From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>,
Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>,
Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>,
"Schaufler, Casey" <casey.schaufler@intel.com>,
LSM <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH security-next v4 22/32] apparmor: Remove boot parameter
Date: Mon, 1 Oct 2018 17:54:55 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20181002005505.6112-23-keescook@chromium.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20181002005505.6112-1-keescook@chromium.org>
Since LSM enabling is now centralized with CONFIG_LSM_ENABLE and
"lsm.enable=...", this removes the LSM-specific enabling logic from
AppArmor, though it leaves the existing userspace API visibility into
/sys/module/apparmor/parameters/enabled.
Co-developed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 7 -------
security/apparmor/Kconfig | 16 ----------------
security/apparmor/lsm.c | 7 ++-----
3 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
index f646cfab5613..cf963febebb0 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -4054,13 +4054,6 @@
If enabled at boot time, /selinux/disable can be used
later to disable prior to initial policy load.
- apparmor= [APPARMOR] Disable or enable AppArmor at boot time
- Format: { "0" | "1" }
- See security/apparmor/Kconfig help text
- 0 -- disable.
- 1 -- enable.
- Default value is set via kernel config option.
-
serialnumber [BUGS=X86-32]
shapers= [NET]
diff --git a/security/apparmor/Kconfig b/security/apparmor/Kconfig
index b6b68a7750ce..3de21f46c82a 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/Kconfig
+++ b/security/apparmor/Kconfig
@@ -14,22 +14,6 @@ config SECURITY_APPARMOR
If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
-config SECURITY_APPARMOR_BOOTPARAM_VALUE
- int "AppArmor boot parameter default value"
- depends on SECURITY_APPARMOR
- range 0 1
- default 1
- help
- This option sets the default value for the kernel parameter
- 'apparmor', which allows AppArmor to be enabled or disabled
- at boot. If this option is set to 0 (zero), the AppArmor
- kernel parameter will default to 0, disabling AppArmor at
- boot. If this option is set to 1 (one), the AppArmor
- kernel parameter will default to 1, enabling AppArmor at
- boot.
-
- If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer 1.
-
config SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH
bool "Enable introspection of sha1 hashes for loaded profiles"
depends on SECURITY_APPARMOR
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index bc56b058dc75..4cd96a66ed6f 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -1303,15 +1303,12 @@ bool aa_g_paranoid_load = true;
module_param_named(paranoid_load, aa_g_paranoid_load, aabool, S_IRUGO);
/* Boot time disable flag */
-static int apparmor_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
+static int apparmor_enabled __lsm_ro_after_init;
module_param_named(enabled, apparmor_enabled, int, 0444);
static int __init apparmor_enabled_setup(char *str)
{
- unsigned long enabled;
- int error = kstrtoul(str, 0, &enabled);
- if (!error)
- apparmor_enabled = enabled ? 1 : 0;
+ pr_err("Boot param 'apparmor=' ignored. Use 'lsm.disable=apparmor'\n");
return 1;
}
--
2.17.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-10-02 1:04 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 92+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-10-02 0:54 [PATCH security-next v4 00/32] LSM: Explict LSM ordering Kees Cook
2018-10-02 0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 01/32] LSM: Correctly announce start of LSM initialization Kees Cook
2018-10-02 0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 02/32] vmlinux.lds.h: Avoid copy/paste of security_init section Kees Cook
2018-10-02 0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 03/32] LSM: Rename .security_initcall section to .lsm_info Kees Cook
2018-10-02 0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 04/32] LSM: Remove initcall tracing Kees Cook
2018-10-02 21:14 ` James Morris
2018-10-02 0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 05/32] LSM: Convert from initcall to struct lsm_info Kees Cook
2018-10-02 0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 06/32] vmlinux.lds.h: Move LSM_TABLE into INIT_DATA Kees Cook
2018-10-02 21:15 ` James Morris
2018-10-02 0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 07/32] LSM: Convert security_initcall() into DEFINE_LSM() Kees Cook
2018-10-02 21:16 ` James Morris
2018-10-02 0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 08/32] LSM: Record LSM name in struct lsm_info Kees Cook
2018-10-02 0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 09/32] LSM: Provide init debugging infrastructure Kees Cook
2018-10-02 21:17 ` James Morris
2018-10-02 0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 10/32] LSM: Don't ignore initialization failures Kees Cook
2018-10-02 21:20 ` James Morris
2018-10-02 21:38 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-02 0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 11/32] LSM: Introduce LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR Kees Cook
2018-10-02 0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 12/32] LSM: Provide separate ordered initialization Kees Cook
2018-10-02 0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 13/32] LoadPin: Rename "enable" to "enforce" Kees Cook
2018-10-02 1:06 ` Randy Dunlap
2018-10-02 4:47 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-02 0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 14/32] LSM: Plumb visibility into optional "enabled" state Kees Cook
2018-10-02 0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 15/32] LSM: Lift LSM selection out of individual LSMs Kees Cook
2018-10-02 0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 16/32] LSM: Prepare for arbitrary LSM enabling Kees Cook
2018-10-02 0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 17/32] LSM: Introduce CONFIG_LSM_ENABLE Kees Cook
2018-10-02 0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 18/32] LSM: Introduce lsm.enable= and lsm.disable= Kees Cook
2018-10-02 0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 19/32] LSM: Prepare for reorganizing "security=" logic Kees Cook
2018-10-02 0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 20/32] LSM: Refactor "security=" in terms of enable/disable Kees Cook
2018-10-02 0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 21/32] LSM: Finalize centralized LSM enabling logic Kees Cook
2018-10-02 1:18 ` Randy Dunlap
2018-10-02 4:49 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-02 0:54 ` Kees Cook [this message]
2018-10-02 0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 23/32] selinux: Remove boot parameter Kees Cook
2018-10-02 12:12 ` Paul Moore
2018-10-02 13:42 ` Stephen Smalley
2018-10-02 14:44 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-02 14:58 ` Stephen Smalley
2018-10-02 16:33 ` Jordan Glover
2018-10-02 16:54 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-02 18:33 ` Stephen Smalley
2018-10-02 19:02 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-02 18:57 ` John Johansen
2018-10-02 19:17 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-02 19:47 ` John Johansen
2018-10-02 20:29 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-02 21:11 ` John Johansen
2018-10-02 22:06 ` James Morris
2018-10-02 23:06 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-02 23:46 ` John Johansen
2018-10-02 23:54 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-03 0:05 ` John Johansen
2018-10-03 0:12 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-03 13:15 ` John Johansen
2018-10-03 13:39 ` Stephen Smalley
2018-10-03 17:26 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-03 19:43 ` Stephen Smalley
2018-10-04 5:38 ` John Johansen
2018-10-04 16:02 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-08 14:25 ` Paul Moore
2018-10-03 18:17 ` James Morris
2018-10-03 18:20 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-03 18:28 ` James Morris
2018-10-03 20:10 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-03 20:36 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-03 21:19 ` James Morris
2018-10-04 5:56 ` John Johansen
2018-10-04 16:18 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-04 17:40 ` Jordan Glover
2018-10-04 17:42 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-03 21:34 ` James Morris
2018-10-03 23:55 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-03 23:59 ` Randy Dunlap
2018-10-04 0:03 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-04 6:22 ` John Johansen
2018-10-04 6:18 ` John Johansen
2018-10-04 17:49 ` James Morris
2018-10-05 0:05 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-05 4:58 ` James Morris
2018-10-05 16:29 ` James Morris
2018-10-05 16:35 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-02 23:28 ` John Johansen
2018-10-02 16:34 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-02 0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 24/32] LSM: Build ordered list of ordered LSMs for init Kees Cook
2018-10-02 0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 25/32] LSM: Introduce CONFIG_LSM_ORDER Kees Cook
2018-10-02 0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 26/32] LSM: Introduce "lsm.order=" for boottime ordering Kees Cook
2018-10-02 0:55 ` [PATCH security-next v4 27/32] LoadPin: Initialize as ordered LSM Kees Cook
2018-10-02 0:55 ` [PATCH security-next v4 28/32] Yama: " Kees Cook
2018-10-02 0:55 ` [PATCH security-next v4 29/32] LSM: Introduce enum lsm_order Kees Cook
2018-10-02 0:55 ` [PATCH security-next v4 30/32] capability: Initialize as LSM_ORDER_FIRST Kees Cook
2018-10-02 0:55 ` [PATCH security-next v4 31/32] LSM: Separate idea of "major" LSM from "exclusive" LSM Kees Cook
2018-10-02 0:55 ` [PATCH security-next v4 32/32] LSM: Add all exclusive LSMs to ordered initialization Kees Cook
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