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From: Peter Gonda <pgonda@google.com>
To: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
	platform-driver-x86@vger.kernel.org, linux-coco@lists.linux.dev,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>,
	Tom Lendacky <Thomas.Lendacky@amd.com>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>,
	Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
	Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>,
	Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Sergio Lopez <slp@redhat.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Srinivas Pandruvada <srinivas.pandruvada@linux.intel.com>,
	David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
	Dov Murik <dovmurik@linux.ibm.com>,
	Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum <tobin@ibm.com>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>,
	Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>,
	"Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name>,
	Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
	"Dr . David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>,
	tony.luck@intel.com, marcorr@google.com,
	sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v7 44/45] virt: sevguest: Add support to derive key
Date: Thu, 18 Nov 2021 09:43:06 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAMkAt6qGASUFv7_bEDd3zrwt2J8kRxKdNuZCGCnsNvnGr4Uv3g@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20211110220731.2396491-45-brijesh.singh@amd.com>

On Wed, Nov 10, 2021 at 3:09 PM Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> wrote:
>
> The SNP_GET_DERIVED_KEY ioctl interface can be used by the SNP guest to
> ask the firmware to provide a key derived from a root key. The derived
> key may be used by the guest for any purposes it choose, such as a
> sealing key or communicating with the external entities.
>
> See SEV-SNP firmware spec for more information.
>
> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
> ---
>  Documentation/virt/coco/sevguest.rst  | 19 ++++++++++-
>  drivers/virt/coco/sevguest/sevguest.c | 49 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  include/uapi/linux/sev-guest.h        | 24 +++++++++++++
>  3 files changed, 91 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/Documentation/virt/coco/sevguest.rst b/Documentation/virt/coco/sevguest.rst
> index 002c90946b8a..0bd9a65e0370 100644
> --- a/Documentation/virt/coco/sevguest.rst
> +++ b/Documentation/virt/coco/sevguest.rst
> @@ -64,10 +64,27 @@ The SNP_GET_REPORT ioctl can be used to query the attestation report from the
>  SEV-SNP firmware. The ioctl uses the SNP_GUEST_REQUEST (MSG_REPORT_REQ) command
>  provided by the SEV-SNP firmware to query the attestation report.
>
> -On success, the snp_report_resp.data will contains the report. The report
> +On success, the snp_report_resp.data will contain the report. The report
>  will contain the format described in the SEV-SNP specification. See the SEV-SNP
>  specification for further details.
>
> +2.2 SNP_GET_DERIVED_KEY
> +-----------------------
> +:Technology: sev-snp
> +:Type: guest ioctl
> +:Parameters (in): struct snp_derived_key_req
> +:Returns (out): struct snp_derived_key_req on success, -negative on error
> +
> +The SNP_GET_DERIVED_KEY ioctl can be used to get a key derive from a root key.

derived

> +The derived key can be used by the guest for any purpose, such as sealing keys
> +or communicating with external entities.
> +
> +The ioctl uses the SNP_GUEST_REQUEST (MSG_KEY_REQ) command provided by the
> +SEV-SNP firmware to derive the key. See SEV-SNP specification for further details
> +on the various fields passed in the key derivation request.
> +
> +On success, the snp_derived_key_resp.data will contains the derived key value. See
".data will contain the..." or ".data contains the derived key..."


> +the SEV-SNP specification for further details.
>
>  Reference
>  ---------
> diff --git a/drivers/virt/coco/sevguest/sevguest.c b/drivers/virt/coco/sevguest/sevguest.c
> index 982714c1b4ca..bece6856573e 100644
> --- a/drivers/virt/coco/sevguest/sevguest.c
> +++ b/drivers/virt/coco/sevguest/sevguest.c
> @@ -392,6 +392,52 @@ static int get_report(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, struct snp_guest_request_io
>         return rc;
>  }
>
> +static int get_derived_key(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, struct snp_guest_request_ioctl *arg)
> +{
> +       struct snp_guest_crypto *crypto = snp_dev->crypto;
> +       struct snp_derived_key_resp resp = {0};
> +       struct snp_derived_key_req req;
> +       int rc, resp_len;
> +       u8 buf[89];

Could we document this magic number?

> +
> +       if (!arg->req_data || !arg->resp_data)
> +               return -EINVAL;
> +
> +       /* Copy the request payload from userspace */
> +       if (copy_from_user(&req, (void __user *)arg->req_data, sizeof(req)))
> +               return -EFAULT;
> +
> +       /* Message version must be non-zero */
> +       if (!req.msg_version)
> +               return -EINVAL;
> +
> +       /*
> +        * The intermediate response buffer is used while decrypting the
> +        * response payload. Make sure that it has enough space to cover the
> +        * authtag.
> +        */
> +       resp_len = sizeof(resp.data) + crypto->a_len;
> +       if (sizeof(buf) < resp_len)
> +               return -ENOMEM;
> +
> +       /* Issue the command to get the attestation report */
> +       rc = handle_guest_request(snp_dev, SVM_VMGEXIT_GUEST_REQUEST, req.msg_version,
> +                                 SNP_MSG_KEY_REQ, &req.data, sizeof(req.data), buf, resp_len,
> +                                 &arg->fw_err);
> +       if (rc)
> +               goto e_free;

Should we check the first 32 bits of |data| here since that is a
status field? If we see 16h here we could return -EINVAL, or better to
let userspace deal with that error handling?

> +
> +       /* Copy the response payload to userspace */
> +       memcpy(resp.data, buf, sizeof(resp.data));
> +       if (copy_to_user((void __user *)arg->resp_data, &resp, sizeof(resp)))
> +               rc = -EFAULT;
> +
> +e_free:
> +       memzero_explicit(buf, sizeof(buf));
> +       memzero_explicit(&resp, sizeof(resp));
> +       return rc;
> +}
> +
>  static long snp_guest_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int ioctl, unsigned long arg)
>  {
>         struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev = to_snp_dev(file);
> @@ -417,6 +463,9 @@ static long snp_guest_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int ioctl, unsigned long
>         case SNP_GET_REPORT:
>                 ret = get_report(snp_dev, &input);
>                 break;
> +       case SNP_GET_DERIVED_KEY:
> +               ret = get_derived_key(snp_dev, &input);
> +               break;
>         default:
>                 break;
>         }
> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/sev-guest.h b/include/uapi/linux/sev-guest.h
> index eda7edcffda8..f6d9c136ff4d 100644
> --- a/include/uapi/linux/sev-guest.h
> +++ b/include/uapi/linux/sev-guest.h
> @@ -36,9 +36,33 @@ struct snp_guest_request_ioctl {
>         __u64 fw_err;
>  };
>
> +struct __snp_derived_key_req {
> +       __u32 root_key_select;
> +       __u32 rsvd;
> +       __u64 guest_field_select;
> +       __u32 vmpl;
> +       __u32 guest_svn;
> +       __u64 tcb_version;
> +};
> +
> +struct snp_derived_key_req {
> +       /* message version number (must be non-zero) */
> +       __u8 msg_version;
> +
> +       struct __snp_derived_key_req data;
> +};
> +
> +struct snp_derived_key_resp {
> +       /* response data, see SEV-SNP spec for the format */
> +       __u8 data[64];
> +};
> +
>  #define SNP_GUEST_REQ_IOC_TYPE 'S'
>
>  /* Get SNP attestation report */
>  #define SNP_GET_REPORT _IOWR(SNP_GUEST_REQ_IOC_TYPE, 0x0, struct snp_guest_request_ioctl)
>
> +/* Get a derived key from the root */
> +#define SNP_GET_DERIVED_KEY _IOWR(SNP_GUEST_REQ_IOC_TYPE, 0x1, struct snp_guest_request_ioctl)
> +
>  #endif /* __UAPI_LINUX_SEV_GUEST_H_ */
> --
> 2.25.1
>

  reply	other threads:[~2021-11-18 16:43 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 80+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-11-10 22:06 [PATCH v7 00/45] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) Guest Support Brijesh Singh
2021-11-10 22:06 ` [PATCH v7 01/45] x86/compressed/64: detect/setup SEV/SME features earlier in boot Brijesh Singh
2021-11-12 16:52   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-11-12 20:30     ` Michael Roth
2021-11-23 21:55       ` Venu Busireddy
2021-11-10 22:06 ` [PATCH v7 02/45] x86/sev: " Brijesh Singh
2021-11-15 19:12   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-11-15 20:17     ` Michael Roth
2021-11-17 13:11       ` Borislav Petkov
2021-12-06 23:47   ` Venu Busireddy
2021-11-10 22:06 ` [PATCH v7 03/45] x86/mm: Extend cc_attr to include AMD SEV-SNP Brijesh Singh
2021-11-10 22:06 ` [PATCH v7 04/45] x86/sev: Shorten GHCB terminate macro names Brijesh Singh
2021-11-10 22:06 ` [PATCH v7 05/45] x86/sev: Get rid of excessive use of defines Brijesh Singh
2021-11-10 22:06 ` [PATCH v7 06/45] x86/head64: Carve out the guest encryption postprocessing into a helper Brijesh Singh
2021-11-10 22:06 ` [PATCH v7 07/45] x86/sev: Remove do_early_exception() forward declarations Brijesh Singh
2021-11-10 22:06 ` [PATCH v7 08/45] x86/sev: Define the Linux specific guest termination reasons Brijesh Singh
2021-11-10 22:06 ` [PATCH v7 09/45] x86/sev: Save the negotiated GHCB version Brijesh Singh
2021-12-07 12:51   ` Tianyu Lan
2021-12-07 13:17     ` Borislav Petkov
2021-12-07 16:58       ` Brijesh Singh
2021-11-10 22:06 ` [PATCH v7 10/45] x86/sev: Add support for hypervisor feature VMGEXIT Brijesh Singh
2021-12-02 17:52   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-12-06 15:15     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-11-10 22:06 ` [PATCH v7 11/45] x86/sev: Check SEV-SNP features support Brijesh Singh
2021-11-10 22:06 ` [PATCH v7 12/45] x86/sev: Add a helper for the PVALIDATE instruction Brijesh Singh
2021-11-10 22:06 ` [PATCH v7 13/45] x86/sev: Check the vmpl level Brijesh Singh
2021-12-06 18:25   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-11-10 22:07 ` [PATCH v7 14/45] x86/compressed: Add helper for validating pages in the decompression stage Brijesh Singh
2021-12-07 11:48   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-12-07 19:21     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-11-10 22:07 ` [PATCH v7 15/45] x86/compressed: Register GHCB memory when SEV-SNP is active Brijesh Singh
2021-11-15 14:05   ` Jörg Rödel
2021-11-10 22:07 ` [PATCH v7 16/45] x86/sev: " Brijesh Singh
2021-12-08 17:41   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-11-10 22:07 ` [PATCH v7 17/45] x86/sev: Add helper for validating pages in early enc attribute changes Brijesh Singh
2021-11-10 22:07 ` [PATCH v7 18/45] x86/kernel: Make the bss.decrypted section shared in RMP table Brijesh Singh
2021-11-10 22:07 ` [PATCH v7 19/45] x86/kernel: Validate rom memory before accessing when SEV-SNP is active Brijesh Singh
2021-11-10 22:07 ` [PATCH v7 20/45] x86/mm: Add support to validate memory when changing C-bit Brijesh Singh
2021-11-10 22:07 ` [PATCH v7 21/45] KVM: SVM: Define sev_features and vmpl field in the VMSA Brijesh Singh
2021-11-10 22:07 ` [PATCH v7 22/45] KVM: SVM: Create a separate mapping for the SEV-ES save area Brijesh Singh
2021-11-10 22:07 ` [PATCH v7 23/45] KVM: SVM: Create a separate mapping for the GHCB " Brijesh Singh
2021-11-10 22:07 ` [PATCH v7 24/45] KVM: SVM: Update the SEV-ES save area mapping Brijesh Singh
2021-11-10 22:07 ` [PATCH v7 25/45] x86/sev: Use SEV-SNP AP creation to start secondary CPUs Brijesh Singh
2021-11-10 22:07 ` [PATCH v7 26/45] x86/head: re-enable stack protection for 32/64-bit builds Brijesh Singh
2021-11-10 22:07 ` [PATCH v7 27/45] x86/sev: move MSR-based VMGEXITs for CPUID to helper Brijesh Singh
2021-11-10 22:07 ` [PATCH v7 28/45] KVM: x86: move lookup of indexed CPUID leafs " Brijesh Singh
2021-11-10 22:07 ` [PATCH v7 29/45] x86/compressed/acpi: move EFI system table lookup " Brijesh Singh
2021-11-10 22:07 ` [PATCH v7 30/45] x86/compressed/acpi: move EFI config " Brijesh Singh
2021-11-10 22:07 ` [PATCH v7 31/45] x86/compressed/acpi: move EFI vendor " Brijesh Singh
2021-11-10 22:07 ` [PATCH v7 32/45] x86/boot: Add Confidential Computing type to setup_data Brijesh Singh
2021-11-10 22:07 ` [PATCH v7 33/45] KVM: SEV: Add documentation for SEV-SNP CPUID Enforcement Brijesh Singh
2021-11-10 22:07 ` [PATCH v7 34/45] x86/compressed/64: add support for SEV-SNP CPUID table in #VC handlers Brijesh Singh
2021-11-10 22:07 ` [PATCH v7 35/45] x86/boot: add a pointer to Confidential Computing blob in bootparams Brijesh Singh
2021-11-10 22:07 ` [PATCH v7 36/45] x86/compressed: add SEV-SNP feature detection/setup Brijesh Singh
2021-11-10 22:07 ` [PATCH v7 37/45] x86/compressed: use firmware-validated CPUID for SEV-SNP guests Brijesh Singh
2021-11-10 22:07 ` [PATCH v7 38/45] x86/compressed/64: add identity mapping for Confidential Computing blob Brijesh Singh
2021-11-10 22:07 ` [PATCH v7 39/45] x86/sev: add SEV-SNP feature detection/setup Brijesh Singh
2021-11-10 22:07 ` [PATCH v7 40/45] x86/sev: use firmware-validated CPUID for SEV-SNP guests Brijesh Singh
2021-11-10 22:07 ` [PATCH v7 41/45] x86/sev: Provide support for SNP guest request NAEs Brijesh Singh
2021-11-10 22:07 ` [PATCH v7 42/45] x86/sev: Register SNP guest request platform device Brijesh Singh
2021-11-10 22:07 ` [PATCH v7 43/45] virt: Add SEV-SNP guest driver Brijesh Singh
2021-11-10 22:27   ` Randy Dunlap
2021-11-11 19:27     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-11-11 22:57       ` Randy Dunlap
2021-11-17 23:34   ` Peter Gonda
2021-11-18 17:08     ` Peter Gonda
2021-11-18 17:32     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-11-19 16:16       ` Peter Gonda
2021-11-20  0:28         ` Brijesh Singh
2021-11-10 22:07 ` [PATCH v7 44/45] virt: sevguest: Add support to derive key Brijesh Singh
2021-11-18 16:43   ` Peter Gonda [this message]
2021-11-18 17:43     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-11-10 22:07 ` [PATCH v7 45/45] virt: sevguest: Add support to get extended report Brijesh Singh
2021-11-15 15:56 ` [PATCH v7 00/45] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) Guest Support Venu Busireddy
2021-11-15 16:02   ` Brijesh Singh
2021-11-15 16:37     ` Venu Busireddy
2021-11-15 16:45       ` Brijesh Singh
2021-11-15 16:55         ` Venu Busireddy
2021-11-16 15:45           ` Venu Busireddy
2021-11-16 16:03             ` Brijesh Singh

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