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From: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: akpm@linux-foundation.org, "Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Subject: [PATCH 3.16 17/63] kvm: x86: use correct privilege level for sgdt/sidt/fxsave/fxrstor  access
Date: Sat, 22 Sep 2018 01:15:42 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <lsq.1537575342.802137681@decadent.org.uk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <lsq.1537575341.194909669@decadent.org.uk>

3.16.58-rc1 review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

commit 3c9fa24ca7c9c47605672916491f79e8ccacb9e6 upstream.

The functions that were used in the emulation of fxrstor, fxsave, sgdt and
sidt were originally meant for task switching, and as such they did not
check privilege levels.  This is very bad when the same functions are used
in the emulation of unprivileged instructions.  This is CVE-2018-10853.

The obvious fix is to add a new argument to ops->read_std and ops->write_std,
which decides whether the access is a "system" access or should use the
processor's CPL.

Fixes: 129a72a0d3c8 ("KVM: x86: Introduce segmented_write_std", 2017-01-12)
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
[bwh: Backported to 3.16: Drop change in handle_ud()]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
---
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h
@@ -104,11 +104,12 @@ struct x86_emulate_ops {
 	 *  @addr:  [IN ] Linear address from which to read.
 	 *  @val:   [OUT] Value read from memory, zero-extended to 'u_long'.
 	 *  @bytes: [IN ] Number of bytes to read from memory.
+	 *  @system:[IN ] Whether the access is forced to be at CPL0.
 	 */
 	int (*read_std)(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
 			unsigned long addr, void *val,
 			unsigned int bytes,
-			struct x86_exception *fault);
+			struct x86_exception *fault, bool system);
 
 	/*
 	 * write_std: Write bytes of standard (non-emulated/special) memory.
@@ -116,10 +117,11 @@ struct x86_emulate_ops {
 	 *  @addr:  [IN ] Linear address to which to write.
 	 *  @val:   [OUT] Value write to memory, zero-extended to 'u_long'.
 	 *  @bytes: [IN ] Number of bytes to write to memory.
+	 *  @system:[IN ] Whether the access is forced to be at CPL0.
 	 */
 	int (*write_std)(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
 			 unsigned long addr, void *val, unsigned int bytes,
-			 struct x86_exception *fault);
+			 struct x86_exception *fault, bool system);
 	/*
 	 * fetch: Read bytes of standard (non-emulated/special) memory.
 	 *        Used for instruction fetch.
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c
@@ -734,14 +734,14 @@ static int linearize(struct x86_emulate_
 static int linear_read_system(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, ulong linear,
 			      void *data, unsigned size)
 {
-	return ctxt->ops->read_std(ctxt, linear, data, size, &ctxt->exception);
+	return ctxt->ops->read_std(ctxt, linear, data, size, &ctxt->exception, true);
 }
 
 static int linear_write_system(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
 			       ulong linear, void *data,
 			       unsigned int size)
 {
-	return ctxt->ops->write_std(ctxt, linear, data, size, &ctxt->exception);
+	return ctxt->ops->write_std(ctxt, linear, data, size, &ctxt->exception, true);
 }
 
 static int segmented_read_std(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
@@ -755,7 +755,7 @@ static int segmented_read_std(struct x86
 	rc = linearize(ctxt, addr, size, false, &linear);
 	if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
 		return rc;
-	return ctxt->ops->read_std(ctxt, linear, data, size, &ctxt->exception);
+	return ctxt->ops->read_std(ctxt, linear, data, size, &ctxt->exception, false);
 }
 
 static int segmented_write_std(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
@@ -769,7 +769,7 @@ static int segmented_write_std(struct x8
 	rc = linearize(ctxt, addr, size, true, &linear);
 	if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
 		return rc;
-	return ctxt->ops->write_std(ctxt, linear, data, size, &ctxt->exception);
+	return ctxt->ops->write_std(ctxt, linear, data, size, &ctxt->exception, false);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -2472,12 +2472,12 @@ static bool emulator_io_port_access_allo
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
 	base |= ((u64)base3) << 32;
 #endif
-	r = ops->read_std(ctxt, base + 102, &io_bitmap_ptr, 2, NULL);
+	r = ops->read_std(ctxt, base + 102, &io_bitmap_ptr, 2, NULL, true);
 	if (r != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
 		return false;
 	if (io_bitmap_ptr + port/8 > desc_limit_scaled(&tr_seg))
 		return false;
-	r = ops->read_std(ctxt, base + io_bitmap_ptr + port/8, &perm, 2, NULL);
+	r = ops->read_std(ctxt, base + io_bitmap_ptr + port/8, &perm, 2, NULL, true);
 	if (r != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
 		return false;
 	if ((perm >> bit_idx) & mask)
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -4191,10 +4191,15 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_read_guest_virt);
 
 static int emulator_read_std(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
 			     gva_t addr, void *val, unsigned int bytes,
-			     struct x86_exception *exception)
+			     struct x86_exception *exception, bool system)
 {
 	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = emul_to_vcpu(ctxt);
-	return kvm_read_guest_virt_helper(addr, val, bytes, vcpu, 0, exception);
+	u32 access = 0;
+
+	if (!system && kvm_x86_ops->get_cpl(vcpu) == 3)
+		access |= PFERR_USER_MASK;
+
+	return kvm_read_guest_virt_helper(addr, val, bytes, vcpu, access, exception);
 }
 
 static int kvm_write_guest_virt_helper(gva_t addr, void *val, unsigned int bytes,
@@ -4229,12 +4234,17 @@ out:
 }
 
 static int emulator_write_std(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, gva_t addr, void *val,
-			      unsigned int bytes, struct x86_exception *exception)
+			      unsigned int bytes, struct x86_exception *exception,
+			      bool system)
 {
 	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = emul_to_vcpu(ctxt);
+	u32 access = PFERR_WRITE_MASK;
+
+	if (!system && kvm_x86_ops->get_cpl(vcpu) == 3)
+		access |= PFERR_USER_MASK;
 
 	return kvm_write_guest_virt_helper(addr, val, bytes, vcpu,
-					   PFERR_WRITE_MASK, exception);
+					   access, exception);
 }
 
 int kvm_write_guest_virt_system(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gva_t addr, void *val,


  parent reply	other threads:[~2018-09-22  0:26 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 71+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-09-22  0:15 [PATCH 3.16 00/63] 3.16.58-rc1 review Ben Hutchings
2018-09-22  0:15 ` [PATCH 3.16 51/63] xfs: catch inode allocation state mismatch corruption Ben Hutchings
2018-09-22  5:25   ` Dave Chinner
2018-09-22 20:57     ` Ben Hutchings
2018-09-22  0:15 ` [PATCH 3.16 07/63] usbip: usbip_host: refine probe and disconnect debug msgs to be useful Ben Hutchings
2018-09-22  0:15 ` [PATCH 3.16 41/63] USB: yurex: fix out-of-bounds uaccess in read handler Ben Hutchings
2018-09-22  0:15 ` [PATCH 3.16 54/63] seccomp: create internal mode-setting function Ben Hutchings
2018-09-22  0:15 ` [PATCH 3.16 45/63] x86/paravirt: Fix spectre-v2 mitigations for paravirt guests Ben Hutchings
2018-09-22  0:15 ` [PATCH 3.16 36/63] jbd2: don't mark block as modified if the handle is out of credits Ben Hutchings
2018-09-22  0:15 ` [PATCH 3.16 18/63] sr: pass down correctly sized SCSI sense buffer Ben Hutchings
2018-09-22  0:15 ` [PATCH 3.16 06/63] usbip: usbip_host: fix to hold parent lock for device_attach() calls Ben Hutchings
2018-09-22  0:15 ` [PATCH 3.16 29/63] ext4: make sure bitmaps and the inode table don't overlap with bg descriptors Ben Hutchings
2018-09-22  0:15 ` [PATCH 3.16 63/63] mm: get rid of vmacache_flush_all() entirely Ben Hutchings
2018-09-22  0:15 ` [PATCH 3.16 26/63] ext4: verify the depth of extent tree in ext4_find_extent() Ben Hutchings
2018-09-22  0:15 ` [PATCH 3.16 38/63] Fix up non-directory creation in SGID directories Ben Hutchings
2018-09-22  0:15 ` [PATCH 3.16 56/63] seccomp: split mode setting routines Ben Hutchings
2018-09-22  0:15 ` [PATCH 3.16 13/63] futex: Remove unnecessary warning from get_futex_key Ben Hutchings
2018-09-22  0:15 ` [PATCH 3.16 21/63] Bluetooth: hidp: buffer overflow in hidp_process_report Ben Hutchings
2018-09-22  0:15 ` [PATCH 3.16 32/63] ext4: always verify the magic number in xattr blocks Ben Hutchings
2018-09-22  0:15 ` [PATCH 3.16 23/63] xfs: set format back to extents if xfs_bmap_extents_to_btree Ben Hutchings
2018-09-22  0:15 ` [PATCH 3.16 08/63] usbip: usbip_host: delete device from busid_table after rebind Ben Hutchings
2018-09-22  0:15 ` [PATCH 3.16 60/63] x86/cpu/AMD: Fix erratum 1076 (CPB bit) Ben Hutchings
2018-09-22  0:15 ` [PATCH 3.16 57/63] seccomp: add "seccomp" syscall Ben Hutchings
2018-09-22  0:15 ` [PATCH 3.16 20/63] scsi: sg: allocate with __GFP_ZERO in sg_build_indirect() Ben Hutchings
2018-09-22  0:19   ` syzbot
2018-09-22  0:15 ` [PATCH 3.16 04/63] net: Set sk_prot_creator when cloning sockets to the right proto Ben Hutchings
2018-09-22  0:15 ` [PATCH 3.16 33/63] ext4: never move the system.data xattr out of the inode body Ben Hutchings
2018-09-22  0:15 ` [PATCH 3.16 55/63] seccomp: extract check/assign mode helpers Ben Hutchings
2018-09-22  0:15 ` [PATCH 3.16 16/63] KVM: x86: pass kvm_vcpu to kvm_read_guest_virt and kvm_write_guest_virt_system Ben Hutchings
2018-09-22  0:15 ` [PATCH 3.16 35/63] ext4: add more inode number paranoia checks Ben Hutchings
2018-09-22  0:15 ` [PATCH 3.16 42/63] ALSA: rawmidi: Change resized buffers atomically Ben Hutchings
2018-09-22  0:15 ` [PATCH 3.16 27/63] ext4: always check block group bounds in ext4_init_block_bitmap() Ben Hutchings
2018-09-22  0:15 ` [PATCH 3.16 25/63] ext4: fix check to prevent initializing reserved inodes Ben Hutchings
2018-09-22  0:15 ` [PATCH 3.16 14/63] KVM: x86: Emulator ignores LDTR/TR extended base on LLDT/LTR Ben Hutchings
2018-09-22  0:15 ` [PATCH 3.16 15/63] KVM: x86: introduce linear_{read,write}_system Ben Hutchings
2018-09-22  0:15 ` [PATCH 3.16 61/63] x86/cpu/intel: Add Knights Mill to Intel family Ben Hutchings
2018-09-22  0:15 ` [PATCH 3.16 40/63] infiniband: fix a possible use-after-free bug Ben Hutchings
2018-09-22  0:15 ` [PATCH 3.16 09/63] usbip: usbip_host: run rebind from exit when module is removed Ben Hutchings
2018-09-22  0:15 ` [PATCH 3.16 11/63] usbip: usbip_host: fix bad unlock balance during stub_probe() Ben Hutchings
2018-09-22  0:15 ` [PATCH 3.16 12/63] futex: Remove requirement for lock_page() in get_futex_key() Ben Hutchings
2018-09-22  0:15 ` [PATCH 3.16 30/63] ext4: fix false negatives *and* false positives in ext4_check_descriptors() Ben Hutchings
2018-09-22  0:15 ` [PATCH 3.16 37/63] ext4: avoid running out of journal credits when appending to an inline file Ben Hutchings
2018-09-22  0:15 ` [PATCH 3.16 47/63] uas: replace WARN_ON_ONCE() with lockdep_assert_held() Ben Hutchings
2018-09-22  0:15 ` [PATCH 3.16 44/63] x86/speculation: Protect against userspace-userspace spectreRSB Ben Hutchings
2018-09-22  0:15 ` [PATCH 3.16 49/63] btrfs: relocation: Only remove reloc rb_trees if reloc control has been initialized Ben Hutchings
2018-09-22  0:15 ` [PATCH 3.16 24/63] ext4: only look at the bg_flags field if it is valid Ben Hutchings
2018-09-22  0:15 ` [PATCH 3.16 53/63] xfs: don't call xfs_da_shrink_inode with NULL bp Ben Hutchings
2018-09-22  0:15 ` Ben Hutchings [this message]
2018-09-22  0:15 ` [PATCH 3.16 43/63] x86/speculation: Clean up various Spectre related details Ben Hutchings
2018-09-22  0:15 ` [PATCH 3.16 52/63] xfs: validate cached inodes are free when allocated Ben Hutchings
2018-09-22  5:26   ` Dave Chinner
2018-09-22 20:57     ` Ben Hutchings
2018-09-22  0:15 ` [PATCH 3.16 48/63] video: uvesafb: Fix integer overflow in allocation Ben Hutchings
2018-09-22  0:15 ` [PATCH 3.16 19/63] jfs: Fix inconsistency between memory allocation and ea_buf->max_size Ben Hutchings
2018-09-22  0:15 ` [PATCH 3.16 22/63] scsi: libsas: defer ata device eh commands to libata Ben Hutchings
2018-09-22  0:15 ` [PATCH 3.16 05/63] usbip: fix error handling in stub_probe() Ben Hutchings
2018-09-22  0:15 ` [PATCH 3.16 10/63] usbip: usbip_host: fix NULL-ptr deref and use-after-free errors Ben Hutchings
2018-09-22  0:15 ` [PATCH 3.16 46/63] cdrom: Fix info leak/OOB read in cdrom_ioctl_drive_status Ben Hutchings
2018-09-22  0:15 ` [PATCH 3.16 28/63] ext4: don't allow r/w mounts if metadata blocks overlap the superblock Ben Hutchings
2018-09-22  0:15 ` [PATCH 3.16 03/63] Revert "vti4: Don't override MTU passed on link creation via IFLA_MTU" Ben Hutchings
2018-09-22  0:15 ` [PATCH 3.16 34/63] ext4: clear i_data in ext4_inode_info when removing inline data Ben Hutchings
2018-09-22  0:15 ` [PATCH 3.16 01/63] x86/fpu: Fix the 'nofxsr' boot parameter to also clear X86_FEATURE_FXSR_OPT Ben Hutchings
2018-09-22  0:15 ` [PATCH 3.16 02/63] x86/fpu: Default eagerfpu if FPU and FXSR are enabled Ben Hutchings
2018-09-22  0:15 ` [PATCH 3.16 58/63] x86/process: Optimize TIF checks in __switch_to_xtra() Ben Hutchings
2018-09-22  0:15 ` [PATCH 3.16 31/63] ext4: add corruption check in ext4_xattr_set_entry() Ben Hutchings
2018-09-22  0:15 ` [PATCH 3.16 39/63] x86/entry/64: Remove %ebx handling from error_entry/exit Ben Hutchings
2018-09-22  0:15 ` [PATCH 3.16 59/63] x86/process: Correct and optimize TIF_BLOCKSTEP switch Ben Hutchings
2018-09-22  0:15 ` [PATCH 3.16 50/63] hfsplus: fix NULL dereference in hfsplus_lookup() Ben Hutchings
2018-09-22  0:15 ` [PATCH 3.16 62/63] KVM: x86: introduce num_emulated_msrs Ben Hutchings
2018-09-22 12:28 ` [PATCH 3.16 00/63] 3.16.58-rc1 review Guenter Roeck
2018-09-22 21:03   ` Ben Hutchings

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