h>
#include <linux/pid.h>
#include <linux/ptrace.h>
-#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/capability.h>
#include <linux/tracehook.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
#include <linux/anon_inodes.h>
@@ -558,8 +558,7 @@ static struct seccomp_filter *seccomp_prepare_filter(struct sock_fprog *fprog)
* behavior of privileged children.
*/
if (!task_no_new_privs(current) &&
- security_capable(current_cred(), current_user_ns(),
- CAP_SYS_ADMIN, CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT) != 0)
+ !ns_capable_noaudit(current_user_ns(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return ERR_PTR(-EACCES);
/* Allocate a new seccomp_filter */
--
2.28.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-10-30 12:39 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-10-30 12:38 [PATCH v1 0/2] Fix misuse of security_capable() Mickaël Salaün
2020-10-30 12:38 ` [PATCH v1 1/2] ptrace: Set PF_SUPERPRIV when checking capability Mickaël Salaün
2020-10-30 15:47 ` Jann Horn
2020-10-30 16:06 ` Mickaël Salaün
2020-10-30 18:00 ` Jann Horn
2020-10-30 12:38 ` Mickaël Salaün [this message]
2020-10-30 15:34 ` [PATCH v1 2/2] seccomp: " Jann Horn
2020-11-17 21:08 ` [PATCH v1 0/2] Fix misuse of security_capable() Kees Cook
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