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From: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
	x86@kernel.org, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	tglx@linutronix.de, torvalds@linux-foundation.org,
	akpm@linux-foundation.org, alan@linux.intel.com
Subject: [PATCH v2 05/19] x86: implement ifence_array_ptr() and array_ptr_mask()
Date: Thu, 11 Jan 2018 16:46:51 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <151571801167.27429.316440257610732033.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <151571798296.27429.7166552848688034184.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com>

'ifence_array_ptr' is provided as an alternative to the default
'__array_ptr' implementation that uses a mask to sanitize user
controllable pointers. Later patches will allow it to be selected via
kernel command line. The '__array_ptr' implementation otherwise appears
safe for current generation cpus across multiple architectures.

'array_ptr_mask' is used by the default 'array_ptr' implementation to
cheaply calculate an array bounds mask.

Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/barrier.h |   42 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 42 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/barrier.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/barrier.h
index b04f572d6d97..4450d25d8cde 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/barrier.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/barrier.h
@@ -28,6 +28,48 @@
 #define ifence() alternative_2("", "mfence", X86_FEATURE_MFENCE_RDTSC, \
 				   "lfence", X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC)
 
+/**
+ * ifence_array_ptr - Generate a pointer to an array element,
+ * ensuring the pointer is bounded under speculation.
+ *
+ * @arr: the base of the array
+ * @idx: the index of the element
+ * @sz: the number of elements in the array
+ *
+ * If @idx falls in the interval [0, @sz), returns the pointer to
+ * @arr[@idx], otherwise returns NULL.
+ */
+#define ifence_array_ptr(arr, idx, sz)					\
+({									\
+	typeof(*(arr)) *__arr = (arr), *__ret;				\
+	typeof(idx) __idx = (idx);					\
+	typeof(sz) __sz = (sz);						\
+									\
+	__ret = __idx < __sz ? __arr + __idx : NULL;			\
+	ifence();							\
+	__ret;								\
+})
+
+/**
+ * array_ptr_mask - generate a mask for array_ptr() that is ~0UL when
+ * the bounds check succeeds and 0 otherwise
+ */
+#define array_ptr_mask array_ptr_mask
+static inline unsigned long array_ptr_mask(unsigned long idx, unsigned long sz)
+{
+	unsigned long mask;
+
+	/*
+	 * mask = index - size, if that result is >= 0 then the index is
+	 * invalid and the mask is 0 else ~0
+	 */
+	asm ("cmpq %1,%2; sbbq %0,%0;"
+			:"=r" (mask)
+			:"r"(sz),"r" (idx)
+			:"cc");
+	return mask;
+}
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_PPRO_FENCE
 #define dma_rmb()	rmb()
 #else

  parent reply	other threads:[~2018-01-12  0:55 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 59+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-01-12  0:46 [PATCH v2 00/19] prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution Dan Williams
2018-01-12  0:46 ` [PATCH v2 01/19] Documentation: document array_ptr Dan Williams
2018-01-12 10:38   ` Geert Uytterhoeven
2018-01-16 21:01   ` Kees Cook
2018-01-12  0:46 ` [PATCH v2 02/19] arm64: implement ifence_array_ptr() Dan Williams
2018-01-12  0:46 ` [PATCH v2 03/19] arm: " Dan Williams
2018-01-12  0:46 ` [PATCH v2 04/19] x86: implement ifence() Dan Williams
2018-01-12  2:27   ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-01-12  3:39     ` Dan Williams
2018-01-12  0:46 ` Dan Williams [this message]
2018-01-12  0:46 ` [PATCH v2 06/19] asm-generic/barrier: mask speculative execution flows Dan Williams
2018-01-12  2:42   ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-01-12  9:12   ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-01-13  0:41     ` Dan Williams
2018-01-15  8:46       ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-01-12  0:47 ` [PATCH v2 07/19] x86: introduce __uaccess_begin_nospec and ASM_IFENCE Dan Williams
2018-01-12 17:51   ` Josh Poimboeuf
2018-01-12 18:21     ` Dan Williams
2018-01-12 18:58       ` Josh Poimboeuf
2018-01-12 19:26         ` Dan Williams
2018-01-12 20:01           ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-12 20:41             ` Josh Poimboeuf
2018-01-12  0:47 ` [PATCH v2 08/19] x86: use __uaccess_begin_nospec and ASM_IFENCE in get_user paths Dan Williams
2018-01-12  1:11   ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-12  1:14     ` Dan Williams
2018-01-12  0:47 ` [PATCH v2 09/19] ipv6: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution Dan Williams
2018-01-12  0:47 ` [PATCH v2 10/19] ipv4: " Dan Williams
2018-01-12  7:59   ` Greg KH
2018-01-12 18:47     ` Dan Williams
2018-01-13  8:56       ` Greg KH
2018-01-12  0:47 ` [PATCH v2 11/19] vfs, fdtable: " Dan Williams
2018-01-12  0:47 ` [PATCH v2 12/19] userns: " Dan Williams
2018-01-12  0:47 ` [PATCH v2 13/19] udf: " Dan Williams
2018-01-15 10:32   ` Jan Kara
2018-01-15 17:49     ` Dan Williams
2018-01-12  0:47 ` [PATCH v2 14/19] [media] uvcvideo: " Dan Williams
2018-08-06 21:40   ` Laurent Pinchart
2018-01-12  0:47 ` [PATCH v2 15/19] carl9170: " Dan Williams
2018-01-12 14:42   ` Christian Lamparter
2018-01-12 18:39     ` Dan Williams
2018-01-12 20:01       ` Christian Lamparter
2018-01-12 23:05         ` Dan Williams
2018-01-12  0:47 ` [PATCH v2 16/19] p54: " Dan Williams
2018-01-12  0:47 ` [PATCH v2 17/19] qla2xxx: " Dan Williams
2018-01-12  1:19   ` James Bottomley
2018-01-12  5:38     ` Dan Williams
2018-01-12  6:05       ` James Bottomley
2018-01-12  0:48 ` [PATCH v2 18/19] cw1200: " Dan Williams
2018-01-12  0:48 ` [PATCH v2 19/19] net: mpls: " Dan Williams
2018-01-12  1:19 ` [PATCH v2 00/19] " Linus Torvalds
2018-01-12  1:41   ` Dan Williams
2018-01-18 13:18     ` Will Deacon
2018-01-18 16:58       ` Dan Williams
2018-01-18 17:05         ` Will Deacon
2018-01-18 21:41           ` Laurent Pinchart
2018-01-13  0:15   ` Tony Luck
2018-01-13 18:51     ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-16 19:21       ` Tony Luck
2018-01-12 10:02 ` Russell King - ARM Linux

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