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From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
To: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
	Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
	John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
	Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>,
	Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>,
	Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>, Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>,
	Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Subject: [PATCH v2 2/8] crypto: ccp: Detect and reject "invalid" addresses destined for PSP
Date: Tue,  6 Apr 2021 15:49:46 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210406224952.4177376-3-seanjc@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210406224952.4177376-1-seanjc@google.com>

Explicitly reject using pointers that are not virt_to_phys() friendly
as the source for SEV commands that are sent to the PSP.  The PSP works
with physical addresses, and __pa()/virt_to_phys() will not return the
correct address in these cases, e.g. for a vmalloc'd pointer.  At best,
the bogus address will cause the command to fail, and at worst lead to
system instability.

While it's unlikely that callers will deliberately use a bad pointer for
SEV buffers, a caller can easily use a vmalloc'd pointer unknowingly when
running with CONFIG_VMAP_STACK=y as it's not obvious that putting the
command buffers on the stack would be bad.  The command buffers are
relative  small and easily fit on the stack, and the APIs to do not
document that the incoming pointer must be a physically contiguous,
__pa() friendly pointer.

Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Fixes: 200664d5237f ("crypto: ccp: Add Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) command support")
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
---
 drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c
index ba240d33d26e..3e0d1d6922ba 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c
@@ -150,6 +150,9 @@ static int __sev_do_cmd_locked(int cmd, void *data, int *psp_ret)
 
 	sev = psp->sev_data;
 
+	if (data && WARN_ON_ONCE(!virt_addr_valid(data)))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	/* Get the physical address of the command buffer */
 	phys_lsb = data ? lower_32_bits(__psp_pa(data)) : 0;
 	phys_msb = data ? upper_32_bits(__psp_pa(data)) : 0;
-- 
2.31.0.208.g409f899ff0-goog


  parent reply	other threads:[~2021-04-06 22:50 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 25+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-04-06 22:49 [PATCH v2 0/8] ccp: KVM: SVM: Use stack for SEV command buffers Sean Christopherson
2021-04-06 22:49 ` [PATCH v2 1/8] crypto: ccp: Free SEV device if SEV init fails Sean Christopherson
2021-04-06 22:49 ` Sean Christopherson [this message]
2021-04-06 22:49 ` [PATCH v2 3/8] crypto: ccp: Reject SEV commands with mismatching command buffer Sean Christopherson
2021-04-06 22:49 ` [PATCH v2 4/8] crypto: ccp: Play nice with vmalloc'd memory for SEV command structs Sean Christopherson
2021-04-06 22:49 ` [PATCH v2 5/8] crypto: ccp: Use the stack for small SEV command buffers Sean Christopherson
2021-04-07  5:18   ` Christophe Leroy
2021-04-17 12:40   ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-04-06 22:49 ` [PATCH v2 6/8] crypto: ccp: Use the stack and common buffer for status commands Sean Christopherson
2021-04-06 22:49 ` [PATCH v2 7/8] crypto: ccp: Use the stack and common buffer for INIT command Sean Christopherson
2021-04-07  5:20   ` Christophe Leroy
2021-04-17 12:42     ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-04-06 22:49 ` [PATCH v2 8/8] KVM: SVM: Allocate SEV command structures on local stack Sean Christopherson
2021-04-07  5:24   ` Christophe Leroy
2021-04-07 10:24     ` Borislav Petkov
2021-04-07 17:05       ` Sean Christopherson
2021-04-07 17:06         ` Christophe Leroy
2021-04-07 17:34         ` Borislav Petkov
2021-04-17 12:45           ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-04-07 17:16 ` [PATCH v2 0/8] ccp: KVM: SVM: Use stack for SEV command buffers Brijesh Singh
2021-04-07 18:00 ` Tom Lendacky
2021-04-15 16:09   ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-04-15 18:15     ` Tom Lendacky
2021-04-16  0:28       ` Herbert Xu
2021-04-17 12:47 ` Paolo Bonzini

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