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From: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
To: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>,
	netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>,
	Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Subject: [PATCH 4/6] xfrm_user: fix info leak in copy_to_user_tmpl()
Date: Wed, 19 Sep 2012 23:33:41 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1348090423-32665-5-git-send-email-minipli@googlemail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1348090423-32665-1-git-send-email-minipli@googlemail.com>

The memory used for the template copy is a local stack variable. As
struct xfrm_user_tmpl contains multiple holes added by the compiler for
alignment, not initializing the memory will lead to leaking stack bytes
to userland. Add an explicit memset(0) to avoid the info leak.

Initial version of the patch by Brad Spengler.

Cc: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
---
 net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
index 7511427..9f1e749 100644
--- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
+++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
@@ -1423,6 +1423,7 @@ static int copy_to_user_tmpl(struct xfrm_policy *xp, struct sk_buff *skb)
 		struct xfrm_user_tmpl *up = &vec[i];
 		struct xfrm_tmpl *kp = &xp->xfrm_vec[i];
 
+		memset(up, 0, sizeof(*up));
 		memcpy(&up->id, &kp->id, sizeof(up->id));
 		up->family = kp->encap_family;
 		memcpy(&up->saddr, &kp->saddr, sizeof(up->saddr));
-- 
1.7.10.4


  parent reply	other threads:[~2012-09-19 21:36 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 18+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2012-09-19 21:33 [PATCH 0/6] xfrm_user info leaks Mathias Krause
2012-09-19 21:33 ` [PATCH 1/6] xfrm_user: fix info leak in copy_to_user_auth() Mathias Krause
2012-09-19 21:33 ` [PATCH 2/6] xfrm_user: fix info leak in copy_to_user_state() Mathias Krause
2012-09-19 21:33 ` [PATCH 3/6] xfrm_user: fix info leak in copy_to_user_policy() Mathias Krause
2012-09-19 21:33 ` Mathias Krause [this message]
2012-09-20  7:26   ` [PATCH 4/6] xfrm_user: fix info leak in copy_to_user_tmpl() Steffen Klassert
2012-09-19 21:33 ` [PATCH 5/6] xfrm_user: ensure user supplied esn replay window is valid Mathias Krause
2012-09-19 22:38   ` Ben Hutchings
2012-09-20  6:12     ` Mathias Krause
2012-09-20  6:22       ` [PATCH v2] " Mathias Krause
2012-09-20  7:05       ` [PATCH 5/6] " Steffen Klassert
2012-09-20  7:37         ` Mathias Krause
2012-09-20 20:01         ` [PATCH v3 5/7] " Mathias Krause
2012-09-20  7:13       ` [PATCH 5/6] " Mathias Krause
2012-09-19 21:33 ` [PATCH 6/6] xfrm_user: don't copy esn replay window twice for new states Mathias Krause
2012-09-20  7:27   ` Steffen Klassert
2012-09-20 22:09 ` [PATCH 0/6] xfrm_user info leaks David Miller
2012-09-21  5:37   ` Mathias Krause

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