From: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>,
"Alexei Starovoitov" <ast@kernel.org>,
"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@amacapital.net>,
"Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>,
"Casey Schaufler" <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
"Daniel Borkmann" <daniel@iogearbox.net>,
"Daniel Mack" <daniel@zonque.org>,
"David Drysdale" <drysdale@google.com>,
"David S . Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
"Elena Reshetova" <elena.reshetova@intel.com>,
"Eric W . Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
"James Morris" <james.l.morris@oracle.com>,
"Kees Cook" <keescook@chromium.org>,
"Paul Moore" <pmoore@redhat.com>,
"Sargun Dhillon" <sargun@sargun.me>,
"Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
"Tejun Heo" <tj@kernel.org>, "Will Drewry" <wad@chromium.org>,
kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, linux-api@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org,
cgroups@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [RFC v3 19/22] landlock: Add interrupted origin
Date: Wed, 14 Sep 2016 09:24:12 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20160914072415.26021-20-mic@digikod.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20160914072415.26021-1-mic@digikod.net>
This third origin of hook call should cover all possible trigger paths
(e.g. page fault). Landlock eBPF programs can then take decisions
accordingly.
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
include/uapi/linux/bpf.h | 3 ++-
security/landlock/lsm.c | 17 +++++++++++++++--
2 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h b/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h
index 12e61508f879..3cc52e51357f 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h
@@ -580,7 +580,8 @@ enum landlock_hook_id {
/* Trigger type */
#define LANDLOCK_FLAG_ORIGIN_SYSCALL (1 << 0)
#define LANDLOCK_FLAG_ORIGIN_SECCOMP (1 << 1)
-#define _LANDLOCK_FLAG_ORIGIN_MASK ((1 << 2) - 1)
+#define LANDLOCK_FLAG_ORIGIN_INTERRUPT (1 << 2)
+#define _LANDLOCK_FLAG_ORIGIN_MASK ((1 << 3) - 1)
/* context of function access flags */
#define _LANDLOCK_FLAG_ACCESS_MASK ((1ULL << 0) - 1)
diff --git a/security/landlock/lsm.c b/security/landlock/lsm.c
index 000dd0c7ec3d..2a15839a08c8 100644
--- a/security/landlock/lsm.c
+++ b/security/landlock/lsm.c
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
#include <linux/kernel.h> /* FIELD_SIZEOF() */
#include <linux/landlock.h>
#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
+#include <linux/preempt.h> /* in_interrupt() */
#include <linux/seccomp.h> /* struct seccomp_* */
#include <linux/types.h> /* uintptr_t */
@@ -109,6 +110,7 @@ static int landlock_run_prog(enum landlock_hook_id hook_id, __u64 args[6])
#endif /* CONFIG_CGROUP_BPF */
struct landlock_rule *rule;
u32 hook_idx = get_index(hook_id);
+ u16 current_call;
struct landlock_data ctx = {
.hook = hook_id,
@@ -128,6 +130,16 @@ static int landlock_run_prog(enum landlock_hook_id hook_id, __u64 args[6])
* prioritize fine-grained policies (i.e. per thread), and return early.
*/
+ if (unlikely(in_interrupt())) {
+ current_call = LANDLOCK_FLAG_ORIGIN_INTERRUPT;
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER
+ /* bypass landlock_ret evaluation */
+ goto seccomp_int;
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER */
+ } else {
+ current_call = LANDLOCK_FLAG_ORIGIN_SYSCALL;
+ }
+
#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER
/* seccomp triggers and landlock_ret cleanup */
ctx.origin = LANDLOCK_FLAG_ORIGIN_SECCOMP;
@@ -164,8 +176,9 @@ static int landlock_run_prog(enum landlock_hook_id hook_id, __u64 args[6])
return -ret;
ctx.cookie = 0;
+seccomp_int:
/* syscall trigger */
- ctx.origin = LANDLOCK_FLAG_ORIGIN_SYSCALL;
+ ctx.origin = current_call;
ret = landlock_run_prog_for_syscall(hook_idx, &ctx,
current->seccomp.landlock_hooks);
if (ret)
@@ -175,7 +188,7 @@ static int landlock_run_prog(enum landlock_hook_id hook_id, __u64 args[6])
#ifdef CONFIG_CGROUP_BPF
/* syscall trigger */
if (cgroup_bpf_enabled) {
- ctx.origin = LANDLOCK_FLAG_ORIGIN_SYSCALL;
+ ctx.origin = current_call;
/* get the default cgroup associated with the current thread */
cgrp = task_css_set(current)->dfl_cgrp;
ret = landlock_run_prog_for_syscall(hook_idx, &ctx,
--
2.9.3
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-09-14 7:29 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 76+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-09-14 7:23 [RFC v3 00/22] Landlock LSM: Unprivileged sandboxing Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 7:23 ` [RFC v3 01/22] landlock: Add Kconfig Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 7:23 ` [RFC v3 02/22] bpf: Move u64_to_ptr() to BPF headers and inline it Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 7:23 ` [RFC v3 03/22] bpf,landlock: Add a new arraymap type to deal with (Landlock) handles Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 18:51 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2016-09-14 23:22 ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 23:28 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2016-09-15 21:51 ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-10-03 23:53 ` Kees Cook
2016-10-05 22:02 ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 7:23 ` [RFC v3 04/22] bpf: Set register type according to is_valid_access() Mickaël Salaün
2016-10-19 14:54 ` Thomas Graf
2016-10-19 15:10 ` Daniel Borkmann
2016-09-14 7:23 ` [RFC v3 05/22] bpf,landlock: Add eBPF program subtype and is_valid_subtype() verifier Mickaël Salaün
2016-10-19 15:01 ` Thomas Graf
2016-09-14 7:23 ` [RFC v3 06/22] landlock: Add LSM hooks Mickaël Salaün
2016-10-19 15:19 ` Thomas Graf
2016-10-19 22:42 ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 7:24 ` [RFC v3 07/22] landlock: Handle file comparisons Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 19:07 ` Jann Horn
2016-09-14 22:39 ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 21:06 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2016-09-14 23:02 ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 23:24 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2016-09-15 21:25 ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-20 0:12 ` lsm naming dilemma. " Alexei Starovoitov
2016-09-20 1:10 ` Sargun Dhillon
2016-09-20 16:58 ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-10-03 23:30 ` Kees Cook
2016-09-14 7:24 ` [RFC v3 08/22] seccomp: Fix documentation for struct seccomp_filter Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 7:24 ` [RFC v3 09/22] seccomp: Move struct seccomp_filter in seccomp.h Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 7:24 ` [RFC v3 10/22] seccomp: Split put_seccomp_filter() with put_seccomp() Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 7:24 ` [RFC v3 11/22] seccomp,landlock: Handle Landlock hooks per process hierarchy Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 18:43 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-09-14 22:34 ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-10-03 23:52 ` Kees Cook
2016-10-05 21:05 ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 7:24 ` [RFC v3 12/22] bpf: Cosmetic change for bpf_prog_attach() Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 7:24 ` [RFC v3 13/22] bpf/cgroup: Replace struct bpf_prog with union bpf_object Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 7:24 ` [RFC v3 14/22] bpf/cgroup: Make cgroup_bpf_update() return an error code Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 21:16 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2016-09-14 7:24 ` [RFC v3 15/22] bpf/cgroup: Move capability check Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 7:24 ` [RFC v3 16/22] bpf/cgroup,landlock: Handle Landlock hooks per cgroup Mickaël Salaün
2016-10-03 23:43 ` Kees Cook
2016-10-05 20:58 ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-10-05 21:25 ` Kees Cook
2016-09-14 7:24 ` [RFC v3 17/22] cgroup: Add access check for cgroup_get_from_fd() Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 22:06 ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 7:24 ` [RFC v3 18/22] cgroup,landlock: Add CGRP_NO_NEW_PRIVS to handle unprivileged hooks Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 18:27 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-09-14 22:11 ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-15 1:25 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-09-15 2:19 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2016-09-15 2:27 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-09-15 4:00 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2016-09-15 4:08 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-09-15 4:31 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2016-09-15 4:38 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-09-15 4:48 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2016-09-15 19:41 ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-20 4:37 ` Sargun Dhillon
2016-09-20 17:02 ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-15 19:35 ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 7:24 ` Mickaël Salaün [this message]
2016-09-14 18:29 ` [RFC v3 19/22] landlock: Add interrupted origin Andy Lutomirski
2016-09-14 22:14 ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-15 1:19 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-10-03 23:46 ` Kees Cook
2016-10-05 21:01 ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 7:24 ` [RFC v3 20/22] landlock: Add update and debug access flags Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 7:24 ` [RFC v3 21/22] bpf,landlock: Add optional skb pointer in the Landlock context Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 21:20 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2016-09-14 22:46 ` Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 7:24 ` [RFC v3 22/22] samples/landlock: Add sandbox example Mickaël Salaün
2016-09-14 21:24 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2016-09-14 14:36 ` [RFC v3 00/22] Landlock LSM: Unprivileged sandboxing David Laight
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