From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>,
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>,
Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>,
Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>,
Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
Jordan Glover <Golden_Miller83@protonmail.ch>,
LSM <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH security-next v5 25/30] LSM: Add all exclusive LSMs to ordered initialization
Date: Wed, 10 Oct 2018 17:18:41 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20181011001846.30964-26-keescook@chromium.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20181011001846.30964-1-keescook@chromium.org>
This removes CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY in favor of the explicit ordering
offered by CONFIG_LSM and adds all the exclusive LSMs to the ordered
LSM initialization. The old meaning of CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY is now
captured by which exclusive LSM is listed first in the LSM order. All
LSMs not added to the ordered list are explicitly disabled.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
security/Kconfig | 39 +--------------------------------------
security/security.c | 35 ++++++++++-------------------------
2 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 63 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
index 0aa82c1c928e..2f8dc1f59cae 100644
--- a/security/Kconfig
+++ b/security/Kconfig
@@ -239,46 +239,9 @@ source security/yama/Kconfig
source security/integrity/Kconfig
-choice
- prompt "Default security module"
- default DEFAULT_SECURITY_SELINUX if SECURITY_SELINUX
- default DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK if SECURITY_SMACK
- default DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO if SECURITY_TOMOYO
- default DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR if SECURITY_APPARMOR
- default DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC
-
- help
- Select the security module that will be used by default if the
- kernel parameter security= is not specified.
-
- config DEFAULT_SECURITY_SELINUX
- bool "SELinux" if SECURITY_SELINUX=y
-
- config DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK
- bool "Simplified Mandatory Access Control" if SECURITY_SMACK=y
-
- config DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO
- bool "TOMOYO" if SECURITY_TOMOYO=y
-
- config DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR
- bool "AppArmor" if SECURITY_APPARMOR=y
-
- config DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC
- bool "Unix Discretionary Access Controls"
-
-endchoice
-
-config DEFAULT_SECURITY
- string
- default "selinux" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SELINUX
- default "smack" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK
- default "tomoyo" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO
- default "apparmor" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR
- default "" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC
-
config LSM
string "Ordered list of enabled LSMs"
- default "integrity"
+ default "integrity,selinux,smack,tomoyo,apparmor"
help
A comma-separated list of LSMs, in initialization order.
Any LSMs left off this list will be ignored. This can be
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 65f1fa733e4b..4f52bd06705f 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -175,8 +175,7 @@ static void __init ordered_lsm_parse(const char *order, const char *origin)
bool found = false;
for (lsm = __start_lsm_info; lsm < __end_lsm_info; lsm++) {
- if ((lsm->flags & LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR) == 0 &&
- strcmp(lsm->name, name) == 0) {
+ if (strcmp(lsm->name, name) == 0) {
append_ordered_lsm(lsm, origin);
found = true;
}
@@ -185,6 +184,15 @@ static void __init ordered_lsm_parse(const char *order, const char *origin)
if (!found)
init_debug("%s ignored: %s\n", origin, name);
}
+
+ /* Disable all LSMs not in the ordered list. */
+ for (lsm = __start_lsm_info; lsm < __end_lsm_info; lsm++) {
+ if (exists_ordered_lsm(lsm))
+ continue;
+ set_enabled(lsm, false);
+ init_debug("%s disabled: %s\n", origin, lsm->name);
+ }
+
kfree(sep);
}
@@ -196,8 +204,6 @@ static void __init ordered_lsm_init(void)
GFP_KERNEL);
/* Process "security=", if given. */
- if (!chosen_major_lsm)
- chosen_major_lsm = CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY;
if (chosen_major_lsm) {
struct lsm_info *major;
@@ -229,22 +235,6 @@ static void __init ordered_lsm_init(void)
kfree(ordered_lsms);
}
-static void __init major_lsm_init(void)
-{
- struct lsm_info *lsm;
-
- for (lsm = __start_lsm_info; lsm < __end_lsm_info; lsm++) {
- if ((lsm->flags & LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR) == 0)
- continue;
-
- /* Enable this LSM, if it is not already set. */
- if (!lsm->enabled)
- lsm->enabled = &lsm_enabled_true;
-
- maybe_initialize_lsm(lsm);
- }
-}
-
/**
* security_init - initializes the security framework
*
@@ -271,11 +261,6 @@ int __init security_init(void)
/* Load LSMs in specified order. */
ordered_lsm_init();
- /*
- * Load all the remaining security modules.
- */
- major_lsm_init();
-
return 0;
}
--
2.17.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-10-11 0:25 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 52+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-10-11 0:18 [PATCH security-next v5 00/30] LSM: Explict ordering Kees Cook
2018-10-11 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 01/30] LSM: Correctly announce start of LSM initialization Kees Cook
2018-10-11 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 02/30] vmlinux.lds.h: Avoid copy/paste of security_init section Kees Cook
2018-10-11 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 03/30] LSM: Rename .security_initcall section to .lsm_info Kees Cook
2018-10-11 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 04/30] LSM: Remove initcall tracing Kees Cook
2018-10-11 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 05/30] LSM: Convert from initcall to struct lsm_info Kees Cook
2018-10-11 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 06/30] vmlinux.lds.h: Move LSM_TABLE into INIT_DATA Kees Cook
2018-10-11 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 07/30] LSM: Convert security_initcall() into DEFINE_LSM() Kees Cook
2018-10-11 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 08/30] LSM: Record LSM name in struct lsm_info Kees Cook
2018-10-11 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 09/30] LSM: Provide init debugging infrastructure Kees Cook
2018-10-11 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 10/30] LSM: Don't ignore initialization failures Kees Cook
2018-10-11 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 11/30] LSM: Introduce LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR Kees Cook
2018-10-11 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 12/30] LSM: Provide separate ordered initialization Kees Cook
2018-11-02 18:13 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-11-02 20:49 ` Kees Cook
2018-11-05 14:13 ` Mimi Zohar
2018-10-11 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 13/30] LoadPin: Rename boot param "enabled" to "enforce" Kees Cook
2018-10-11 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 14/30] LSM: Plumb visibility into optional "enabled" state Kees Cook
2018-10-11 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 15/30] LSM: Lift LSM selection out of individual LSMs Kees Cook
2018-10-11 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 16/30] LSM: Build ordered list of LSMs to initialize Kees Cook
2018-10-11 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 17/30] LSM: Introduce CONFIG_LSM Kees Cook
2018-10-11 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 18/30] LSM: Introduce "lsm=" for boottime LSM selection Kees Cook
2018-10-11 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 19/30] LSM: Tie enabling logic to presence in ordered list Kees Cook
2018-10-11 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 20/30] LSM: Prepare for reorganizing "security=" logic Kees Cook
2018-10-11 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 21/30] LSM: Refactor "security=" in terms of enable/disable Kees Cook
2018-10-11 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 22/30] LSM: Separate idea of "major" LSM from "exclusive" LSM Kees Cook
2018-10-11 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 23/30] apparmor: Remove SECURITY_APPARMOR_BOOTPARAM_VALUE Kees Cook
2018-10-11 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 24/30] selinux: Remove SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE Kees Cook
2018-10-11 0:18 ` Kees Cook [this message]
2018-10-11 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 26/30] LSM: Split LSM preparation from initialization Kees Cook
2018-10-11 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 27/30] LoadPin: Initialize as ordered LSM Kees Cook
2018-10-11 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 28/30] Yama: " Kees Cook
2018-10-11 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 29/30] LSM: Introduce enum lsm_order Kees Cook
2018-10-11 0:18 ` [PATCH security-next v5 30/30] capability: Initialize as LSM_ORDER_FIRST Kees Cook
2018-10-11 3:45 ` [PATCH security-next v5 00/30] LSM: Explict ordering James Morris
2018-10-11 15:14 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-11 15:52 ` James Morris
2018-10-11 17:57 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-11 22:58 ` Jordan Glover
2018-10-11 23:09 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-11 23:48 ` John Johansen
2018-10-12 0:11 ` Jordan Glover
2018-10-12 1:19 ` John Johansen
2018-10-12 11:31 ` Jordan Glover
2018-10-12 18:24 ` John Johansen
2018-10-12 19:01 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-23 16:48 ` Casey Schaufler
2018-10-23 18:50 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-11 23:53 ` Jordan Glover
2018-10-12 0:26 ` John Johansen
2018-10-12 11:31 ` Jordan Glover
2018-10-12 18:11 ` John Johansen
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