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From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
To: LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>,
	Mark Mossberg <mark.mossberg@gmail.com>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, X86 ML <x86@kernel.org>,
	Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
	kyin@redhat.com, Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Subject: [patch v2 1/2] x86/dumpstack: Dont try to access user space code of other tasks
Date: Tue, 17 Nov 2020 21:23:34 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20201117202753.667274723@linutronix.de> (raw)
In-Reply-To: 20201117202333.869470686@linutronix.de

sysrq-t ends up invoking show_opcodes() for each task which tries to access
the user space code of other processes which is obviously bogus.

It either manages to dump where the foreign tasks regs->ip points to in a
valid mapping of the current task or triggers a pagefault and prints "Code:
Bad RIP value.". Both is just wrong.

Add a safeguard in copy_code() and check whether the @regs pointer matches
currents pt_regs. If not, do not even try to access it.

While at it, add commentary why using copy_from_user_nmi() is safe in
copy_code() even if the function name suggests otherwise.

Reported-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Tested-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/87blfxx8ps.fsf@nanos.tec.linutronix.de
---
V2: Fixed changelog, comment and Reported-by attribution (Boris)
---
 arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c |   23 +++++++++++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c
@@ -78,6 +78,9 @@ static int copy_code(struct pt_regs *reg
 	if (!user_mode(regs))
 		return copy_from_kernel_nofault(buf, (u8 *)src, nbytes);
 
+	/* The user space code from other tasks cannot be accessed. */
+	if (regs != task_pt_regs(current))
+		return -EPERM;
 	/*
 	 * Make sure userspace isn't trying to trick us into dumping kernel
 	 * memory by pointing the userspace instruction pointer at it.
@@ -85,6 +88,12 @@ static int copy_code(struct pt_regs *reg
 	if (__chk_range_not_ok(src, nbytes, TASK_SIZE_MAX))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
+	/*
+	 * Even if named copy_from_user_nmi() this can be invoked from
+	 * other contexts and will not try to resolve a pagefault, which is
+	 * the correct thing to do here as this code can be called from any
+	 * context.
+	 */
 	return copy_from_user_nmi(buf, (void __user *)src, nbytes);
 }
 
@@ -115,13 +124,19 @@ void show_opcodes(struct pt_regs *regs,
 	u8 opcodes[OPCODE_BUFSIZE];
 	unsigned long prologue = regs->ip - PROLOGUE_SIZE;
 
-	if (copy_code(regs, opcodes, prologue, sizeof(opcodes))) {
-		printk("%sCode: Unable to access opcode bytes at RIP 0x%lx.\n",
-		       loglvl, prologue);
-	} else {
+	switch (copy_code(regs, opcodes, prologue, sizeof(opcodes))) {
+	case 0:
 		printk("%sCode: %" __stringify(PROLOGUE_SIZE) "ph <%02x> %"
 		       __stringify(EPILOGUE_SIZE) "ph\n", loglvl, opcodes,
 		       opcodes[PROLOGUE_SIZE], opcodes + PROLOGUE_SIZE + 1);
+		break;
+	case -EPERM:
+		/* No access to the user space stack of other tasks. Ignore. */
+		break;
+	default:
+		printk("%sCode: Unable to access opcode bytes at RIP 0x%lx.\n",
+		       loglvl, prologue);
+		break;
 	}
 }
 


  reply	other threads:[~2020-11-17 20:29 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-11-17 20:23 [patch v2 0/2] x86/dumpstack: Prevent access to foreign tasks user space Thomas Gleixner
2020-11-17 20:23 ` Thomas Gleixner [this message]
2020-11-18 12:20   ` [tip: x86/urgent] x86/dumpstack: Do not try to access user space code of other tasks tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2020-11-17 20:23 ` [patch v2 2/2] x86/uaccess: Document copy_from_user_nmi() Thomas Gleixner
2020-11-18 12:31   ` [tip: x86/cleanups] " tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner

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