From: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>
To: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Cc: virtio-fs@redhat.com, rmohr@redhat.com, qemu-devel@nongnu.org,
vromanso@redhat.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH for-5.1 2/3] virtiofsd: add container-friendly -o chroot sandboxing option
Date: Thu, 23 Jul 2020 18:55:38 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200723175538.GW2621@work-vm> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200723123229.GK186372@stefanha-x1.localdomain>
* Stefan Hajnoczi (stefanha@redhat.com) wrote:
> On Wed, Jul 22, 2020 at 08:03:18PM +0100, Dr. David Alan Gilbert wrote:
> > * Stefan Hajnoczi (stefanha@redhat.com) wrote:
> > > + /*
> > > + * Make the shared directory the file system root so that FUSE_OPEN
> > > + * (lo_open()) cannot escape the shared directory by opening a symlink.
> > > + *
> > > + * It's still possible to escape the chroot via lo->proc_self_fd but that
> > > + * requires gaining control of the process first.
> > > + */
> > > + if (chroot(lo->source) != 0) {
> > > + fuse_log(FUSE_LOG_ERR, "chroot(\"%s\"): %m\n", lo->source);
> > > + exit(1);
> > > + }
> >
> > I'm seeing suggestions that you should drop CAP_SYS_CHROOT after
> > chroot'ing to stop an old escape (where you create another jail inside
> > the jail and the kernel then lets you walk outside of the old one).
>
> That's already the case:
>
> 1. setup_seccomp() blocks further chroot(2) calls.
> 2. setup_capabilities() drops CAP_SYS_CHROOT.
Ah yes; could you add a comment if you respin; it's not obvious that
the capability to chroot allows you to break out of an existing chroot
you're in.
Dave
> Stefan
--
Dr. David Alan Gilbert / dgilbert@redhat.com / Manchester, UK
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-07-23 17:57 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 24+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-07-22 13:02 [PATCH for-5.1 0/3] virtiofsd: allow virtiofsd to run in a container Stefan Hajnoczi
2020-07-22 13:02 ` [PATCH for-5.1 1/3] virtiofsd: drop CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH Stefan Hajnoczi
2020-07-22 16:51 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2020-07-22 13:02 ` [PATCH for-5.1 2/3] virtiofsd: add container-friendly -o chroot sandboxing option Stefan Hajnoczi
2020-07-22 16:58 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2020-07-23 12:17 ` Stefan Hajnoczi
2020-07-22 17:58 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2020-07-23 12:28 ` Stefan Hajnoczi
2020-07-23 13:47 ` [Virtio-fs] " Vivek Goyal
2020-07-23 15:36 ` Stefan Hajnoczi
2020-07-22 18:17 ` Vivek Goyal
2020-07-23 12:29 ` Stefan Hajnoczi
2020-07-22 19:03 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2020-07-23 12:32 ` Stefan Hajnoczi
2020-07-23 17:55 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert [this message]
2020-07-24 12:22 ` Stefan Hajnoczi
2020-07-22 13:02 ` [PATCH for-5.1 3/3] virtiofsd: probe unshare(CLONE_FS) and print an error Stefan Hajnoczi
2020-07-22 17:03 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2020-07-23 12:46 ` Stefan Hajnoczi
2020-07-23 12:50 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2020-07-23 13:56 ` [Virtio-fs] " Vivek Goyal
2020-07-23 15:19 ` Stefan Hajnoczi
2020-07-22 18:19 ` [Virtio-fs] [PATCH for-5.1 0/3] virtiofsd: allow virtiofsd to run in a container Vivek Goyal
2020-07-23 12:46 ` Stefan Hajnoczi
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