From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>,
Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>,
Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>,
"Schaufler, Casey" <casey.schaufler@intel.com>,
LSM <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH security-next v4 27/32] LoadPin: Initialize as ordered LSM
Date: Mon, 1 Oct 2018 17:55:00 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20181002005505.6112-28-keescook@chromium.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20181002005505.6112-1-keescook@chromium.org>
This converts LoadPin from being a direct "minor" LSM into an ordered LSM.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 5 -----
security/Kconfig | 2 +-
security/loadpin/loadpin.c | 8 +++++++-
security/security.c | 1 -
4 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index b026ea93ff01..098ccf2caa0e 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -2091,10 +2091,5 @@ extern void __init yama_add_hooks(void);
#else
static inline void __init yama_add_hooks(void) { }
#endif
-#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_LOADPIN
-void __init loadpin_add_hooks(void);
-#else
-static inline void loadpin_add_hooks(void) { };
-#endif
#endif /* ! __LINUX_LSM_HOOKS_H */
diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
index c68520d97fd7..e59cb9296316 100644
--- a/security/Kconfig
+++ b/security/Kconfig
@@ -293,7 +293,7 @@ config LSM_ENABLE
config LSM_ORDER
string "Default initialization order of builtin LSMs"
- default "integrity"
+ default "loadpin,integrity"
help
A comma-separated list of LSMs, in initialization order.
Any LSMs left off this list will be link-order initialized
diff --git a/security/loadpin/loadpin.c b/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
index d8a68a6f6fef..dab42bfa1e4a 100644
--- a/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
+++ b/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
@@ -184,13 +184,19 @@ static struct security_hook_list loadpin_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_load_data, loadpin_load_data),
};
-void __init loadpin_add_hooks(void)
+static int __init loadpin_init(void)
{
pr_info("ready to pin (currently %senforcing)\n",
enforcing ? "" : "not ");
security_add_hooks(loadpin_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(loadpin_hooks), "loadpin");
+ return 0;
}
+DEFINE_LSM(loadpin) = {
+ .name = "loadpin",
+ .init = loadpin_init,
+};
+
/* Should not be mutable after boot, so not listed in sysfs (perm == 0). */
module_param(enforcing, int, 0);
MODULE_PARM_DESC(enforcing, "Enforce module/firmware pinning");
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 6fafad44b85e..6957f5f50483 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -297,7 +297,6 @@ int __init security_init(void)
*/
capability_add_hooks();
yama_add_hooks();
- loadpin_add_hooks();
/* Load LSMs in specified order. */
prepare_lsm_order();
--
2.17.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-10-02 1:05 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 92+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-10-02 0:54 [PATCH security-next v4 00/32] LSM: Explict LSM ordering Kees Cook
2018-10-02 0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 01/32] LSM: Correctly announce start of LSM initialization Kees Cook
2018-10-02 0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 02/32] vmlinux.lds.h: Avoid copy/paste of security_init section Kees Cook
2018-10-02 0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 03/32] LSM: Rename .security_initcall section to .lsm_info Kees Cook
2018-10-02 0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 04/32] LSM: Remove initcall tracing Kees Cook
2018-10-02 21:14 ` James Morris
2018-10-02 0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 05/32] LSM: Convert from initcall to struct lsm_info Kees Cook
2018-10-02 0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 06/32] vmlinux.lds.h: Move LSM_TABLE into INIT_DATA Kees Cook
2018-10-02 21:15 ` James Morris
2018-10-02 0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 07/32] LSM: Convert security_initcall() into DEFINE_LSM() Kees Cook
2018-10-02 21:16 ` James Morris
2018-10-02 0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 08/32] LSM: Record LSM name in struct lsm_info Kees Cook
2018-10-02 0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 09/32] LSM: Provide init debugging infrastructure Kees Cook
2018-10-02 21:17 ` James Morris
2018-10-02 0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 10/32] LSM: Don't ignore initialization failures Kees Cook
2018-10-02 21:20 ` James Morris
2018-10-02 21:38 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-02 0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 11/32] LSM: Introduce LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR Kees Cook
2018-10-02 0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 12/32] LSM: Provide separate ordered initialization Kees Cook
2018-10-02 0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 13/32] LoadPin: Rename "enable" to "enforce" Kees Cook
2018-10-02 1:06 ` Randy Dunlap
2018-10-02 4:47 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-02 0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 14/32] LSM: Plumb visibility into optional "enabled" state Kees Cook
2018-10-02 0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 15/32] LSM: Lift LSM selection out of individual LSMs Kees Cook
2018-10-02 0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 16/32] LSM: Prepare for arbitrary LSM enabling Kees Cook
2018-10-02 0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 17/32] LSM: Introduce CONFIG_LSM_ENABLE Kees Cook
2018-10-02 0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 18/32] LSM: Introduce lsm.enable= and lsm.disable= Kees Cook
2018-10-02 0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 19/32] LSM: Prepare for reorganizing "security=" logic Kees Cook
2018-10-02 0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 20/32] LSM: Refactor "security=" in terms of enable/disable Kees Cook
2018-10-02 0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 21/32] LSM: Finalize centralized LSM enabling logic Kees Cook
2018-10-02 1:18 ` Randy Dunlap
2018-10-02 4:49 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-02 0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 22/32] apparmor: Remove boot parameter Kees Cook
2018-10-02 0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 23/32] selinux: " Kees Cook
2018-10-02 12:12 ` Paul Moore
2018-10-02 13:42 ` Stephen Smalley
2018-10-02 14:44 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-02 14:58 ` Stephen Smalley
2018-10-02 16:33 ` Jordan Glover
2018-10-02 16:54 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-02 18:33 ` Stephen Smalley
2018-10-02 19:02 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-02 18:57 ` John Johansen
2018-10-02 19:17 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-02 19:47 ` John Johansen
2018-10-02 20:29 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-02 21:11 ` John Johansen
2018-10-02 22:06 ` James Morris
2018-10-02 23:06 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-02 23:46 ` John Johansen
2018-10-02 23:54 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-03 0:05 ` John Johansen
2018-10-03 0:12 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-03 13:15 ` John Johansen
2018-10-03 13:39 ` Stephen Smalley
2018-10-03 17:26 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-03 19:43 ` Stephen Smalley
2018-10-04 5:38 ` John Johansen
2018-10-04 16:02 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-08 14:25 ` Paul Moore
2018-10-03 18:17 ` James Morris
2018-10-03 18:20 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-03 18:28 ` James Morris
2018-10-03 20:10 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-03 20:36 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-03 21:19 ` James Morris
2018-10-04 5:56 ` John Johansen
2018-10-04 16:18 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-04 17:40 ` Jordan Glover
2018-10-04 17:42 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-03 21:34 ` James Morris
2018-10-03 23:55 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-03 23:59 ` Randy Dunlap
2018-10-04 0:03 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-04 6:22 ` John Johansen
2018-10-04 6:18 ` John Johansen
2018-10-04 17:49 ` James Morris
2018-10-05 0:05 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-05 4:58 ` James Morris
2018-10-05 16:29 ` James Morris
2018-10-05 16:35 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-02 23:28 ` John Johansen
2018-10-02 16:34 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-02 0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 24/32] LSM: Build ordered list of ordered LSMs for init Kees Cook
2018-10-02 0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 25/32] LSM: Introduce CONFIG_LSM_ORDER Kees Cook
2018-10-02 0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 26/32] LSM: Introduce "lsm.order=" for boottime ordering Kees Cook
2018-10-02 0:55 ` Kees Cook [this message]
2018-10-02 0:55 ` [PATCH security-next v4 28/32] Yama: Initialize as ordered LSM Kees Cook
2018-10-02 0:55 ` [PATCH security-next v4 29/32] LSM: Introduce enum lsm_order Kees Cook
2018-10-02 0:55 ` [PATCH security-next v4 30/32] capability: Initialize as LSM_ORDER_FIRST Kees Cook
2018-10-02 0:55 ` [PATCH security-next v4 31/32] LSM: Separate idea of "major" LSM from "exclusive" LSM Kees Cook
2018-10-02 0:55 ` [PATCH security-next v4 32/32] LSM: Add all exclusive LSMs to ordered initialization Kees Cook
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