From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>,
Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>,
Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>,
"Schaufler, Casey" <casey.schaufler@intel.com>,
LSM <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH security-next v2 09/26] LSM: Provide init debugging infrastructure
Date: Thu, 20 Sep 2018 09:23:21 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180920162338.21060-10-keescook@chromium.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180920162338.21060-1-keescook@chromium.org>
Booting with "lsm.debug" will report future details on how LSM ordering
decisions are being made.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
.../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 2 ++
security/security.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 20 insertions(+)
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
index 9871e649ffef..32d323ee9218 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -2274,6 +2274,8 @@
ltpc= [NET]
Format: <io>,<irq>,<dma>
+ lsm.debug [SECURITY] Enable LSM initialization debugging output.
+
machvec= [IA-64] Force the use of a particular machine-vector
(machvec) in a generic kernel.
Example: machvec=hpzx1_swiotlb
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index e74f46fba591..ee49b921d750 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -12,6 +12,8 @@
* (at your option) any later version.
*/
+#define pr_fmt(fmt) "LSM: " fmt
+
#include <linux/bpf.h>
#include <linux/capability.h>
#include <linux/dcache.h>
@@ -43,11 +45,19 @@ char *lsm_names;
static __initdata char chosen_lsm[SECURITY_NAME_MAX + 1] =
CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY;
+static bool debug __initdata;
+#define init_debug(...) \
+ do { \
+ if (debug) \
+ pr_info(__VA_ARGS__); \
+ } while (0)
+
static void __init major_lsm_init(void)
{
struct lsm_info *lsm;
for (lsm = __start_lsm_info; lsm < __end_lsm_info; lsm++) {
+ init_debug("initializing %s\n", lsm->name);
lsm->init();
}
}
@@ -91,6 +101,14 @@ static int __init choose_lsm(char *str)
}
__setup("security=", choose_lsm);
+/* Enable LSM order debugging. */
+static int __init enable_debug(char *str)
+{
+ debug = true;
+ return 1;
+}
+__setup("lsm.debug", enable_debug);
+
static bool match_last_lsm(const char *list, const char *lsm)
{
const char *last;
--
2.17.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-09-20 16:24 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 45+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-09-20 16:23 [PATCH security-next v2 00/26] LSM: Explict LSM ordering Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 01/26] LSM: Correctly announce start of LSM initialization Kees Cook
2018-09-20 23:39 ` Casey Schaufler
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 02/26] vmlinux.lds.h: Avoid copy/paste of security_init section Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 03/26] LSM: Rename .security_initcall section to .lsm_info Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 04/26] LSM: Remove initcall tracing Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 05/26] LSM: Convert from initcall to struct lsm_info Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 06/26] vmlinux.lds.h: Move LSM_TABLE into INIT_DATA Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 07/26] LSM: Convert security_initcall() into DEFINE_LSM() Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 08/26] LSM: Record LSM name in struct lsm_info Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` Kees Cook [this message]
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 10/26] LSM: Don't ignore initialization failures Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 11/26] LSM: Introduce LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 12/26] LSM: Provide separate ordered initialization Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 13/26] LSM: Plumb visibility into optional "enabled" state Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 14/26] LSM: Lift LSM selection out of individual LSMs Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 15/26] LSM: Introduce lsm.enable= and lsm.disable= Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 16/26] LSM: Prepare for reorganizing "security=" logic Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 17/26] LSM: Refactor "security=" in terms of enable/disable Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 18/26] LSM: Build ordered list of ordered LSMs for init Kees Cook
2018-09-21 0:04 ` Casey Schaufler
2018-09-21 0:37 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 19/26] LSM: Introduce CONFIG_LSM_ORDER Kees Cook
2018-09-21 0:10 ` Casey Schaufler
2018-09-21 0:14 ` Casey Schaufler
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 20/26] LSM: Introduce "lsm.order=" for boottime ordering Kees Cook
2018-09-21 0:12 ` Casey Schaufler
2018-09-21 0:40 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 21/26] LoadPin: Initialize as ordered LSM Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 22/26] Yama: " Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 23/26] LSM: Introduce enum lsm_order Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 24/26] capability: Mark as LSM_ORDER_FIRST Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 25/26] LSM: Separate idea of "major" LSM from "exclusive" LSM Kees Cook
2018-09-20 16:23 ` [PATCH security-next v2 26/26] LSM: Add all exclusive LSMs to ordered initialization Kees Cook
2018-09-21 0:25 ` Casey Schaufler
2018-09-21 0:45 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-21 1:10 ` Casey Schaufler
2018-09-21 1:39 ` John Johansen
2018-09-21 2:05 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-21 2:14 ` John Johansen
2018-09-21 3:02 ` Kees Cook
2018-09-21 13:19 ` John Johansen
2018-09-21 14:57 ` Casey Schaufler
2018-09-20 20:14 ` [PATCH security-next v2 00/26] LSM: Explict LSM ordering Martin Steigerwald
2018-09-20 21:55 ` Kees Cook
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