From: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
To: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@tycho.nsa.gov,
casey.schaufler@intel.com, dave.hansen@intel.com,
deneen.t.dock@intel.com, kristen@linux.intel.com,
arjan@linux.intel.com
Subject: [PATCH v3 5/5] SELinux: Support SELinux determination of side-channel
Date: Mon, 20 Aug 2018 17:04:44 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180821000444.7004-6-casey.schaufler@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180821000444.7004-1-casey.schaufler@intel.com>
SELinux considers tasks to be side-channel safe if they
have FILE__READ access.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
---
security/selinux/hooks.c | 9 +++++++++
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index a8bf324130f5..992f2402edaa 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -4219,6 +4219,14 @@ static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
}
+static int selinux_task_safe_sidechannel(struct task_struct *p)
+{
+ struct av_decision avd;
+
+ return avc_has_perm_noaudit(&selinux_state, current_sid(), task_sid(p),
+ SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__READ, 0, &avd);
+}
+
/* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb,
struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
@@ -7002,6 +7010,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_movememory, selinux_task_movememory),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_kill, selinux_task_kill),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_to_inode, selinux_task_to_inode),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_safe_sidechannel, selinux_task_safe_sidechannel),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_permission, selinux_ipc_permission),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_getsecid, selinux_ipc_getsecid),
--
2.17.1
prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-08-21 0:04 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 12+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-08-21 0:04 [PATCH RFC v3 0/5] LSM: Add and use a hook for side-channel safety checks Casey Schaufler
2018-08-21 0:04 ` [PATCH v3 1/5] LSM: Introduce a hook for side-channel danger Casey Schaufler
2018-08-21 0:04 ` [PATCH v3 2/5] X86: Support LSM determination of side-channel Casey Schaufler
2018-08-21 0:04 ` [PATCH v3 3/5] LSM: Security module checking for side-channel dangers Casey Schaufler
2018-08-21 17:23 ` Jann Horn
2018-08-21 23:44 ` Schaufler, Casey
2018-08-22 1:01 ` Jann Horn
2018-08-22 16:39 ` Schaufler, Casey
2018-08-22 17:03 ` Jann Horn
2018-08-22 17:48 ` Schaufler, Casey
2018-08-21 0:04 ` [PATCH v3 4/5] Smack: Support determination of side-channel Casey Schaufler
2018-08-21 0:04 ` Casey Schaufler [this message]
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