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From: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, akpm@linux-foundation.org,
	kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
	Hideaki YOSHIFUJI <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>,
	netdev@vger.kernel.org, Alexey Kuznetsov <kuznet@ms2.inr.ac.ru>,
	tglx@linutronix.de, torvalds@linux-foundation.org,
	"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
	Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>,
	alan@linux.intel.com
Subject: [PATCH v2 09/19] ipv6: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution
Date: Thu, 11 Jan 2018 16:47:13 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <151571803370.27429.18342496227199960317.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <151571798296.27429.7166552848688034184.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com>

Static analysis reports that 'offset' may be a user controlled value
that is used as a data dependency reading from a raw6_frag_vec buffer.
In order to avoid potential leaks of kernel memory values, block
speculative execution of the instruction stream that could issue further
reads based on an invalid '*(rfv->c + offset)' value.

Based on an original patch by Elena Reshetova.

Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Alexey Kuznetsov <kuznet@ms2.inr.ac.ru>
Cc: Hideaki YOSHIFUJI <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
---
 net/ipv6/raw.c |   10 ++++++----
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/ipv6/raw.c b/net/ipv6/raw.c
index 761a473a07c5..0b7ceeb6f709 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/raw.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/raw.c
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@
 #include <linux/skbuff.h>
 #include <linux/compat.h>
 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <linux/nospec.h>
 #include <asm/ioctls.h>
 
 #include <net/net_namespace.h>
@@ -725,17 +726,18 @@ static int raw6_getfrag(void *from, char *to, int offset, int len, int odd,
 		       struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
 	struct raw6_frag_vec *rfv = from;
+	char *rfv_buf;
 
-	if (offset < rfv->hlen) {
+	rfv_buf = array_ptr(rfv->c, offset, rfv->hlen);
+	if (rfv_buf) {
 		int copy = min(rfv->hlen - offset, len);
 
 		if (skb->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_PARTIAL)
-			memcpy(to, rfv->c + offset, copy);
+			memcpy(to, rfv_buf, copy);
 		else
 			skb->csum = csum_block_add(
 				skb->csum,
-				csum_partial_copy_nocheck(rfv->c + offset,
-							  to, copy, 0),
+				csum_partial_copy_nocheck(rfv_buf, to, copy, 0),
 				odd);
 
 		odd = 0;

  parent reply	other threads:[~2018-01-12  0:55 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 59+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-01-12  0:46 [PATCH v2 00/19] prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution Dan Williams
2018-01-12  0:46 ` [PATCH v2 01/19] Documentation: document array_ptr Dan Williams
2018-01-12 10:38   ` Geert Uytterhoeven
2018-01-16 21:01   ` Kees Cook
2018-01-12  0:46 ` [PATCH v2 02/19] arm64: implement ifence_array_ptr() Dan Williams
2018-01-12  0:46 ` [PATCH v2 03/19] arm: " Dan Williams
2018-01-12  0:46 ` [PATCH v2 04/19] x86: implement ifence() Dan Williams
2018-01-12  2:27   ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-01-12  3:39     ` Dan Williams
2018-01-12  0:46 ` [PATCH v2 05/19] x86: implement ifence_array_ptr() and array_ptr_mask() Dan Williams
2018-01-12  0:46 ` [PATCH v2 06/19] asm-generic/barrier: mask speculative execution flows Dan Williams
2018-01-12  2:42   ` Eric W. Biederman
2018-01-12  9:12   ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-01-13  0:41     ` Dan Williams
2018-01-15  8:46       ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-01-12  0:47 ` [PATCH v2 07/19] x86: introduce __uaccess_begin_nospec and ASM_IFENCE Dan Williams
2018-01-12 17:51   ` Josh Poimboeuf
2018-01-12 18:21     ` Dan Williams
2018-01-12 18:58       ` Josh Poimboeuf
2018-01-12 19:26         ` Dan Williams
2018-01-12 20:01           ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-12 20:41             ` Josh Poimboeuf
2018-01-12  0:47 ` [PATCH v2 08/19] x86: use __uaccess_begin_nospec and ASM_IFENCE in get_user paths Dan Williams
2018-01-12  1:11   ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-12  1:14     ` Dan Williams
2018-01-12  0:47 ` Dan Williams [this message]
2018-01-12  0:47 ` [PATCH v2 10/19] ipv4: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution Dan Williams
2018-01-12  7:59   ` Greg KH
2018-01-12 18:47     ` Dan Williams
2018-01-13  8:56       ` Greg KH
2018-01-12  0:47 ` [PATCH v2 11/19] vfs, fdtable: " Dan Williams
2018-01-12  0:47 ` [PATCH v2 12/19] userns: " Dan Williams
2018-01-12  0:47 ` [PATCH v2 13/19] udf: " Dan Williams
2018-01-15 10:32   ` Jan Kara
2018-01-15 17:49     ` Dan Williams
2018-01-12  0:47 ` [PATCH v2 14/19] [media] uvcvideo: " Dan Williams
2018-08-06 21:40   ` Laurent Pinchart
2018-01-12  0:47 ` [PATCH v2 15/19] carl9170: " Dan Williams
2018-01-12 14:42   ` Christian Lamparter
2018-01-12 18:39     ` Dan Williams
2018-01-12 20:01       ` Christian Lamparter
2018-01-12 23:05         ` Dan Williams
2018-01-12  0:47 ` [PATCH v2 16/19] p54: " Dan Williams
2018-01-12  0:47 ` [PATCH v2 17/19] qla2xxx: " Dan Williams
2018-01-12  1:19   ` James Bottomley
2018-01-12  5:38     ` Dan Williams
2018-01-12  6:05       ` James Bottomley
2018-01-12  0:48 ` [PATCH v2 18/19] cw1200: " Dan Williams
2018-01-12  0:48 ` [PATCH v2 19/19] net: mpls: " Dan Williams
2018-01-12  1:19 ` [PATCH v2 00/19] " Linus Torvalds
2018-01-12  1:41   ` Dan Williams
2018-01-18 13:18     ` Will Deacon
2018-01-18 16:58       ` Dan Williams
2018-01-18 17:05         ` Will Deacon
2018-01-18 21:41           ` Laurent Pinchart
2018-01-13  0:15   ` Tony Luck
2018-01-13 18:51     ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-16 19:21       ` Tony Luck
2018-01-12 10:02 ` Russell King - ARM Linux

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