From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
LSM List <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>,
linux-integrity <linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org>,
Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Subject: [PATCH v2] exec: Set file unwritable before LSM check
Date: Fri, 9 Mar 2018 11:30:20 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180309193020.GA5149@beast> (raw)
The LSM check should happen after the file has been confirmed to be
unchanging. Without this, we could have a race between the Time of Check
(the call to security_kernel_read_file() which could read the file and
make access policy decisions) and the Time of Use (starting with
kernel_read_file()'s reading of the file contents). In theory, file
contents could change between the two.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
v2: Clarify the ToC/ToU race (Linus)
Only loadpin and SELinux currently implement this hook. From what
I can see, this won't change anything for either of them. IMA calls
kernel_read_file(), but looking there it seems those callers won't be
negatively impacted either. Can folks double-check this and send an
Ack please?
---
fs/exec.c | 6 +++---
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
index 7eb8d21bcab9..a919a827d181 100644
--- a/fs/exec.c
+++ b/fs/exec.c
@@ -895,13 +895,13 @@ int kernel_read_file(struct file *file, void **buf, loff_t *size,
if (!S_ISREG(file_inode(file)->i_mode) || max_size < 0)
return -EINVAL;
- ret = security_kernel_read_file(file, id);
+ ret = deny_write_access(file);
if (ret)
return ret;
- ret = deny_write_access(file);
+ ret = security_kernel_read_file(file, id);
if (ret)
- return ret;
+ goto out;
i_size = i_size_read(file_inode(file));
if (max_size > 0 && i_size > max_size) {
--
2.7.4
--
Kees Cook
Pixel Security
next reply other threads:[~2018-03-09 19:30 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 6+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-03-09 19:30 Kees Cook [this message]
2018-03-09 19:47 ` [PATCH v2] exec: Set file unwritable before LSM check Linus Torvalds
2018-03-09 19:54 ` Kees Cook
2018-03-09 21:54 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-03-13 5:16 ` James Morris
2018-03-19 4:52 ` James Morris
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