From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>,
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>,
Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>,
Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>,
Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
Jordan Glover <Golden_Miller83@protonmail.ch>,
LSM <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH security-next v5 30/30] capability: Initialize as LSM_ORDER_FIRST
Date: Wed, 10 Oct 2018 17:18:46 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20181011001846.30964-31-keescook@chromium.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20181011001846.30964-1-keescook@chromium.org>
This converts capabilities to use the new LSM_ORDER_FIRST position.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 2 --
security/commoncap.c | 9 ++++++++-
security/security.c | 5 -----
3 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index 97898679a505..b728cb448957 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -2092,6 +2092,4 @@ static inline void security_delete_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks,
#define __lsm_ro_after_init __ro_after_init
#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_WRITABLE_HOOKS */
-extern void __init capability_add_hooks(void);
-
#endif /* ! __LINUX_LSM_HOOKS_H */
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index 2e489d6a3ac8..c928eb3fe784 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -1366,10 +1366,17 @@ struct security_hook_list capability_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(vm_enough_memory, cap_vm_enough_memory),
};
-void __init capability_add_hooks(void)
+static int __init capability_init(void)
{
security_add_hooks(capability_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(capability_hooks),
"capability");
+ return 0;
}
+DEFINE_LSM(capability) = {
+ .name = "capability",
+ .order = LSM_ORDER_FIRST,
+ .init = capability_init,
+};
+
#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 004938eb8e70..aa91181133c1 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -267,11 +267,6 @@ int __init security_init(void)
i++)
INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&list[i]);
- /*
- * Load minor LSMs, with the capability module always first.
- */
- capability_add_hooks();
-
/* Load LSMs in specified order. */
ordered_lsm_init();
--
2.17.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-10-11 0:25 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 52+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-10-11 0:18 [PATCH security-next v5 00/30] LSM: Explict ordering Kees Cook
2018-10-11 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 01/30] LSM: Correctly announce start of LSM initialization Kees Cook
2018-10-11 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 02/30] vmlinux.lds.h: Avoid copy/paste of security_init section Kees Cook
2018-10-11 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 03/30] LSM: Rename .security_initcall section to .lsm_info Kees Cook
2018-10-11 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 04/30] LSM: Remove initcall tracing Kees Cook
2018-10-11 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 05/30] LSM: Convert from initcall to struct lsm_info Kees Cook
2018-10-11 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 06/30] vmlinux.lds.h: Move LSM_TABLE into INIT_DATA Kees Cook
2018-10-11 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 07/30] LSM: Convert security_initcall() into DEFINE_LSM() Kees Cook
2018-10-11 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 08/30] LSM: Record LSM name in struct lsm_info Kees Cook
2018-10-11 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 09/30] LSM: Provide init debugging infrastructure Kees Cook
2018-10-11 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 10/30] LSM: Don't ignore initialization failures Kees Cook
2018-10-11 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 11/30] LSM: Introduce LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR Kees Cook
2018-10-11 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 12/30] LSM: Provide separate ordered initialization Kees Cook
2018-11-02 18:13 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-11-02 20:49 ` Kees Cook
2018-11-05 14:13 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-10-11 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 13/30] LoadPin: Rename boot param "enabled" to "enforce" Kees Cook
2018-10-11 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 14/30] LSM: Plumb visibility into optional "enabled" state Kees Cook
2018-10-11 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 15/30] LSM: Lift LSM selection out of individual LSMs Kees Cook
2018-10-11 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 16/30] LSM: Build ordered list of LSMs to initialize Kees Cook
2018-10-11 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 17/30] LSM: Introduce CONFIG_LSM Kees Cook
2018-10-11 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 18/30] LSM: Introduce "lsm=" for boottime LSM selection Kees Cook
2018-10-11 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 19/30] LSM: Tie enabling logic to presence in ordered list Kees Cook
2018-10-11 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 20/30] LSM: Prepare for reorganizing "security=" logic Kees Cook
2018-10-11 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 21/30] LSM: Refactor "security=" in terms of enable/disable Kees Cook
2018-10-11 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 22/30] LSM: Separate idea of "major" LSM from "exclusive" LSM Kees Cook
2018-10-11 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 23/30] apparmor: Remove SECURITY_APPARMOR_BOOTPARAM_VALUE Kees Cook
2018-10-11 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 24/30] selinux: Remove SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE Kees Cook
2018-10-11 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 25/30] LSM: Add all exclusive LSMs to ordered initialization Kees Cook
2018-10-11 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 26/30] LSM: Split LSM preparation from initialization Kees Cook
2018-10-11 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 27/30] LoadPin: Initialize as ordered LSM Kees Cook
2018-10-11 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 28/30] Yama: " Kees Cook
2018-10-11 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 29/30] LSM: Introduce enum lsm_order Kees Cook
2018-10-11 0:18 ` Kees Cook [this message]
2018-10-11 3:45 ` [PATCH security-next v5 00/30] LSM: Explict ordering James Morris
2018-10-11 15:14 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-11 15:52 ` James Morris
2018-10-11 17:57 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-11 22:58 ` Jordan Glover
2018-10-11 23:09 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-11 23:48 ` John Johansen
2018-10-12 0:11 ` Jordan Glover
2018-10-12 1:19 ` John Johansen
2018-10-12 11:31 ` Jordan Glover
2018-10-12 18:24 ` John Johansen
2018-10-12 19:01 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-23 16:48 ` Casey Schaufler
2018-10-23 18:50 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-11 23:53 ` Jordan Glover
2018-10-12 0:26 ` John Johansen
2018-10-12 11:31 ` Jordan Glover
2018-10-12 18:11 ` John Johansen
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