From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>,
Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>,
Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>,
"Schaufler, Casey" <casey.schaufler@intel.com>,
LSM <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH security-next v2 15/26] LSM: Introduce lsm.enable= and lsm.disable=
Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2018 09:23:27 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180920162338.21060-16-keescook@chromium.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180920162338.21060-1-keescook@chromium.org>
This has identical functionality to the existing per-LSM enable handling,
but provides a centralized place to perform it. If multiple instances
of a parameter (either with the custom LSM-specific parameter or the
"lsm.{enable,disable}" parameter) for a specific LSM are on the boot
command line, the last one takes precedent.
Disabling an LSM means it will not be considered when performing
initializations. Enabling an LSM means either undoing a previous disabling
or a undoing a default-disabled CONFIG setting.
For example: "lsm.disable=apparmor apparmor.enabled=1" will leave
AppArmor enabled. "selinux.enabled=0 lsm.enable=selinux" will leave
SELinux enabled.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
security/security.c | 47 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
1 file changed, 46 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 85533d4e534a..72d1ef2fc4cc 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -53,10 +53,29 @@ static bool debug __initdata;
} while (0)
/* Mark an LSM's enabled flag, if it exists. */
+static int lsm_enabled_true __initdata = 1;
+static int lsm_enabled_false __initdata = 0;
static void __init set_enabled(struct lsm_info *lsm, bool enabled)
{
- if (lsm->enabled)
+ if (!lsm->enabled) {
+ /*
+ * If the LSM hasn't configured an enable flag, we
+ * can use a hard-coded setting for storing the
+ * state ourselves.
+ */
+ if (enabled)
+ lsm->enabled = &lsm_enabled_true;
+ else
+ lsm->enabled = &lsm_enabled_false;
+ } else if (lsm->enabled == &lsm_enabled_true) {
+ if (!enabled)
+ lsm->enabled = &lsm_enabled_false;
+ } else if (lsm->enabled == &lsm_enabled_false) {
+ if (enabled)
+ lsm->enabled = &lsm_enabled_true;
+ } else {
*lsm->enabled = enabled;
+ }
}
/* Is an LSM allowed to be enabled? */
@@ -169,6 +188,32 @@ static int __init enable_debug(char *str)
}
__setup("lsm.debug", enable_debug);
+/* Explicitly enable an LSM */
+static int __init enable_lsm(char *str)
+{
+ struct lsm_info *lsm;
+
+ for (lsm = __start_lsm_info; lsm < __end_lsm_info; lsm++) {
+ if (strcmp(str, lsm->name) == 0)
+ set_enabled(lsm, true);
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+__setup("lsm.enable=", enable_lsm);
+
+/* Explicitly disable an LSM */
+static int __init disable_lsm(char *str)
+{
+ struct lsm_info *lsm;
+
+ for (lsm = __start_lsm_info; lsm < __end_lsm_info; lsm++) {
+ if (strcmp(str, lsm->name) == 0)
+ set_enabled(lsm, false);
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+__setup("lsm.disable=", disable_lsm);
+
static bool match_last_lsm(const char *list, const char *lsm)
{
const char *last;
--
2.17.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-09-20 16:24 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 45+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-09-20 16:23 [PATCH security-next v2 00/26] LSM: Explict LSM ordering Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 01/26] LSM: Correctly announce start of LSM initialization Kees Cook
2018-09-20 23:39 ` Casey Schaufler
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 02/26] vmlinux.lds.h: Avoid copy/paste of security_init section Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 03/26] LSM: Rename .security_initcall section to .lsm_info Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 04/26] LSM: Remove initcall tracing Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 05/26] LSM: Convert from initcall to struct lsm_info Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 06/26] vmlinux.lds.h: Move LSM_TABLE into INIT_DATA Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 07/26] LSM: Convert security_initcall() into DEFINE_LSM() Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 08/26] LSM: Record LSM name in struct lsm_info Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 09/26] LSM: Provide init debugging infrastructure Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 10/26] LSM: Don't ignore initialization failures Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 11/26] LSM: Introduce LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 12/26] LSM: Provide separate ordered initialization Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 13/26] LSM: Plumb visibility into optional "enabled" state Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 14/26] LSM: Lift LSM selection out of individual LSMs Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` Kees Cook [this message]
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 16/26] LSM: Prepare for reorganizing "security=" logic Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 17/26] LSM: Refactor "security=" in terms of enable/disable Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 18/26] LSM: Build ordered list of ordered LSMs for init Kees Cook
2018-09-21 0:04 ` Casey Schaufler
2018-09-21 0:37 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 19/26] LSM: Introduce CONFIG_LSM_ORDER Kees Cook
2018-09-21 0:10 ` Casey Schaufler
2018-09-21 0:14 ` Casey Schaufler
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 20/26] LSM: Introduce "lsm.order=" for boottime ordering Kees Cook
2018-09-21 0:12 ` Casey Schaufler
2018-09-21 0:40 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 21/26] LoadPin: Initialize as ordered LSM Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 22/26] Yama: " Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 23/26] LSM: Introduce enum lsm_order Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 24/26] capability: Mark as LSM_ORDER_FIRST Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 25/26] LSM: Separate idea of "major" LSM from "exclusive" LSM Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 26/26] LSM: Add all exclusive LSMs to ordered initialization Kees Cook
2018-09-21 0:25 ` Casey Schaufler
2018-09-21 0:45 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-21 1:10 ` Casey Schaufler
2018-09-21 1:39 ` John Johansen
2018-09-21 2:05 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-21 2:14 ` John Johansen
2018-09-21 3:02 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-21 13:19 ` John Johansen
2018-09-21 14:57 ` Casey Schaufler
2018-09-20 20:14 ` [PATCH security-next v2 00/26] LSM: Explict LSM ordering Martin Steigerwald
2018-09-20 21:55 ` Kees Cook
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20180920162338.21060-16-keescook@chromium.org \
--to=keescook@chromium.org \
--cc=casey.schaufler@intel.com \
--cc=casey@schaufler-ca.com \
--cc=corbet@lwn.net \
--cc=jmorris@namei.org \
--cc=john.johansen@canonical.com \
--cc=linux-arch@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-doc@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=paul@paul-moore.com \
--cc=penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp \
--cc=sds@tycho.nsa.gov \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).