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From: Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@intel.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@intel.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
	Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>,
	Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
	Arjan Van De Ven <arjan.van.de.ven@intel.com>,
	David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>,
	Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com>,
	Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>
Subject: [PATCH 5/5] x86/feature: Detect the x86 feature Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier
Date: Thu, 11 Jan 2018 17:32:19 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1515720739-43819-6-git-send-email-ashok.raj@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1515720739-43819-1-git-send-email-ashok.raj@intel.com>

cpuid ax=0x7, return rdx bit 26 to indicate presence of both
IA32_SPEC_CTRL(MSR 0x48) and IA32_PRED_CMD(MSR 0x49)

BIT0: Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier

When this MSR is written with IBPB=1 it ensures that earlier code's behavior
doesn't control later indirect branch predictions.

Note this MSR is only writable and does not carry any state. Its a barrier
so the code should perform a wrmsr when the barrier is needed.

Signed-off-by: Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@intel.com>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h |  1 +
 arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h   |  3 +++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/spec_ctrl.c    |  7 +++++++
 arch/x86/kvm/svm.c                 | 16 ++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c                 | 10 ++++++++++
 5 files changed, 37 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
index 624b58e..52f37fc 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -213,6 +213,7 @@
 #define X86_FEATURE_MBA			( 7*32+18) /* Memory Bandwidth Allocation */
 #define X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL		( 7*32+19) /* Speculation Control */
 #define X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL_IBRS	( 7*32+20) /* Speculation Control, use IBRS */
+#define X86_FEATURE_PRED_CMD	( 7*32+21) /* Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier */
 
 /* Virtualization flags: Linux defined, word 8 */
 #define X86_FEATURE_TPR_SHADOW		( 8*32+ 0) /* Intel TPR Shadow */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
index 3e1cb18..1888e19 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
@@ -46,6 +46,9 @@
 #define SPEC_CTRL_DISABLE_IBRS		(0 << 0)
 #define SPEC_CTRL_ENABLE_IBRS		(1 << 0)
 
+#define MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD		0x00000049
+#define FEATURE_SET_IBPB		(1<<0)
+
 #define MSR_IA32_PERFCTR0		0x000000c1
 #define MSR_IA32_PERFCTR1		0x000000c2
 #define MSR_FSB_FREQ			0x000000cd
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/spec_ctrl.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/spec_ctrl.c
index 02fc630..6cfec19 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/spec_ctrl.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/spec_ctrl.c
@@ -15,6 +15,13 @@ void spec_ctrl_scan_feature(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 			if (!c->cpu_index)
 				static_branch_enable(&spec_ctrl_dynamic_ibrs);
 		}
+		/*
+		 * For Intel CPU's this MSR is shared the same cpuid
+		 * enumeration. When MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL is present
+		 * MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL is also available
+		 * TBD: AMD might have a separate enumeration for each.
+		 */
+		set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_PRED_CMD);
 	}
 }
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
index 7c14471a..36924c9 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
@@ -251,6 +251,7 @@ static const struct svm_direct_access_msrs {
 	{ .index = MSR_SYSCALL_MASK,			.always = true  },
 #endif
 	{ .index = MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL,          .always = true  },
+	{ .index = MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD,           .always = false },
 	{ .index = MSR_IA32_LASTBRANCHFROMIP,		.always = false },
 	{ .index = MSR_IA32_LASTBRANCHTOIP,		.always = false },
 	{ .index = MSR_IA32_LASTINTFROMIP,		.always = false },
@@ -531,6 +532,7 @@ struct svm_cpu_data {
 	struct kvm_ldttss_desc *tss_desc;
 
 	struct page *save_area;
+	struct vmcb *current_vmcb;
 };
 
 static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct svm_cpu_data *, svm_data);
@@ -923,6 +925,8 @@ static void svm_vcpu_init_msrpm(u32 *msrpm)
 
 	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL))
 		set_msr_interception(msrpm, MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, 1, 1);
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PRED_CMD))
+		set_msr_interception(msrpm, MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, 1, 1);
 }
 
 static void add_msr_offset(u32 offset)
@@ -1711,11 +1715,18 @@ static void svm_free_vcpu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	__free_pages(virt_to_page(svm->nested.msrpm), MSRPM_ALLOC_ORDER);
 	kvm_vcpu_uninit(vcpu);
 	kmem_cache_free(kvm_vcpu_cache, svm);
+    /* 
+     * The VMCB could be recycled, causing a false negative in svm_vcpu_load;
+     * block speculative execution.
+     */
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PRED_CMD))
+        native_wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, FEATURE_SET_IBPB);
 }
 
 static void svm_vcpu_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu)
 {
 	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+	struct svm_cpu_data *sd = per_cpu(svm_data, cpu);
 	int i;
 
 	if (unlikely(cpu != vcpu->cpu)) {
@@ -1744,6 +1755,11 @@ static void svm_vcpu_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu)
 	if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RDTSCP))
 		wrmsrl(MSR_TSC_AUX, svm->tsc_aux);
 
+	if (sd->current_vmcb != svm->vmcb) {
+		sd->current_vmcb = svm->vmcb;
+		if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PRED_CMD))
+			native_wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, FEATURE_SET_IBPB);
+	}
 	avic_vcpu_load(vcpu, cpu);
 }
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
index 1913896..caeb9ff 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
@@ -2280,6 +2280,8 @@ static void vmx_vcpu_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu)
 	if (per_cpu(current_vmcs, cpu) != vmx->loaded_vmcs->vmcs) {
 		per_cpu(current_vmcs, cpu) = vmx->loaded_vmcs->vmcs;
 		vmcs_load(vmx->loaded_vmcs->vmcs);
+		if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL))
+			native_wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, FEATURE_SET_IBPB);
 	}
 
 	if (!already_loaded) {
@@ -3837,6 +3839,12 @@ static void free_loaded_vmcs(struct loaded_vmcs *loaded_vmcs)
 	free_vmcs(loaded_vmcs->vmcs);
 	loaded_vmcs->vmcs = NULL;
 	WARN_ON(loaded_vmcs->shadow_vmcs != NULL);
+    /*
+     * The VMCS could be recycled, causing a false negative in vmx_vcpu_load
+     * block speculative execution.
+     */
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL))
+        native_wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, FEATURE_SET_IBPB);
 }
 
 static void free_kvm_area(void)
@@ -6804,6 +6812,8 @@ static __init int hardware_setup(void)
 	 */
 	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL))
 		vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, false);
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PRED_CMD))
+		vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, false);
 
 	vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(MSR_FS_BASE, false);
 	vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(MSR_GS_BASE, false);
-- 
2.7.4

  parent reply	other threads:[~2018-01-12  1:32 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 76+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-01-12  1:32 [PATCH 0/5] Add support for IBRS & IBPB KVM support Ashok Raj
2018-01-12  1:32 ` [PATCH 1/5] x86/ibrs: Introduce native_rdmsrl, and native_wrmsrl Ashok Raj
2018-01-12  1:41   ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-01-12  1:52     ` Raj, Ashok
2018-01-12  2:20       ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-01-12  3:01         ` Raj, Ashok
2018-01-12  5:03           ` Dave Hansen
2018-01-12 16:28             ` Josh Poimboeuf
2018-01-12 16:28             ` Woodhouse, David
2018-01-13  6:20             ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-01-13 13:52               ` Van De Ven, Arjan
2018-01-13 15:20                 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-01-13  6:19           ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-01-12  7:54   ` Greg KH
2018-01-12 12:28   ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-12  1:32 ` [PATCH 2/5] x86/ibrs: Add new helper macros to save/restore MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL Ashok Raj
2018-01-12  1:32 ` [PATCH 3/5] x86/ibrs: Add direct access support for MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL Ashok Raj
2018-01-12  1:58   ` Dave Hansen
2018-01-12  3:14     ` Raj, Ashok
2018-01-12  9:51     ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-01-12 10:09       ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-15 13:45         ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-01-15 13:59           ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-15 14:45             ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-01-12  1:32 ` [PATCH 4/5] x86/svm: Direct access to MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL Ashok Raj
2018-01-12  7:23   ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-12  9:58     ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-01-12 10:13       ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-12 12:38   ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-12 15:14   ` Tom Lendacky
2018-01-12  1:32 ` Ashok Raj [this message]
2018-01-12 10:08   ` [PATCH 5/5] x86/feature: Detect the x86 feature Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier Peter Zijlstra
2018-01-12 12:32   ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-12 12:39     ` Woodhouse, David
2018-01-12 15:21       ` Tom Lendacky
2018-01-12 15:31   ` Tom Lendacky
2018-01-12 15:36     ` Woodhouse, David
2018-01-12 17:06       ` Tom Lendacky
2018-02-01 21:59 [PATCH v6 0/5] KVM: Expose speculation control feature to guests KarimAllah Ahmed
2018-02-01 21:59 ` [PATCH v6 1/5] KVM: x86: Update the reverse_cpuid list to include CPUID_7_EDX KarimAllah Ahmed
2018-02-02 17:37   ` Jim Mattson
2018-02-03 22:50   ` [tip:x86/pti] KVM/x86: " tip-bot for KarimAllah Ahmed
2018-02-01 21:59 ` [PATCH v6 2/5] KVM: x86: Add IBPB support KarimAllah Ahmed
2018-02-02 17:49   ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-02-02 18:02     ` David Woodhouse
2018-02-02 19:56       ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-02-02 20:16         ` David Woodhouse
2018-02-02 20:28           ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-02-02 20:31             ` David Woodhouse
2018-02-02 20:52               ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-02-02 20:52             ` Alan Cox
2018-02-05 19:22               ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-02-05 19:24             ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-02-03 22:50   ` [tip:x86/pti] KVM/x86: " tip-bot for Ashok Raj
2018-02-16  3:44   ` [PATCH v6 2/5] KVM: x86: " Jim Mattson
2018-02-16  4:22     ` Andi Kleen
2018-05-03  1:27   ` Wanpeng Li
2018-05-03  9:19     ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-05-03 12:01       ` Wanpeng Li
2018-05-03 12:46       ` Tian, Kevin
2018-02-01 21:59 ` [PATCH v6 3/5] KVM: VMX: Emulate MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES KarimAllah Ahmed
2018-02-02 10:53   ` Darren Kenny
2018-02-02 17:35     ` Jim Mattson
2018-02-02 17:51   ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-02-03 22:51   ` [tip:x86/pti] KVM/VMX: " tip-bot for KarimAllah Ahmed
2018-02-01 21:59 ` [PATCH v6 4/5] KVM: VMX: Allow direct access to MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL KarimAllah Ahmed
2018-02-02 11:03   ` Darren Kenny
2018-02-02 11:27   ` David Woodhouse
2018-02-02 17:53   ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-02-02 18:05     ` David Woodhouse
2018-02-02 18:19       ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-02-02 17:57   ` Jim Mattson
2018-02-03 22:51   ` [tip:x86/pti] KVM/VMX: " tip-bot for KarimAllah Ahmed
2018-02-01 21:59 ` [PATCH v6 5/5] KVM: SVM: " KarimAllah Ahmed
2018-02-02 11:06   ` Darren Kenny
2018-02-02 18:02   ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk

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