From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-0.8 required=3.0 tests=HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS autolearn=no autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 20888C3A5A1 for ; Wed, 28 Aug 2019 12:03:10 +0000 (UTC) Received: from lists.gnu.org (lists.gnu.org [209.51.188.17]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id EB4712173E for ; Wed, 28 Aug 2019 12:03:09 +0000 (UTC) DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mail.kernel.org EB4712173E Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=none dis=none) header.from=redhat.com Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=qemu-devel-bounces+qemu-devel=archiver.kernel.org@nongnu.org Received: from localhost ([::1]:35518 helo=lists1p.gnu.org) by lists.gnu.org with esmtp (Exim 4.90_1) (envelope-from ) id 1i2wfN-0008Ne-34 for qemu-devel@archiver.kernel.org; Wed, 28 Aug 2019 08:03:09 -0400 Received: from eggs.gnu.org ([2001:470:142:3::10]:45313) by lists.gnu.org with esmtp (Exim 4.90_1) (envelope-from ) id 1i2wdn-0007vO-9l for qemu-devel@nongnu.org; Wed, 28 Aug 2019 08:01:36 -0400 Received: from Debian-exim by eggs.gnu.org with spam-scanned (Exim 4.71) (envelope-from ) id 1i2wdl-0000uT-8P for qemu-devel@nongnu.org; Wed, 28 Aug 2019 08:01:30 -0400 Received: from mx1.redhat.com ([209.132.183.28]:13779) by eggs.gnu.org with esmtps (TLS1.0:DHE_RSA_AES_256_CBC_SHA1:32) (Exim 4.71) (envelope-from ) id 1i2wdl-0000uC-1H for qemu-devel@nongnu.org; Wed, 28 Aug 2019 08:01:29 -0400 Received: from smtp.corp.redhat.com (int-mx04.intmail.prod.int.phx2.redhat.com [10.5.11.14]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mx1.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 4908946; Wed, 28 Aug 2019 12:01:28 +0000 (UTC) Received: from Igors-MacBook-Pro (ovpn-112-18.ams2.redhat.com [10.36.112.18]) by smtp.corp.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id D15915D9C9; Wed, 28 Aug 2019 12:01:24 +0000 (UTC) Date: Wed, 28 Aug 2019 14:01:21 +0200 From: Igor Mammedov To: Laszlo Ersek Message-ID: <20190828140121.6dba213c@Igors-MacBook-Pro> In-Reply-To: <805ab9fc-2d51-8768-8a11-bfc90d77a29f@redhat.com> References: <8091f6e8-b1ec-f017-1430-00b0255729f4@redhat.com> <2b4ba607-f0e3-efee-6712-6dcef129b310@redhat.com> <7f2d2f1e-2dd8-6914-c55e-61067e06b142@redhat.com> <3661c0c5-3da4-1453-a66a-3e4d4022e876@redhat.com> <74D8A39837DF1E4DA445A8C0B3885C503F76FDAF@shsmsx102.ccr.corp.intel.com> <20190827182307.0b5ce17b@redhat.com> <805ab9fc-2d51-8768-8a11-bfc90d77a29f@redhat.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 2.79 on 10.5.11.14 X-Greylist: Sender IP whitelisted, not delayed by milter-greylist-4.6.2 (mx1.redhat.com [10.5.110.71]); Wed, 28 Aug 2019 12:01:28 +0000 (UTC) X-detected-operating-system: by eggs.gnu.org: GNU/Linux 2.2.x-3.x [generic] X-Received-From: 209.132.183.28 Subject: Re: [Qemu-devel] [edk2-rfc] [edk2-devel] CPU hotplug using SMM with QEMU+OVMF X-BeenThere: qemu-devel@nongnu.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.23 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Cc: "Chen, Yingwen" , "devel@edk2.groups.io" , Phillip Goerl , qemu devel list , Alex Williamson , "Yao, Jiewen" , "Nakajima, Jun" , "Kinney, Michael D" , Paolo Bonzini , Boris Ostrovsky , "rfc@edk2.groups.io" , Joao Marcal Lemos Martins Errors-To: qemu-devel-bounces+qemu-devel=archiver.kernel.org@nongnu.org Sender: "Qemu-devel" On Tue, 27 Aug 2019 22:11:15 +0200 Laszlo Ersek wrote: > On 08/27/19 18:23, Igor Mammedov wrote: > > On Mon, 26 Aug 2019 17:30:43 +0200 > > Laszlo Ersek wrote: > >=20 > >> On 08/23/19 17:25, Kinney, Michael D wrote: > >>> Hi Jiewen, > >>> > >>> If a hot add CPU needs to run any code before the > >>> first SMI, I would recommend is only executes code > >>> from a write protected FLASH range without a stack > >>> and then wait for the first SMI. =20 > >> > >> "without a stack" looks very risky to me. Even if we manage to impleme= nt > >> the guest code initially, we'll be trapped without a stack, should we > >> ever need to add more complex stuff there. > >=20 > > Do we need anything complex in relocation handler, though? > > From what I'd imagine, minimum handler should > > 1: get address of TSEG, possibly read it from chipset >=20 > The TSEG base calculation is not trivial in this environment. The 32-bit > RAM size needs to be read from the CMOS (IO port accesses). Then the > extended TSEG size (if any) needs to be detected from PCI config space > (IO port accesses). Both CMOS and PCI config space requires IO port > writes too (not just reads). Even if there are enough registers for the > calculations, can we rely on these unprotected IO ports? >=20 > Also, can we switch to 32-bit mode without a stack? I assume it would be > necessary to switch to 32-bit mode for 32-bit arithmetic. from SDM vol 3: " 34.5.1 Initial SMM Execution Environment After saving the current context of the processor, the processor initialize= s its core registers to the values shown in Table 34-4. Upon entering SMM, = the PE and PG flags in control register CR0 are cleared, which places the p= rocessor in an environment similar to real-address mode. The differences be= tween the SMM execution environment and the real-address mode execution env= ironment are as follows: =E2=80=A2 The addressable address space ranges from 0 to FFFFFFFFH (4 GByte= s). =E2=80=A2 The normal 64-KByte segment limit for real-address mode is increa= sed to 4 GBytes. =E2=80=A2 The default operand and address sizes are set to 16 bits, which r= estricts the addressable SMRAM address space to the 1-MByte real-address mo= de limit for native real-address-mode code. However, operand-size and addre= ss-size override prefixes can be used to access the address space beyond ^^^^^^^^ the 1-MByte. " >=20 > Getting the initial APIC ID needs some CPUID instructions IIUC, which > clobber EAX through EDX, if I understand correctly. Given the register > pressure, CPUID might have to be one of the first instructions to call. we could map at 30000 not 64K required for save area but 128K and use 2nd half as secure RAM for stack and intermediate data. Firmware could put there pre-calculated pointer to TSEG after it's configur= ed and locked down, this way relocation handler won't have to figure out TSEG address on its ow= n. > > 2: calculate its new SMBASE offset based on its APIC ID > > 3: save new SMBASE > >=20 > >>> For this OVMF use case, is any CPU init required > >>> before the first SMI? =20 > >> > >> I expressed a preference for that too: "I wish we could simply wake the > >> new CPU [...] with an SMI". > >> > >> http://mid.mail-archive.com/398b3327-0820-95af-a34d-1a4a1d50cf35@redha= t.com > >> > >> > >>> From Paolo's list of steps are steps (8a) and (8b)=20 > >>> really required? =20 > >=20 > > 07b - implies 08b >=20 > I agree about that implication, yes. *If* we send an INIT/SIPI/SIPI to > the new CPU, then the new CPU needs a HLT loop, I think. It also could execute INIT reset, which leaves initialized SMM untouched but otherwise CPU would be inactive. =20 >=20 > > 8b could be trivial hlt loop and we most likely could skip 08a and s= ignaling host CPU steps > > but we need INIT/SIPI/SIPI sequence to wake up AP so it could handle= pending SMI > > before handling SIPI (so behavior would follow SDM). > >=20 > >=20 > >> See again my message linked above -- just after the quoted sentence, I > >> wrote, "IOW, if we could excise steps 07b, 08a, 08b". > >> > >> But, I obviously defer to Paolo and Igor on that. > >> > >> (I do believe we have a dilemma here. In QEMU, we probably prefer to > >> emulate physical hardware as faithfully as possible. However, we do not > >> have Cache-As-RAM (nor do we intend to, IIUC). Does that justify other > >> divergences from physical hardware too, such as waking just by virtue = of > >> an SMI?) > > So far we should be able to implement it per spec (at least SDM one), > > but we would still need to invent chipset hardware > > i.e. like adding to Q35 non exiting SMRAM and means to map/unmap it > > to non-SMM address space. > > (and I hope we could avoid adding "parked CPU" thingy) >=20 > I think we'll need a separate QEMU tree for this. I'm quite in the dark > -- I can't tell if I'll be able to do something in OVMF without actually > trying it. And for that, we'll need some proposed QEMU code that is > testable, but not upstream yet. (As I might realize that I'm unable to > make it work in OVMF.) Let me prepare a QEMU branch with something usable for you. To avoid inventing mgmt API for configuring SMRAM at 30000, I'm suggesting to steal/alias top or bottom 128K of TSEG window to 30000. This way OVMF would be able to set SMI relocation handler modifying TSEG and pass TSEG base/other data to it as well. Would it work for you or should we try more elaborate approach? =20 > >>> Can the SMI monarch use the Local > >>> APIC to send a directed SMI to the hot added CPU? > >>> The SMI monarch needs to know the APIC ID of the > >>> hot added CPU. Do we also need to handle the case > >>> where multiple CPUs are added at once? I think we > >>> would need to serialize the use of 3000:8000 for the > >>> SMM rebase operation on each hot added CPU. =20 > >> > >> I agree this would be a huge help. > >=20 > > We can serialize it (for normal hotplug flow) from ACPI handler > > in the guest (i.e. non enforced serialization). > > The only reason for serialization I see is not to allow > > a bunch of new CPU trample over default SMBASE save area > > at the same time. >=20 > If the default SMBASE area is corrupted due to concurrent access, could > that lead to invalid relocated SMBASE values? Possibly pointing into > normal RAM? in case of broadcast SMI (btw does OVMF use broadcast SMIs?) several CPUs c= ould end up with the same SMBASE within SMRAM 1: default one: in case the 2nd CPU enters SMM after the 1st CPU saved ne= w SMBASE but before it's called RSM 2: duplicated SMBASE: where the 2nd CPU saves its new SMBASE before the 1= st calls RSM while the 2nd could be counteracted with using locks, I don't see how 1st o= ne could be avoided. May be host CPU can send 2nd SMI so just relocated CPU could send an ACK fr= om relocated SMBASE/with new SMI handler? >=20 > Thanks > Laszlo