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From: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
To: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
	linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, linux-s390@vger.kernel.org,
	iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, platform-driver-x86@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-graphics-maintainer@vmware.com,
	amd-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org, dri-devel@lists.freedesktop.org,
	kexec@lists.infradead.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
	Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
	Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>, Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
	Sathyanarayanan Kuppuswamy 
	<sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com>,
	Tianyu Lan <Tianyu.Lan@microsoft.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>, Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 06/12] x86/sev: Replace occurrences of sev_active() with prot_guest_has()
Date: Tue, 17 Aug 2021 12:02:38 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <YRuJPqxFZ6ItZd++@zn.tnic> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <2b3a8fc4659f2e7617399cecdcca549e0fa1dcb7.1628873970.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>

On Fri, Aug 13, 2021 at 11:59:25AM -0500, Tom Lendacky wrote:
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c
> index 8e7b517ad738..66ff788b79c9 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c
> @@ -167,7 +167,7 @@ static int init_transition_pgtable(struct kimage *image, pgd_t *pgd)
>  	}
>  	pte = pte_offset_kernel(pmd, vaddr);
>  
> -	if (sev_active())
> +	if (prot_guest_has(PATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT))
>  		prot = PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC;
>  
>  	set_pte(pte, pfn_pte(paddr >> PAGE_SHIFT, prot));
> @@ -207,7 +207,7 @@ static int init_pgtable(struct kimage *image, unsigned long start_pgtable)
>  	level4p = (pgd_t *)__va(start_pgtable);
>  	clear_page(level4p);
>  
> -	if (sev_active()) {
> +	if (prot_guest_has(PATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT)) {
>  		info.page_flag   |= _PAGE_ENC;
>  		info.kernpg_flag |= _PAGE_ENC;
>  	}
> @@ -570,12 +570,12 @@ void arch_kexec_unprotect_crashkres(void)
>   */
>  int arch_kexec_post_alloc_pages(void *vaddr, unsigned int pages, gfp_t gfp)
>  {
> -	if (sev_active())
> +	if (!prot_guest_has(PATTR_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT))
>  		return 0;
>  
>  	/*
> -	 * If SME is active we need to be sure that kexec pages are
> -	 * not encrypted because when we boot to the new kernel the
> +	 * If host memory encryption is active we need to be sure that kexec
> +	 * pages are not encrypted because when we boot to the new kernel the
>  	 * pages won't be accessed encrypted (initially).
>  	 */

That hunk belongs logically into the previous patch which removes
sme_active().

>  	return set_memory_decrypted((unsigned long)vaddr, pages);
> @@ -583,12 +583,12 @@ int arch_kexec_post_alloc_pages(void *vaddr, unsigned int pages, gfp_t gfp)
>  
>  void arch_kexec_pre_free_pages(void *vaddr, unsigned int pages)
>  {
> -	if (sev_active())
> +	if (!prot_guest_has(PATTR_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT))
>  		return;
>  
>  	/*
> -	 * If SME is active we need to reset the pages back to being
> -	 * an encrypted mapping before freeing them.
> +	 * If host memory encryption is active we need to reset the pages back
> +	 * to being an encrypted mapping before freeing them.
>  	 */
>  	set_memory_encrypted((unsigned long)vaddr, pages);
>  }
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
> index e8ccab50ebf6..b69f5ac622d5 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
> @@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
>  #include <linux/pagemap.h>
>  #include <linux/swap.h>
>  #include <linux/rwsem.h>
> +#include <linux/protected_guest.h>
>  
>  #include <asm/apic.h>
>  #include <asm/perf_event.h>
> @@ -457,7 +458,7 @@ static int has_svm(void)
>  		return 0;
>  	}
>  
> -	if (sev_active()) {
> +	if (prot_guest_has(PATTR_SEV)) {
>  		pr_info("KVM is unsupported when running as an SEV guest\n");
>  		return 0;

Same question as for PATTR_SME. PATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT should be enough.

> @@ -373,7 +373,7 @@ int __init early_set_memory_encrypted(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long size)
>   * up under SME the trampoline area cannot be encrypted, whereas under SEV
>   * the trampoline area must be encrypted.
>   */
> -bool sev_active(void)
> +static bool sev_active(void)
>  {
>  	return sev_status & MSR_AMD64_SEV_ENABLED;
>  }
> @@ -382,7 +382,6 @@ static bool sme_active(void)
>  {
>  	return sme_me_mask && !sev_active();
>  }
> -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sev_active);

Just get rid of it altogether.

Thx.

-- 
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette

  reply	other threads:[~2021-08-17 10:02 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 45+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-08-13 16:59 [PATCH v2 00/12] Implement generic prot_guest_has() helper function Tom Lendacky
2021-08-13 16:59 ` [PATCH v2 01/12] x86/ioremap: Selectively build arch override encryption functions Tom Lendacky
2021-08-14 15:25   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-08-13 16:59 ` [PATCH v2 02/12] mm: Introduce a function to check for virtualization protection features Tom Lendacky
2021-08-13 17:19   ` Kuppuswamy, Sathyanarayanan
2021-08-14 18:32   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-08-14 18:49     ` Tom Lendacky
2021-08-19  9:46   ` Christoph Hellwig
2021-08-19 16:39     ` Tom Lendacky
2021-08-13 16:59 ` [PATCH v2 03/12] x86/sev: Add an x86 version of prot_guest_has() Tom Lendacky
2021-08-14 19:08   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-08-15 13:53     ` Tom Lendacky
2021-08-15 14:39       ` Borislav Petkov
2021-08-17 15:22         ` Tom Lendacky
2021-08-17 18:39           ` Borislav Petkov
2021-08-19  9:52   ` Christoph Hellwig
2021-08-19 17:26     ` Borislav Petkov
2021-08-19 18:33     ` Tom Lendacky
2021-08-19 19:57       ` Kuppuswamy, Sathyanarayanan
2021-08-24  7:14       ` Christoph Hellwig
2021-08-13 16:59 ` [PATCH v2 04/12] powerpc/pseries/svm: Add a powerpc " Tom Lendacky
2021-08-17  8:35   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-08-17 14:11     ` Tom Lendacky
2021-08-17 12:38   ` Michael Ellerman
2021-08-19  9:55   ` Christoph Hellwig
2021-08-19 18:34     ` Tom Lendacky
2021-08-13 16:59 ` [PATCH v2 05/12] x86/sme: Replace occurrences of sme_active() with prot_guest_has() Tom Lendacky
2021-08-17  9:00   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-08-17 14:46     ` Tom Lendacky
2021-08-17 18:41       ` Borislav Petkov
2021-08-13 16:59 ` [PATCH v2 06/12] x86/sev: Replace occurrences of sev_active() " Tom Lendacky
2021-08-17 10:02   ` Borislav Petkov [this message]
2021-08-17 15:26     ` Tom Lendacky
2021-08-17 18:43       ` Borislav Petkov
2021-08-13 16:59 ` [PATCH v2 07/12] x86/sev: Replace occurrences of sev_es_active() " Tom Lendacky
2021-08-17 10:06   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-08-13 16:59 ` [PATCH v2 08/12] treewide: Replace the use of mem_encrypt_active() " Tom Lendacky
2021-08-13 16:59 ` [PATCH v2 09/12] mm: Remove the now unused mem_encrypt_active() function Tom Lendacky
2021-08-17 10:22   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-08-17 10:24     ` Borislav Petkov
2021-08-17 15:30       ` Tom Lendacky
2021-08-13 16:59 ` [PATCH v2 10/12] x86/sev: " Tom Lendacky
2021-08-13 16:59 ` [PATCH v2 11/12] powerpc/pseries/svm: " Tom Lendacky
2021-08-13 16:59 ` [PATCH v2 12/12] s390/mm: " Tom Lendacky
2021-08-13 17:22 ` [PATCH v2 00/12] Implement generic prot_guest_has() helper function Tom Lendacky

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